

Edw. Threlkeld A. M.
A N
I N Q U I R Y *2. 0.*

INTO THE *8411. m.*

ORIGINAL of our IDEAS

OF *Hutcheson (F.)*

BEAUTY *and* VIRTUE;

IN TWO TREATISES.

I. Concerning BEAUTY, ORDER,
HARMONY, DESIGN.

II. Concerning MORAL GOOD and
EVIL.

The Fourth Edition, Corrected.

Itaque eorum ipsorum quæ aspectu sentiuntur, nullum aliud animal pulchritudinem, venustatem, convenientiam partium sentit. Quam similitudinem natura ratioque ab oculis ad animum transferens, multo etiam magis pulchritudinem, constantiam, ordinem in consiliis, factisque conservandum putat. Quibus ex rebus conflatur & efficitur id quod quaerimus honestum: Quod etiam si nobilitatum non sit, tamen honestum sit: quodque etiam si à nullo laudetur, naturâ est laudabile. Formam quidem ipsam & tanquam faciem honesti vides, quæ si oculis cerneretur, mirabiles amores excitaret sapientix.

Cic. de Off. lib. 1. c. 4.

L O N D O N:

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M.DCC XXXVIII.





TO —

HIS EXCELLENCY

J O H N,

Lord CARTERET,

Lord Lieutenant of IRELAND.

May it please your Excellency,

WHEN I publish'd these
Papers, I had so lit-
tle Confidence of their Suc-
cess, that I was unwilling
to own them; and what I

was unwilling myself to own, I durst not presume to inscribe to any great Name.

YOUR Excellency's favourable Reception of them, soon put me out of all Fears about their Success with the wiser and better Part of the World; and since this has given me Assurance to own them, I humbly presume to inscribe them in this second Edition to your Excellency, that I may have at once an Opportunity of expressing the sincerest Gratitude for the Notice you were pleas'd to take of me, and have the Pleasure also of letting the World know, that this small Work has your Excellency's Approbation.

THE

D E D I C A T I O N. V

THE Praise bestow'd by
Persons of real Merit and
Discernment, is allow'd by all
to give a noble and rational
Pleasure. Your Excellency
first made me feel this in
the most lively manner; and
it will be a Pleasure as lasting
as it is great: 'twill ever
be matter of the highest
Joy and Satisfaction to me,
that I am Author of a Book
my LORD CARTERET ap-
proves.

I KNOW, my Lord, that
much of your Commendation
is to be attributed to your
own Humanity: You can in-
tirely approve the Works of
those alone, who can think
and

and speak on these Subjects as justly as Yourself; and that is what few, if any, even of those who spend their Lives in such Contemplations, are able to do. In the Conversation, with which your Excellency has been pleas'd to honour me, I could not, I own, without the utmost Surprize, observe so intimate an Acquaintance with the most valuable Writings of contemplative Men, Antient and Modern; so just a Taste of what is excellent in the ingenious Arts, in so young a Man, amidst the Hurry of an active Life. Forgive me, my Lord, that mention this Part of your Character: 'tis so uncommon, that
it

DEDICATION. vii

it deserves the highest Ad-
 miration; and 'tis the only one
 which an obscure Philosopher,
 who has receiv'd the greatest
 Obligations from your Excel-
 lency, can with any Propriety
 take notice of.

THOSE other great Endow-
 ments which have enabled
 You, even in Youth, to dis-
 charge the most difficult Em-
 ployments, with the highest
 Honour to Yourself, and Ad-
 vantage to your Country, I
 dare not presume to describe.
 He who attempts to do Justice
 to so great and good a Cha-
 racter, ought himself to be one
 of uncommon Merit and Di-
 stinction: And yet the ablest
 Pane-

viii DEDICATION.

Panegyrist would find it difficult to add any thing to your Excellency's Fame. The Voices of NATIONS proclaim your Worth. I am,

May it please your Excellency,

Your most obliged,

Most obedient, and

Most devoted humble Servant,

Dublin,
June 29.
1725.

Francis Hutcheson.

PREFACE.

On.

greatest and most lasting Pleasures, and not employ our Reason, after all our laborious Improvements of it, in trifling Pursuits. It is to be fear'd indeed, that most of our Studys, without this Inquiry, will be of very little Use to us; for they seem to have scarce any other Tendency than to lead us into Speculative Knowledge itself. Nor are we distinctly told how it is that Knowledge or Truth is pleasant to us.

THIS Consideration put the Author of the following Papers upon inquiring into the various Pleasures which Human Nature is capable of receiving. We shall generally find in our modern philosophick Writings, nothing farther on this Head, than some bare Division of them into Sensible, and Rational, and some trite Common-place Arguments to prove the latter more valuable than the former. Our sensible Pleasures are slightly pass'd over, and explain'd only by some Instances in Tastes, Smells, Sounds, or such-like, which Men of any tolerable Reflection generally look upon as very trifling

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trifling *Satisfactions*. Our rational Pleasures have had much the same kind of Treatment. We are seldom taught any other Notion of rational Pleasure than that which we have upon reflecting on our Possession or Claim to those Objects, which may be Occasions of Pleasure. Such Objects we call advantageous; but Advantage, or Interest, cannot be distinctly conceiv'd, till we know what those Pleasures are which advantageous Objects are apt to excite; and what Senses or Powers of Perception we have with respect to such Objects. We may perhaps find such an Inquiry of more Importance in Morals, to prove what we call the Reality of Virtue, or that it is the surest Happiness of the Agent, than one would at first imagine.

IN reflecting upon our external Senses, we plainly see, that our Perceptions of Pleasure or Pain do not depend directly on our Will. Objects do not please us, according as we incline they should. The Presence of some Objects necessarily pleases us, and

the Presence of others as necessarily displeases us. Nor can we, by our Will, any otherwise procure Pleasure, or avoid Pain, than by procuring the former kind of Objects, and avoiding the latter. By the very Frame of our Nature the one is made the Occasion of Delight, and the other of Dissatisfaction.

THE same Observation will hold in all our other Pleasures and Pains. For there are many other sorts of Objects, which please, or displease us as necessarily, as material Objects do when they operate upon our Organs of Sense. There is scarcely any Object which our Minds are employ'd about, which is not thus constituted the necessary Occasion of some Pleasure or Pain. Thus we find ourselves pleas'd with a regular Form, a Piece of Architecture or Painting, a Composition of Notes, a Theorem, an Action, an Affection, a Character. And we are conscious that this Pleasure necessarily arises from the Contemplation of the Idea, which is then present
to

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to our Minds, with all its Circumstances, altho' some of these Ideas have nothing of what we commonly call sensible Perception in them; and in those which have, the Pleasure arises from some Uniformity, Order, Arrangement, Imitation; and not from the simple Ideas of Colour, or Sound, or Mode of Extension separately consider'd.

THESE Determinations to be pleas'd with any Forms, or Ideas which occur to our Observation, the Author chooses to call SENSES; distinguishing them from the Powers which commonly go by that Name, by calling our Power of perceiving the Beauty of Regularity, Order, Harmony, an INTERNAL SENSE; and that Determination to approve Affections, Actions, or Characters of rational Agents, which we call virtuous, he marks by the Name of a MORAL SENSE.

HIS principal Design is to shew,
 " That Human Nature was not left
 " quite indifferent in the Affair of
 " Virtue, to form to itself Observa-
 " tions

“ tions concerning the Advantage, or
 “ Disadvantage of *Actions*, and accord-
 “ ingly to regulate its Conduct.” The
Weakness of our Reason, and the Avoca-
tions arising from the Infirmities
and Necessitys of our Nature, are so
great, that very few Men could ever
have form'd those long Deductions of
Reason, which shew some Actions to
be in the whole advantageous to the
Agent, and their Contrarys pernicious.
The AUTHOR of Nature has much
better furnish'd us for a virtuous Con-
duct, than our Moralists seem to ima-
gine, by almost as quick and powerful
Instructions, as we have for the Pre-
servation of our Bodys. He has given
us strong Affections to be the Springs
of each virtuous Action; and made
Virtue a lovely Form, that we might
easily distinguish it from its Contrary,
and be made happy by the Pursuit of
it.

THIS Moral Sense of Beauty in
Actions and Affections, may appear
strange at first View. Some of our
Moralists themselves are offended at it
 in

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in my Lord SHAFTESBURY; so much are they accustomed to deduce every Approbation, or Aversion, from rational Views of private Interest, except it be merely in the Simple Ideas of the external Senses) and have such a Horror at innate Ideas, which they imagine this borders upon. But this moral Sense has no relation to innate Ideas, as will appear in the second Treatise.

OUR Gentlemen of good Taste, can tell us of a great many Senses, Tastes, and Relishes for Beauty, Harmony, Imitation in Painting and Poetry; and may not we find too in Mankind a Relish for a Beauty in Characters, in Manners? It will perhaps be found, that the greater Part of the Ingenious Arts are calculated to please some Natural Powers, pretty different either from what we commonly call Reason, or the External Senses.

IN the first Treatise, the Author perhaps in some Instances has gone too far, in supposing a greater Agreement

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of

of Mankind in their Sense of Beauty, than Experience will confirm; but all he is solicitous about is to shew, " That
" there is some Sense of Beauty natural
" to Men; that we find as great an
" Agreement of Men in their Relishes
" of Forms, as in their external
" Senses, which all agree to be natural;
" and that Pleasure or Pain,
" Delight or Aversion, are naturally
" join'd to their Perceptions." If the Reader be convinc'd of this, it will be no difficult matter to apprehend another superior Sense, natural also to Men, determining them to be pleas'd with Actions, Characters, Affections. This is the moral Sense, which makes the Subject of the second Treatise.

T H E proper Occasions of Perception by the external Senses, occur to us as soon as we come into the World; whence perhaps we easily look upon these Senses to be natural: but the Objects of the superior Senses of Beauty and Virtue generally do not. It is probably some little time before Children

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children reflect, or at least let us know that they reflect upon Proportion and Similitude; upon Affections, Characters, Tempers; or come to know the external Actions which are Evidences of them. Hence we imagine that their Sense of Beauty, and their moral Sentiments of Actions, must be entirely owing to Instruction and Education; whereas it is as easy to conceive, how a Character, a Temper, as soon as they are observ'd, may be constituted by NATURE the necessary Occasion of Pleasure, or an Object of Approbation, as a Taste or a Sound; tho' these Objects present themselves to our Observation sooner than the other.

THE first Impression of these Papers was so well receiv'd, that the Author hopes it will be no Offence to any who are concern'd in the Memory of the late Lord Viscount MOLESWORTH, if he lets his Readers know that he was the Noble Person mention'd in the Preface to the first Edition, and that their being publish'd was owing to his
Appro-

*Approbation of them. It was from him he had that shrewd Objection, which the Reader may find in the first Treatise *; besides many other Remarks in the frequent Conversations with which he honour'd the Author; by which that Treatise was very much improv'd beyond what it was in the Draught presented to him. The Author retains the most grateful Sense of his singular Civilities, and of the Pleasure and Improvement he receiv'd in his Conversation; and is still fond of expressing his grateful Remembrance of him: but,*

Id cinerem, & Manes credas curare sepultos?

TO be concern'd in this Book can be no Honour to a Person so justly celebrated for the most generous Sentiments of Virtue and Religion, deliver'd with the most manly Eloquence: yet it would not be just toward the World, should the Author conceal his Obliga-

** Sect. 5. Art. 2. the last Paragraph.*

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tions to the Reverend Mr. EDWARD SYNG; not only for revising these Papers, when they stood in great need of an accurate Review, but for suggesting several just Amendments in the general Scheme of Morality. The Author was much confirm'd in his Opinion of the Justness of these Thoughts, upon finding that this Gentleman had fallen into the same way of Thinking before him; and will ever look upon his Friendship as one of the greatest Advantages and Pleasures of his Life.

TO recommend the Lord SHAFTESBURY'S Writings to the World, is a very needless Attempt. They will be esteem'd while any Reflection remains among Men. It is indeed to be wish'd, that he had abstain'd from mixing with such Noble Performances, some Prejudices he had receiv'd against Christianity; a Religion which gives us the truest Idea of Virtue, and recommends the Love of GOD, and of MANKIND, as the Sum of all true Religion. How would it have moved
the

the Indignation of that ingenious Nobleman, to have found a dissolute Set of Men, who relish nothing in Life but the lowest and most sordid Pleasures, searching into his Writings for those Insinuations against Christianity, that they might be the less restrained from their Debaucherys; when at the same time their low Minds are incapable of relishing those noble Sentiments of Virtue and Honour, which he has placed in so lovely a Light!

WHATEVER Faults the Ingenious may find with this Performance, the Author hopes no body will find any thing in it contrary to Religion, or good Manners: and he shall be well pleased, if he gives the learned World an Occasion of examining more thoroughly these Subjects, which are, he presumes, of very considerable Importance. The chief Ground of his Assurance that his Opinions in the main are just, is this, That as he took the first Hints of them from some of the greatest Writers of Antiquity, so the more he has convers'd
with

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with them, he finds his Illustrations the more conformable to their Sentiments.

I N the later Editions, what Alterations are made, are partly owing to the Objections of some Gentlemen, who wrote very keenly against several Principles in this Book. The Author was convinc'd of some inaccurate Expressions, which are now alter'd; and some Arguments, he hopes, are now made clearer: but he has not yet seen Cause to renounce any of the Principles maintain'd in it. Nor is there any thing of Consequence added, except in Sect. II. of Treatise 2d; and the same Reasoning is found in Sect. I. of the Essay on the Passions.

I N this 4th Edition there are Additions interspersed, to prevent Objections which have been published against this Scheme by several Authors; and some Mathematical Expressions are left out, which, upon second Thoughts, appear'd useless, and were disagreeable to some Readers.

THE

THE REFLECTOR

1. The first part of the document is a list of names and titles, including "The Hon. Mr. Justice" and "The Hon. Mr. Justice".

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1875

THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO

1906

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This image shows a blank, aged, cream-colored page, likely an endpaper or flyleaf of a book. The paper has a slightly textured appearance with some minor discoloration and a small dark spot near the top center. A faint vertical crease is visible running down the middle of the page.

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INQUIRY

INTO THE
Original of our IDEAS

OF
BEAUTY and VIRTUE.

TREATISE I.
Of Beauty, Order, Harmony, Design.

SECT. I.
Concerning some Powers of Perception, distinct from what is generally understood by Sensation.

TO make the following Observations understood, it may be necessary to premise some *Definitions*, and *Observations*, either universally acknowledg'd, or sufficiently prov'd by many Writers both antient and modern, concerning our Perceptions called *Sensations*, and the Actions of the Mind consequent upon them.

Art. I. THOSE *Ideas* which are rais'd in the Mind upon the Presence of external Objects,

Sensation.

2 *An Inquiry concerning Beauty,*

Sect. I. *jects*, and their acting upon our Bodys, are call'd *Sensations*. We find that the Mind in such Cases is passive, and has not Power directly to prevent the Perception or Idea, or to vary it at its Reception, as long as we continue our Bodys in a State fit to be acted upon by the external Object.

*Different
Senses.*


II. W H E N two Perceptions are intirely different from each other, or agree in nothing but the general Idea of *Sensation*, we call the Powers of receiving those different Perceptions, *different Senses*. Thus *Seeing* and *Hearing* denote the different Powers of receiving the Ideas of Colours and Sounds. And altho' Colours have great Differences among themselves, as also have Sounds; yet there is a greater Agreement among the most opposite Colours, than between any Colour and a Sound: Hence we call all Colours Perceptions of the same Sense. All the several Senses seem to have their distinct Organs, except *Feeling*, which is in some degree diffus'd over the whole Body.

*The Mind
how active.*

III. T H E Mind has a Power of *compound-
ing* Ideas, which were receiv'd separately; of *comparing* Objects by means of the Ideas, and of observing their *Relations* and *Proportions*; of *enlarging* and *diminishing* its Ideas at Pleasure, or in any certain *Ratio*, or Degree; and of considering *separately* each of the simple Ideas, which might per-
haps

Order, Harmony, and Design.

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haps have been impress'd jointly in the Sen- Sect. I.
sation. This last Operation we commonly 
call *Abstraction*.

IV. THE Ideas of *Substances* are com- *Substances.*
pounded of the various simple Ideas jointly
impress'd, when they presented themselves
to our Senses. We define Substances only
by enumerating these sensible Ideas. And
such Definitions may raise an Idea clear
enough of the Substance in the Mind of one
who never immediately perceiv'd the Sub-
stance; provided he has separately receiv'd
by his Senses all the simple Ideas which are
in the Composition of the complex one of
the Substance defin'd: But if there be any
simple Ideas which he has not receiv'd, or
if he wants any of the *Senses* necessary for
the Perception of them, no Definition can
raise any simple Idea which has not been
before perceiv'd by the *Senses*.

V. HENCE it follows, "That when *In- Education.*
struction, Education, or Prejudice of any *Instruction.*
" kind, raise any Desire or Aversion toward
" an Object, this Desire or Aversion must
" be founded upon an Opinion of some
" Perfection, or of some Deficiency in those
" *Qualitys*, for Perception of which we
" have the proper Senses." Thus, if *Beauty*
be desir'd by one who has not the Sense of
Sight, the Desire must be rais'd by some
apprehended Regularity of *Figure, Sweet-*
ness

Sect. I. *ness of Voice, Smoothness, or Softness, or some other Quality perceivable by the other Senses, without relation to the Ideas of Colour.*

*Pleasure,
Pain.*

VI. MANY of our sensitive Perceptions are pleasant and many painful, immediately, and that without any Knowledge of the Cause of this Pleasure or Pain, or how the Objects excite it, or are the Occasions of it; or without seeing to what farther Advantage or Detriment the Use of such Objects might tend: Nor would the most accurate Knowledge of these things vary either the Pleasure or Pain of the Perception, however it might give a rational Pleasure distinct from the sensible; or might raise a distinct Joy, from a Prospect of farther Advantage in the Object, or Aversion, from an Apprehension of Evil.

*Different
Ideas.*

VII. THE *simple Ideas* rais'd in different Persons by the same Object, are probably some way different, when they disagree in their Approbation or Dislike; and in the same Person, when his *Fancy* at one time differs from what it was at another. This will appear from reflecting on those Objects, to which we have now an Aversion, tho' they were formerly agreeable: And we shall generally find that there is some accidental *Conjunction* of a disagreeable Idea, which always recurs with the Object; as in those Wines to which Men acquire an Aversion,

Order, Harmony, and Design.

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Aversion, after they have taken them in an Emetick Preparation, we are conscious that the *Idea* is alter'd from what it was when that Wine was agreeable, by the Conjunction of the Ideas of Loathing and Sickness of Stomach. The like Change of *Idea* may be insensibly made by the Change of our Bodys as we advance in Years, or when we are accustomed to any Object, which may occasion an Indifference toward Meats we were fond of in our Childhood; and may make some Objects cease to raise the disagreeable Ideas, which they excited upon our first use of them. Many of our simple Perceptions are disagreeable only thro' the too great *Intenseness* of the Quality: thus moderate Light is agreeable, very strong Light may be painful; moderate Bitter may be pleasant, a higher Degree may be offensive. A Change in our Organs will necessarily occasion a Change in the *Intenseness* of the Perception at least; nay, sometimes will occasion a quite contrary Perception: Thus a warm Hand shall feel that Water cold, which a cold Hand shall feel warm.

WE shall not find it perhaps so easy to account for the Diversity of Fancy about more *complex Ideas* of Objects, in which we regard many Ideas of different Senses at once; as some Perceptions of those call'd *primary Qualities*, and some *secondary*, as explain'd by Mr. LOCKE: for instance,

Sect. 1. in the different Fancys about *Architecture*,
 ~~~~~ *Gardening*, *Dress*. Of the two former we  
 shall offer something in Sect. VI. As to  
*Dress*, we may generally account for the  
 Diversity of Fancys from a like Conjunction  
 of Ideas: Thus, if either from any thing  
 in Nature, or from the Opinion of our  
 Country or Acquaintance, the fancying of  
*glaring Colours* be look'd upon as an Evi-  
 dence of Levity, or of any other evil Qua-  
 lity of Mind; or if any *Colour or Fashion* be  
 commonly us'd by Rusticks, or by Men of  
 any disagreeable Profession, Employment,  
 or Temper; these additional Ideas may re-  
 cur constantly with that of the *Colour* or  
*Fashion*, and cause a constant Dislike to  
 them in those who join the additional Ideas,  
 altho' the Colour or Form be no way dis-  
 agreeable of themselves, and actually do  
 please others who join no such Ideas to  
 them. But there does not seem to be any  
 Ground to believe such a Diversity in hu-  
 man Minds, as that the same simple Idea  
 or Perception should give Pleasure to one  
 and Pain to another, or to the same Person  
 at different times; not to say that it seems  
 a Contradiction, that the same simple Idea  
 should do so.

*Complex  
 Ideas.*

VIII. THE only Pleasure of Sense, which  
 many Philosophers seem to consider, is that  
 which accompanys the simple Ideas of Sen-  
 sation: But there are far greater Pleasures  
 in



## Order, Harmony, and Design.

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in those complex Ideas of Objects, which Sect. 1. obtain the Names of *Beautiful, Regular, Harmonious*. Thus every one acknowledges he is more delighted with a fine Face, a just Picture, than with the View of any one Colour, were it as strong and lively as possible; and more pleas'd with a Prospect of the Sun arising among settled Clouds, and colouring their Edges, with a starry Hemisphere, a fine Landskip, a regular Building, than with a clear blue Sky, a smooth Sea, or a large open Plain, not diversified by Woods, Hills, Waters, Buildings: And yet even these latter Appearances are not quite *simple*. So in Musick, the Pleasure of *fine Composition* is incomparably greater than that of any one Note, how sweet, full, or swelling soever.

IX. LET it be observ'd, that in the following Papers,, the Word *Beauty* is taken for *the Idea rais'd in us*, and a *Sense* of Beauty for *our Power of receiving this Idea*. *Harmony* also denotes *our pleasant Ideas arising from Composition of Sounds*, and a good Ear (as it is generally taken) a *Power of perceiving this Pleasure*. In the following Sections, an Attempt is made to discover " what is the *immediate Occasion* of these " pleasant Ideas, or what real Quality in the Objects ordinarily excites them."

B 4

X. It

Sect. 1. X. IT is of no Consequence whether we  
 call these Ideas of *Beauty* and *Harmony*,  
 Perceptions of the *External Senses* of See-  
 ing and Hearing, or not. I should rather  
 choose to call our Power of perceiving these  
 Ideas, an INTERNAL SENSE, were it on-  
 ly for the Convenience of distinguishing them  
 from other Sensations of Seeing and Hear-  
 ing, which Men may have without Percep-  
 tion of *Beauty* and *Harmony*. It is plain  
 from Experience, that many Men have, in  
 the common Meaning, the Senses of See-  
 ing and Hearing perfect enough; they per-  
 ceive all the *simple Ideas* separately, and  
 have their Pleasures; they distinguish them  
 from each other, such as one Colour from  
 another, either quite different, or the stronger  
 or fainter of the same Colour, when they  
 are plac'd beside each other, altho' they may  
 often confound their *Names* when they oc-  
 cur apart from each other, as some do the  
 Names of *Green* and *Blue*: they can tell  
 in separate Notes the *higher*, *lower*,  
*sharper* or *flatter*, when separately sounded;  
 in Figures they discern the *Length*, *Breadth*,  
*Wideness* of each Line, Surface, Angle;  
 and may be as capable of hearing and see-  
 ing at great Distances as any Men whatso-  
 ever: And yet perhaps they shall find no  
 Pleasure in Musical Compositions, in Paint-  
 ing, Architecture, natural Landskip; or but  
 a very weak one in comparison of what  
 others

others enjoy from the same Objects. This Sect. 1.  
greater Capacity of receiving such pleasant Ideas we commonly call a *fine Genius* or *Taste*:  
In Musick we seem universally to acknowledge something like a distinct Sense from the External one of Hearing, and call it a *good Ear*; and the like Distinction we should probably acknowledge in other Objects, had we also got distinct Names to denote these *Powers* of Perception by.


XI. WE generally imagine the brute Animals endowed with the same sort of Powers of Perception as our *External Senses*, and having sometimes greater Acuteness in them: but we conceive few or none of them with any of these sublimer Powers of Perception here call'd *Internal Senses*; or at least if some of them have them, it is in a Degree much inferior to ours.

THERE will appear another Reason perhaps hereafter, for calling this Power of perceiving the Ideas of *Beauty*, an *Internal Sense*, from this, that in some other Affairs, where our *External Senses* are not much concern'd, we discern a sort of Beauty, very like, in many Respects, to that observ'd in sensible Objects, and accompany'd with like Pleasure: Such is that *Beauty* perceiv'd in *Theorems*, or universal Truths, in *general Causes*, and in some *extensive Principles* of Action.

XII. LET



Sect. I.



XII. LET one consider, first, That 'tis probable a Being may have the full Power of External Sensation, which we enjoy, so as to perceive each Colour, Line, Surface, as we do; yet, without the Power of *comparing*, or of discerning the *Similitudes* or Proportions: Again, It might discern these also, and yet have no *Pleasure* or Delight accompanying these Perceptions. The bare Idea of the Form is something separable from Pleasure, as may appear from the different *Tastes* of Men about the Beauty of Forms, where we don't imagine that they differ in any Ideas, either of the Primary or Secondary Qualities. *Similitude*, *Proportion*, *Analogy*, or *Equality* of Proportion, are Objects of the Understanding, and must be actually known before we know the natural Causes of our Pleasure. But *Pleasure* perhaps is not necessarily connected with the Perception of them; and may be felt where the Proportion is not known or attended to: and may not be felt where the Proportion is observed. Since then there are such different Powers of Perception, where what are commonly called the *External Senses* are the same; since the most accurate Knowledge of what the External Senses discover, may often not give the Pleasure of Beauty or Harmony, which yet one of a *good Taste* will enjoy at once without much *Knowledge*; we may justly use another Name for these higher and more delightful Perceptions

tions

## Order, Harmony, and Design.

11

tions of Beauty and Harmony, and call the Sect. 1.  
*Power* of receiving such Impressions, an *Internal Sense*: The Difference of the Perceptions seems sufficient to vindicate the Use of a different Name, especially when we are told in what Meaning the Word is applied.

THIS superior Power of Perception is *Its Pleasures necessary and immediate.* justly called a *Sense*, because of its Affinity to the other Senses in this, that the Pleasure is different from any *Knowledge* of Principles, Proportions, Causes, or of the Usefulness of the Object; we are struck at the first with the Beauty: nor does the most accurate *Knowledge* increase this Pleasure of Beauty, however it may superadd a distinct rational Pleasure from Prospects of *Advantage*, or may bring along that peculiar kind of Pleasure, which attends the Increase of Knowledge \*.

XIII. AND farther, the Ideas of Beauty and Harmony, like other sensible Ideas, are *necessarily* pleasant to us, as well as immediately so; neither can any Resolution of our own, nor any *Prospect* of Advantage or Disadvantage, vary the Beauty or Deformity of an Object: For as in the external Sensations, no View of *Interest* will make an Object grateful, nor View of *Detriment*, distinct from immediate *Pain* in the Perception, make it disagreeable to the Sense; so propose

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\* See above, Art. 6.

Sect. 1. the whole World as a *Reward*, or *threaten*  
 the greatest Evil, to make us approve a de-  
 form'd Object, or disapprove a beautiful one;  
 Dissimulation may be procur'd by Rewards  
 or Threatnings, or we may in external Con-  
 duct abstain from any *Pursuit* of the Beau-  
 tiful, and pursue the Deform'd; but our *Sen-*  
*timents* of the Forms, and our *Perceptions*,  
 would continue invariably the same.

*This Sense  
 antecedent  
 to, and di-  
 stinct from  
 Prospects of  
 Interest.*

XIV. HENCE it plainly appears, " that  
 some Objects are *immediately* the Occasions  
 of this Pleasure of Beauty, and that we  
 have Senses fitted for perceiving it; and  
 that it is distinct from that Joy which  
 arises upon Prospect of Advantage." Nay,  
 do not we often see Convenience and Use  
 neglected to obtain Beauty, without any other  
 Prospect of *Advantage* in the beautiful Form,  
 than the suggesting the pleasant Ideas of  
 Beauty? Now this shews us, that however  
 we may *pursue* beautiful Objects from Self-  
 love, with a View to obtain the Pleasures of  
 Beauty, as in Architecture, Gardening, and  
 many other Affairs; yet there must be a *Sense*  
 of Beauty, antecedent to Prospects even of this  
 Advantage, without which Sense these Ob-  
 jects would not be thus *advantageous*, nor ex-  
 cite in us this Pleasure which constitutes them  
 advantageous. Our *Sense* of Beauty from  
 Objects, by which they are constituted good  
 to us, is very distinct from our *Desire* of them  
 when they are thus constituted: Our *Desire*  
 of



of Beauty may be counter-balanc'd by Rewards or Threatnings, but never our *Sense* of it; even as Fear of Death may make us desire a bitter Potion, or neglect those Meats which the *Sense* of Taste would recommend as pleasant; but cannot make that Potion agreeable to the *Sense*, or Meat disagreeable to it, which was not so antecedently to this Prospect. The same holds true of the *Sense* of Beauty and Harmony; that the *Pursuit* of such Objects is frequently neglected, from Prospects of Advantage, Aversion to Labour, or any other Motive of Interest, does not prove that we have no *Sense* of Beauty, but only that our Desire of it may be counter-balanc'd by a stronger Desire.

XV. HAD we no such *Sense* of Beauty and Harmony, Houses, Gardens, Dress, Equipage, might have been recommended to us as convenient, fruitful, warm, easy; but never as *beautiful*: And yet nothing is more certain, than that all these Objects are recommended under quite different *Views* on many Occasions: 'Tis true, what chiefly pleases in the Countenance, are the Indications of *Moral Dispositions*; and yet were we by the longest Acquaintance fully convinc'd of the best Moral Dispositions in any Person, with that Countenance we now think deform'd, this would never hinder our immediate Dislike of the Form, or our liking other Forms more: And Custom, Education, or Example, could

Sect. 1. could never give us *Perceptions* distinct from those of the Senses which we had the Use of before, or recommend Objects under another *Conception* than grateful to \* them. But of the Influence of Custom, Education, Example, upon the Sense of Beauty, we shall treat below †.

Beauty  
Original  
or Compa-  
rative.

XVI. BEAUTY, in Corporeal Forms, is either *Original* or *Comparative*; or, if any like the Terms better, *Absolute*, or *Relative*: Only let it be observ'd, that by *Absolute* or *Original* Beauty, is not understood any Quality suppos'd to be in the Object, which should of itself be beautiful, without relation to any Mind which perceives it: For Beauty, like other Names of sensible Ideas, properly denotes the *Perception* of some Mind; so *Cold*, *Hot*, *Sweet*, *Bitter*, denote the Sensations in our Minds, to which perhaps there is no Resemblance in the Objects, which excite these Ideas in us, however we generally imagine otherwise. The Ideas of Beauty and Harmony being excited upon our *Perception* of some *primary Quality*, and having relation to *Figure* and *Time*, may indeed have a nearer Resemblance to Objects, than these Sensations, which seem not so much any *Pictures* of Objects, as *Modifications* of the perceiving Mind; and yet were there no Mind with a *Sense* of Beauty to

\* See Art. 5.

† Sect. 7.

## Order, Harmony, and Design.

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
contemplate Objects, I see not how they Sect. 1.  
could be call'd *Beautiful*. We therefore by  
*Absolute* Beauty understand only that Beauty  
which we perceive in Objects without *Com-*  
*parison* to any thing external, of which the  
Object is suppos'd an Imitation, or Picture;  
such as that Beauty perceiv'd from the *Works*  
of Nature, *artificial Forms, Figures.* *Com-*  
*parative* or *Relative* Beauty is that which we  
perceive in Objects, commonly considered as  
*Imitations* or *Resemblances* of something else.  
These two Kinds of Beauty employ the three  
following Sections.

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\* This Division of Beauty is taken from the different Foun-  
dations of Pleasure to our Sense of it, rather than from the Ob-  
jects themselves: for most of the following Instances of *relative*  
Beauty have also *absolute* Beauty; and many of the Instances of  
*absolute* Beauty, have also *relative* Beauty in some respect or other.  
But we may distinctly consider these two Fountains of Pleasure,  
Uniformity in the Object itself, and Resemblance to some Ori-  
ginal.

S E C T.





## S E C T. II.

## Of Original or Absolute Beauty.

*Sense of  
Men.*

I. **S**INCE it is certain that we have *Idea* of Beauty and Harmony, let us examine what *Quality* in Objects excites these Ideas, or is the Occasion of them. And let it be here observ'd, that our Inquiry is only about the *Qualities* which are beautiful to *Men*; or about the Foundation of their *Sense* of Beauty: for, as was above hinted, Beauty has always relation to the *Sense* of some Mind; and when we afterwards shew how generally the Objects which occur to us are *beautiful*, we mean, that such Objects are agreeable to the *Sense* of *Men*: for there are many Objects which seem no way beautiful to Men, and yet other *Animals* seem delighted with them; they may have *Senses* otherwise constituted than those of Men, and may have the Ideas of Beauty excited by Objects of a quite different Form. We see Animals fitted for every Place; and what to Men appears rude and shapeless, or loathsome, may be to them a *Paradise*.

II. **T**HAT we may more distinctly discover the general *Foundation* or Occasion of the Ideas of Beauty among Men, it will be  
neces-

## Order, Harmony, and Design. 17

necessary to consider it first in its *simpler* Sect. 2.  
Kinds, such as occurs to us in regular Fi-  
gures; and we may perhaps find that the  
same Foundation extends to all the more  
complex Species of it.

III. THE Figures which excite in us the <sup>Uniformity</sup>  
Ideas of Beauty, seem to be those in which <sup>with Va-</sup>  
there is *Uniformity amidst Variety*. There  
are many Conceptions of Objects which are  
agreeable upon other accounts, such as *Gran-*  
*deur, Novelty, Sanctity*, and some others,  
which shall be mention'd hereafter\*. But  
what we call Beautiful in Objects, to speak  
in the Mathematical Style, seems to be in  
a compound *Ratio* of *Uniformity* and *Va-*  
*riety*: so that where the *Uniformity* of Bodys  
is equal, the Beauty is as the *Variety*; and  
where the *Variety* is equal, the Beauty is as  
the *Uniformity*. This will be plain from  
Examples.

FIRST, the *Variety* increases the Beauty <sup>Variety</sup>  
in equal *Uniformity*. The Beauty of an  
*equilateral Triangle* is less than that of the  
*Square*; which is less than that of a *Penta-*  
*gon*; and this again is surpass'd by the *Hex-*  
*agon*. When indeed the Number of Sides is  
much increas'd, the Proportion of them to  
the *Radius*, or *Diameter* of the Figure, or  
of the *Circle*, to which regular *Polygons* have

\* See Sect. vi. Art. 11, 12, 13.

18. *An Inquiry concerning Beauty,*

Sect. 2. an obvious Relation, is so much lost to our  
 ~~~~~ Observation, that the Beauty does not al-  
 ways increase with the Number of Sides,
 and the want of Parallelism in the Sides of
Heptagons, and other Figures of odd Num-
 bers, may also diminish their Beauty.
 So in *Solids*, the *Eicosiedron* surpasses the
Dodecaedron, and this the *Octaedron*, which
 is still more beautiful than the *Cube*; and
 this again surpasses the regular *Pyramid*.
 The obvious Ground of this, is greater *Va-*
riety with equal *Uniformity*.

Uniformity.

THE greater *Uniformity* increases the
Beauty amidst equal *Variety*, in these In-
 stances: An Equilateral *Triangle*, or even
 an *Isofceles*, surpasses the *Scalenum*: A
Square surpasses the *Rhombus* or *Lozenge*,
 and this again the *Rhomboides*, which is
 still more beautiful than the *Trapezium*, or
 any Figure with irregular curve Sides.
 So the *regular Solids* surpass all other Solids
 of equal number of plain Surfaces: And the
 same is observable not only in the Five per-
 fectly *regular Solids*, but in all those
 which have any considerable *Uniformity*,
 as *Cylinders*, *Prisms*, *Pyramids*, *Obelisks*;
 which please every Eye more than any rude
 Figures, where there is no *Unity* or Resem-
 blance among the Parts.

Compound
Ratio.


INSTANCES of the compound *Ratio*
 we have in comparing *Circles* or *Spheres*,
 with

with *Ellipses* or *Spheroides* not very *eccen-* Sect. 2.
tric; and in comparing the *compound* So-
 lids, the *Exoctaedron*, and *Eicofidodecaedron*,
 with the perfectly *regular* ones of which
 they are compounded: and we shall find,
 that the want of that most perfect *Unifor-*
mity observable in the latter, is compensated
 by the greater *Variety* in the former, so
 that the *Beauty* is nearly equal.

IV. THESE Observations would proba-
 bly hold true for the most part, and might
 be confirm'd by the Judgment of Children
 in the *simpler* Figures, where the *Variety* is
 not too great for their Comprehension.
 And however uncertain some of the particu-
 lar aforesaid Instances may seem, yet this is
 perpetually to be observ'd, that Children
 are fond of all *regular* Figures in their little
 Diversions, altho' they be no more conve-
 nient, or useful for them, than the Figures
 of our common Pebbles: We see how early
 they discover a *Taste* or Sense of *Beauty*, in
 desiring to see Buildings, regular Gardens,
 or even Representations of them in Pictures
 of any kind.

V. THE same Foundation we have for *Beauty of*
 our Sense of *Beauty*, in the Works of NA- *Nature.*
 TURE. In every Part of the World which
 we call *Beautiful*, there is a surprizing
Uniformity amidst an almost infinite *Va-*
riety. Many Parts of the Universe seem not

20 *An Inquiry concerning Beauty,*

Se&t. 2. at all design'd for the Use of Man ; nay, it  is but a very small Spot with which we have any Acquaintance. The *Figures* and *Motions* of the great Bodys are not obvious to our Senses, but found out by Reasoning and Reflection, upon many long Observations: and yet as far as we can by Sense discover, or by *Reasoning* enlarge our Knowledge, and extend our Imagination, we generally find their Structure, Order, and Motion, agreeable to our Sense of *Beauty*. Every particular Object in *Nature* does not indeed appear *beautiful* to us ; but there is a great Profusion of *Beauty* over most of the Objects which occur either to our Senses, or Reasonings upon Observation: For, not to mention the apparent Situation of the heavenly Bodys in the Circumference of a great Sphere, which is wholly occasion'd by the Imperfection of our Sight in discerning Distances ; the Forms of all the great Bodys in the Universe are nearly *Spherical*; the Orbits of their Revolutions generally *Elliptick*, and without great Eccentricity, in those which continually occur to our Observation: now these are Figures of great *Uniformity*, and therefore pleasing to us.

FURTHER, to pass by the less obvious *Uniformity* in the Proportion of their *Quantities* of Matter, *Distances*, *Times*, of revolving, to each other ; what can exhibit a greater Instance of *Uniformity*, amidst *Variety*,


Order, Harmony, and Design. 21

riety, than the constant Tenour of Revolu- Sect. 2.
tions in nearly equal Times, in each *Planet*,
around its Axis, and the central Fire or
SUN, thro' all the Ages of which we have
any Records, and in nearly the same Or-
bit? Thus after certain Periods, all the
same Appearances are again renew'd; the
alternate Successions of *Light* and *Shade*, or
Day and *Night*, constantly pursuing each
other around each *Planet*, with an agree-
able and regular Diversity in the Times they
possess the several Hemispheres, in the *Sum-
mer*, *Harvest*, *Winter*, and *Spring*; and the
various *Phases*, *Aspects*, and *Situations*, of
the *Planets* to each other, their *Conjunctions*
and *Oppositions*, in which they suddenly dar-
ken each other with their Conick Shades in
Eclipses, are repeated to us at their fixed
Periods with invariable Constancy: These
are the *Beautys* which charm the *Astrono-
mer*, and make his tedious Calculations
pleasant.

*Molliter austerum studio fallente laborem.**


VI. AGAIN, as to the dry Part of the *Earth*.
Surface of our Globe, a great Part of which
is cover'd with a very pleasant inoffensive
Colour, how *beautifully* is it diversify'd with
various Degrees of *Light* and *Shade*, ac-

* Hor. Lib. 2. Sat. 2. v. 12.

Sect. 2. cording to the different Situations of the
 Parts of its Surface, in *Mountains, Valleys, Hills,* and open *Plains,* which are variously inclin'd toward the great LUMINARY!

Plants.

VII. IF we descend to the minuter Works of NATURE, what great *Uniformity* among all the Species of *Plants* and *Vegetables* in the manner of their Growth and Propagation! how near the Resemblance among all the Plants of the same Species, whose Numbers surpass our Imagination! And this *Uniformity* is not only observable in the Form in gross; (nay, in this it is not so very exact in all Instances) but in the Structure of their minutest Parts, which no Eye unassisted with Glasses can discern. In the almost infinite Multitude of *Leaves, Fruit, Seed, Flowers* of any one Species, we often see a very great *Uniformity* in the Structure and Situation of the smallest Fibres. This is the *Beauty* which charms an ingenious *Botanist*. Nay, what great *Uniformity* and Regularity of Figure is found in each particular *Plant, Leaf, or Flower*! In all Trees and most of the smaller Plants, the Stalks or Trunks are either *Cylinders* nearly, or regular *Prisms*; the Branches similar to their several Trunks, arising at nearly regular Distances, when no Accidents retard their natural Growth: In one Species the Branches arise in Pairs on the opposite Sides; the perpendicular

pendicular Plain of Direction of the imme- Sect 2.
diately superior Pair, intersecting the Plain 
of Direction of the inferior, nearly at right
Angles: In another *Species*, the Branches
spring singly, and alternately, all around in
nearly equal Distances: And the Branches
in other *Species* sprout all in Knots around
the Trunk, one for each Year. And in each
Species, all the Branches in the first Shoots
preserve the same Angles with their Trunk;
and they again sprout out into smaller
Branches exactly after the Manner of their
Trunks. Nor ought we to pass over that
great *Unity* of Colours which we often see
in all the Flowers of the same Plant or Tree,
and often of a whole *Species*; and their exact
Agreement in many shaded Transitions into
opposite Colours, in which all the Flowers
of the same Plant generally agree, nay, often
all the Flowers of a *Species*.

VIII. AGAIN, as to the *Beauty of Ani- Animals.*
mals, either in their inward Structure, which
we come to the Knowledge of by Exper-
iment and long Observation, or their out-
ward Form, we shall find surprizing *Uni-*
formity among all the *Species* which are
known to us, in the Structure of those
Parts, upon which Life depends more im-
mediately. And how amazing is the *Unity*
of Mechanism, when we shall find an al-
most infinite Diversity of Motions, all their
Actions in *walking, running, flying, swim-*
ming ;

Sect. 2. *ming*; all their serious Efforts for *Self-preservation*, all their freakish *Contortions* when they are gay and sportful, in all their various Limbs, perform'd by one simple Contrivance of a contracting *Muscle*, apply'd with inconceivable Diversities to answer all these Ends! Various Engines might have obtain'd the same Ends; but then there had been less *Uniformity*, and the *Beauty* of our Animal Systems, and of particular Animals, had been much less, when this surprising *Unity* of Mechanism had been remov'd from them.

IX. AMONG Animals of the same Species, the *Unity* is very obvious, and this Resemblance is the very Ground of our ranking them in such *Classes* or *Species*, notwithstanding the great Diversities in Bulk, Colour, Shape, which are observ'd even in those call'd of the same Species. And then in each Individual, how universal is that *Beauty* which arises from the exact Resemblance of all the external double Members to each other, which seems the universal Intention of NATURE, when no Accident prevents it! We see the Want of this Resemblance never fails to pass for an Imperfection, and Want of *Beauty*, tho' no other Inconvenience ensues; as when the Eyes are not exactly like, or one Arm or Leg is a little shorter or smaller than its fellow.

As to that most powerful Beauty in *Countenances, Airs, Gestures, Motion*, we shall shew in the second Treatise*, that it arises from some imagin'd *Indication* of morally good Dispositions of Mind. In Motion there is also a natural Beauty, when at fixed Periods like Gestures and Steps are regularly repeated, suiting the Time and Air of Music, which is observed in regular Dancing.

X. THERE is a farther *Beauty* in *Animals*, arising from a certain *Proportion* of the various Parts to each other, which still pleases the Sense of Spectators, tho' they cannot calculate it with the Accuracy of a *Statuary*. The *Statuary* knows what Proportion of each Part of the *Face* to the whole *Face* is most agreeable, and can tell us the same of the Proportion of the *Face* to the *Body*, or any Parts of it; and between the *Diameters* and *Lengths* of each Limb: When this Proportion of the Head to the Body is remarkably alter'd, we shall have a *Giant* or a *Dwarf*. And hence it is, that either the one or the other may be represented to us even in *Miniature*, without relation to any external Object, by observing how the Body surpasses the Proportion it should have to the Head in *Giants*, and falls

* Sect. vi. Art. 3.

Sect. 2. below it in *Dwarfs*. There is a farther
 ~~~~~ Beauty arising from that Figure, which is a  
 natural Indication of *Strength*; but this may  
 be pass'd over, because probably it may be  
 alledg'd, that our Approbation of this Shape  
 flows from an Opinion of *Advantage*, and  
 not from the Form it self.

THE *Beauty* arising from Mechanism,  
 apparently adapted to the Necessities and Ad-  
 vantages of any Animal; which pleases us,  
 even tho' there be no Advantage to our selves  
 ensuing from it; will be consider'd under  
 the Head of *Relative Beauty*, or *Design*.\*

*Fowls.*

XI. THE peculiar *Beauty* of *Fowls* can  
 scarce be omitted, which arises from the great  
*Variety* of Feathers, a curious Sort of Ma-  
 chines adapted to many admirable Uses, which  
 retain a considerable Resemblance in their  
 Structure among all the Species; and a perfect  
*Uniformity* in those of the same Species in the  
 corresponding Parts, and in the two Sides of  
 each Individual; besides all the *Beauty* of  
 lively Colours and gradual Shades, not only  
 in the external Appearance of the Fowl, re-  
 sulting from an artful Combination of shaded  
 Feathers, but often visible even in one Fea-  
 ther separately.

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
\* See Sect. iv. Art. 7.

XII. IF our Reasonings about the *Nature* of *Fluids* be just, the vast Stores of *Water* will give us an Instance of *Uniformity* in *Nature* above Imagination, when we reflect upon the almost infinite Multitude of small, polish'd, smooth Spheres, which must be suppos'd form'd in all the Parts of this Globe. The same *Uniformity* there is probably among the Parts of other *Fluids* as well as *Water*; and the like must be observ'd in several other natural Bodys, as *Salts*, *Sulphurs*, and such like; whose uniform Propertys do probably depend upon an *Uniformity* in the Figures of their Parts.

XIII. UNDER *Original Beauty* we may include *Harmony*, or *Beauty of Sound*, if that Expression can be allow'd, because *Harmony* is not usually conceiv'd as an Imitation of anything else. *Harmony* often raises Pleasure in those who know not what is the Occasion of it: And yet the Foundation of this Pleasure is known to be a sort of *Uniformity*. When the several Vibrations of one Note regularly coincide with the Vibrations of another, they make an agreeable Composition; and such Notes are call'd *Concords*. Thus the Vibrations of any one Note coincide in *Time* with two Vibrations of its *Octave*; and two Vibrations of any Note coincide with three of its *Fifth*; and so on in the rest of the *Concords*. Now no *Composition* can be

harmony.



*Sect. 2.* harmonious, in which the Notes are not,  for the most part, dispos'd according to these natural Proportions. Besides which, a due Regard must be had to the *Key*, which governs the whole, and to the *Time* and *Humour*, in which the Composition is begun: a frequent and inartificial *Change* of any of which will produce the greatest, and most unnatural *Discord*. This will appear, by observing the *Dissonance* which would arise from tacking Parts of different Tunes together as one, altho' both were separately agreeable. A like *Uniformity* is also observable among the *Bases*, *Tenors*, *Trebles* of the same Tune.


THERE is indeed observable, in the best Compositions, a mysterious Effect of *Discords*: They often give as great Pleasure as continu'd Harmony; whether by refreshing the Ear with *Variety*, or by awakening the Attention, and enlivening the Relish for the succeeding Harmony of *Concords*, as Shades enliven and beautify Pictures, or by some other means not yet known: Certain it is, however, that they have their Place, and some good Effect in our best Compositions. Some other Powers of *Musick* may be consider'd hereafter\*.

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\* See *Sect. vi. Art. 12.*

XIV. BUT in all these Instances of *Beauty* let it be observ'd, That the Pleasure is communicated to those who never reflected on this general Foundation; and that all here alledg'd is this, "That the pleasant Sensation arises only from Objects, in which there is *Uniformity amidst Variety*:" We may have the Sensation without knowing what is the Occasion of it; as a Man's *Taste* may suggest Ideas of Sweets, Acids, Bitters, tho' he be ignorant of the *Forms* of the small Bodys, or their Motions, which excite the Perceptions in him.

## S E C T.



## S E C T. III.

## Of the Beauty of Theorems.

*Theorems.* I. **T**HE Beauty of *Theorems*, or universal Truths demonstrated, deserves a distinct Consideration, being of a Nature pretty different from the former kinds of *Beauty*; and yet there is none in which we shall see such an amazing *Variety* with *Uniformity*: and hence arises a very great Pleasure distinct from Prospects of any farther Advantage.

II. F O R in one *Theorem* we may find included, with the most exact Agreement, an infinite Multitude of particular Truths; nay, often an Infinity of Infinites: so that altho' the Necessity of forming abstract Ideas and universal *Theorems*, arises perhaps from the Limitation of our Minds, which cannot admit an Infinite Multitude of singular Ideas or Judgments at once, yet this Power gives us an Evidence of the Largeness of the human Capacity above our Imagination. Thus for instance, the 47th Proposition of the first *Book* of EUCLID's *Elements* contains an infinite Multitude of Truths, concerning the infinite possible *Sizes* of right-angled *Triangles*, as you make the *Area* greater  
or



or less; and in each of these *Sizes* you may Sect. 3.  
find an infinite Multitude of dissimilar *Tri-*  
*angles*, as you vary the Proportion of the  
*Base* to the *Perpendicular*; all which In-  
finitys of Infinites agree in the general  
*Theorem*. In *Algebraick*, and *Fluxional*  
*Calculations*, we shall still find a greater  
*Variety* of particular *Truths* included in  
general *Theorems*; not only in general *Equa-*  
*tions* applicable to all Kinds of *Quantity*,  
but in more particular Investigations of  
*Areas* and *Tangents*: In which one Man-  
ner of Operation shall discover *Theorems*  
applicable to infinite *Orders* or *Species* of  
*Curves*, to the infinite *Sizes* of each Species,  
and to the infinite *Points* of the infinite  
*Individuals* of each Size.

III. T H A T we may the better discern this *Foundati-*  
Agreement, or *Unity* of an Infinity of Ob- *on of their*  
jects, in the general *Theorem*, to be the *Beauty*.  
Foundation of the *Beauty* or *Pleasure* at-  
tending their Discovery, let us compare our  
Satisfaction in such Discoveries, with the  
uneasy State of Mind in which we are, when  
we can only measure Lines, or Surfaces, by  
a Scale, or are making Experiments which  
we can reduce to no general *Canon*, but  
only heaping up a Multitude of particular  
incoherent Observations. Now each of  
these Trials discovers a new Truth, but  
with no Pleasure or *Beauty*, notwithstand-  
ing

## 32 *An Inquiry concerning Beauty,*

Sect. 3. ing the *Variety*, till we can discover some  
 ~~~~~ sort of *Unity*, or reduce them to some general Canon.

*Little
Beauty in
Axioms.*

IV. AGAIN, let us make a Metaphysical Axiom, such as this, *Every Whole is greater than its Part*; and we shall find no *Beauty* in the Contemplation. For tho' this Proposition contains many Infinities of particular Truths; yet the *Unity* is inconsiderable, since they all agree only in a vague, undetermin'd Conception of *Whole* and *Part*, and in an indefinite Excess of the former above the latter, which is sometimes great and sometimes small. So, should we hear that the *Cylinder* is greater than the inscrib'd *Sphere*, and this again greater than the *Cone* of the same Altitude, and Diameter of the Base, we shall find no Pleasure in this Knowledge of a general Relation of greater or less, without any precise Difference or Proportion. But when we see the universal exact Agreement of all possible Sizes of such Systems of Solids, that they persevere to each other the constant *Ratio* of 3, 2, 1; how beautiful is the *Theorem*, and how are we ravish'd with its first Discovery!

Easy Theorems.

WE may likewise observe, that *easy* or *obvious* Propositions, even where the *Unity* is sufficiently distinct, and determinate, do not please us so much as those, which being

being less *obvious*, give us some *Surprize* in Sect. 3. the Discovery: Thus we find little Pleasure in discovering that *a Line bisecting the vertical Angle of an Isosceles Triangle, bisects the Base, or the Reverse*; or, that *Equilateral Triangles are Equiangular*. These Truths we almost know *Intuitively*, without Demonstration: They are like common Goods, or those which Men have long possessed, which do not give such sensible Joys as much smaller new *Additions* may give us. But let none hence imagine, that the sole Pleasure of Theorems is from *Surprize*; for the same *Novelty* of a single Experiment does not please us much: nor ought we to conclude from the greater Pleasure accompanying a *new, or unexpected Advantage*, that *Surprize, or Novelty* is the only Pleasure of Life, or the only Ground of Delight in *Truth*. Another kind of *Surprize* in certain Theorems increases our Pleasure above that we have in Theorems of greater Extent; when we discover a *general Truth*, which upon some confused Notion we had reputed false: as that *Assymptotes always approaching should never meet the Curve*. This is like the Joy of unexpected Advantage where we dreaded Evil. But still the *Unity* of many Particulars in the general Theorem is necessary to give Pleasure in any Theorem.

D

V. THERE

3.
 Corollary.

V. THERE is another *Beauty* in Propositions, when one *Theorem* contains a great Multitude of *Corollarys* easily deducible from it. Thus that *Theorem* which gives us the Equation of a *Curve*, whence perhaps most of its *Propertys* may be deduc'd, does some way please and satisfy our Mind above any other Proposition: Such a *Theorem* also is the 35th of the 1st *Book* of EUCLID, from which the whole Art of measuring right-lin'd Areas is deduc'd, by Resolution into *Triangles*, which are the halves of so many *Parallelograms*; and these are each respectively equal to so many *Rectangles* of the *Base* into the perpendicular *Altitude*: The 47th of the 1st *Book* is another of like *Beauty*, and so are many others.

IN the Search of *Nature* there is the like *Beauty* in the Knowledge of some great *Principles*, or universal *Forces*, from which innumerable Effects do flow. Such is *Gravitation*, in Sir ISAAC NEWTON'S Scheme; such also is the Knowledge of the Original of *Rights*, perfect and imperfect, and external; alienable and unalienable, with their manner of *Translation*; from whence the greatest Part of moral Dutys may be deduc'd in the various Relations of human Life.

IT is easy to see how Men are charm'd with the *Beauty* of such Knowledge, besides its Usefulness; and how this sets them upon deducing the Property's of each Figure from one *Genesis*, and demonstrating the mechanic Forces from one *Theorem* of the Composition of Motion; even after they have sufficient Knowledge and Certainty in all these Truths from distinct independent Demonstrations. And this Pleasure we enjoy even when we have no Prospect of obtaining any other *Advantage* from such Manner of Deduction, than the immediate Pleasure of contemplating the *Beauty*: nor could Love of *Fame* excite us to such regular Methods of Deduction, were we not conscious that Mankind are pleas'd with them immediately, by this *internal Sense* of their *Beauty*.

IT is no less easy to see into what absurd Attempts Men have been led by this Sense of *Beauty*, and an Affectation of obtaining it in the other Sciences as well as the *Mathematicks*. 'Twas this probably which set DESCARTES on that hopeful Project of deducing all human Knowledge from one Proposition, *viz. Cogito, ergo sum*; while others with as little Sense contended, that *Impossibile est idem simul esse & non esse*, had much fairer Pretensions to the Style and Title of *Principium humanæ Cognitionis absolute*

Sect. 3. *solutè primum.* Mr. LEIBNITZ had an equal Affection for his favourite Principle of a *sufficient Reason* for every thing in *Nature*, and brags to Dr. CLARKE of the Wonders he had wrought in the intellectual World by its Assistance; but his learned Antagonist seems to think he had not sufficient Reason for his Boasting*. If we look into particular Sciences, we may see in the Systems learned Men have given us of them, the Inconveniencies of this Love of *Uniformity*. How awkwardly is PUFFENDORF forc'd to deduce the several Dutys of Men to God, *themselves*, and their *Neighbours*, from his single fundamental Principle of *Sociableness to the whole Race of Mankind*? This Observation might easily be extended farther, were it necessary; and is a strong Proof, that Men perceive the *Beauty of Uniformity* in the Sciences, even from the Contortions of common Sense they are led into by pursuing it.

VI. THIS Delight which accompanys Sciences, or universal *Theorems*, may really be call'd a kind of *Sensation*; since it necessarily accompanys the Discovery of any Proposition, and is distinct from bare Knowledge itself, being most violent at first, whereas the Knowledge is uniformly the

* See the Letters which pass'd between Dr. CLARKE, and Mr. LEIBNITZ, Pag. 23.

Order, Harmony, and Design. 37

same. And however Knowledge enlarges Sect. 3.
the *Mind*, and makes us more capable of
comprehensive Views and Projects in some
kinds of Business, whence *Advantage* may
also arise to us; yet we may leave it in the
Breast of every Student to determine, whe-
ther he has not often felt this Pleasure with-
out any such Prospect of Advantage from
the Discovery of his *Theorem*. All which
can thence be inferr'd is only this, that as
in our external Senses, so in our *internal* ones,
the pleasant Sensations generally arise from
those Objects which calm Reason would have
recommended, had we understood their Use,
and which might have engag'd our Pursuits
from *Self-Interest*.

VII. As to the Works of ART, were we *Works of*
to run thro' the various artificial Contrivan- *Art.*
ces or Structures, we should constantly find
the Foundation of the *Beauty* which appears
in them, to be some kind of *Uniformity*, or
Unity of Proportion among the Parts, and
of each Part to the Whole. As there is a
great Diversity of Proportions possible, and
different Kinds of *Uniformity*, so there is
room enough for that Diversity of Fancys
observable in *Architecture*, *Gardening*, and
such like Arts in different *Nations*; they all
may have *Uniformity*, tho' the Parts in one
may differ from those in another. The
Chinese or *Persian* Buildings are not like the
Grecian and *Roman*, and yet the former has

Sect. 3. its *Uniformity* of the various Parts to each other, and to the Whole, as well as the latter. In that kind of Architecture which the EUROPEANS call *Regular*, the *Uniformity* of Parts is very obvious, the several Parts are *regular Figures*, and either *equal* or *similar* at least in the same Range; the Pedestals are *Parallelopipedons* or square *Prisms*; the Pillars, *Cylinders* nearly; the Arches *circular*, and all those in the same Row *equal*; there is the same Proportion every-where observ'd in the same Range between the *Diameters* of Pillars and their *Heights*, their *Capitals*, the *Diameters* of *Arches*, the *Heights* of the *Pedestals*, the *Projections* of the *Cornice*, and all the Ornaments in each of our *five Orders*. And tho' other Countrys do not follow the *Grecian* or *Roman* Proportions, yet there is even among them a Proportion retain'd, a *Uniformity*, and Resemblance of corresponding Figures; and every Deviation in one Part from that Proportion which is observ'd in the rest of the Building, is displeasing to every Eye, and destroys or diminishes at least the *Beauty* of the Whole.

VIII. The same might be observ'd thro' all other Works of *Art*, even to the meanest *Utenfil*; the *Beauty* of every one of which we shall always find to have the same Foundation of *Uniformity amidst Variety*, without which they appear mean, irregular and deform'd.

S E C T.

S E C T. IV.

Of Relative or Comparative Beauty.

I. IF the preceding Thoughts concerning *Comparative* the Foundation of *absolute Beauty* be *relative Beauty* just, we may easily understand wherein *relative Beauty* consists. All *Beauty* is relative to the Sense of some Mind perceiving it; but what we call *relative* is that which is apprehended in any *Object*, commonly consider'd as an *Imitation* of some Original: And this *Beauty* is founded on a *Conformity*, or a kind of *Unity* between the Original and the Copy. The Original may be either some *Object* in *Nature*, or some *establish'd Idea*; for if there be any known *Idea* as a Standard, and Rules to fix this Image or *Idea* by, we may make a *beautiful Imitation*. Thus a *Statuary*, *Painter*, or *Poet*, may please us with an *HERCULES*, if his Piece retains that *Grandeur*, and those Marks of *Strength* and *Courage*, which we imagine in that Hero.

AND farther, to obtain *comparative Beauty* alone, it is not necessary that there be any *Beauty* in the Original; the *Imitation* of *absolute Beauty* may indeed in the whole make a more lovely Piece, and yet an exact

Sect. 4. Imitation shall still be *beautiful*, though the Original were intirely void of it: Thus the *Deformitys* of old Age in a Picture, the *rudest Rocks* or *Mountains* in a *Landskip*, if well represented, shall have abundant *Beauty*, tho' perhaps not so great as if the Original were *absolutely beautiful*, and as well represented: Nay, perhaps the *Novelty* may make us prefer the Representation of Irregularity.

Description
in Poetry.

II. THE same Observation holds true in the Descriptions of the Poets either of *natural* Objects or Persons; and this *relative Beauty* is what they should principally endeavour to obtain, as the peculiar *Beauty* of their Works. By the *Moratæ Fabula*, or the *Opin* of ARISTOTLE, we are not to understand *virtuous Manners* in a moral Sense, but a *just Representation* of Manners or Characters as they are in *Nature*; and that the *Actions* and *Sentiments* be suited to the Characters of the *Persons* to whom they are ascrib'd in *Epick* and *Dramatick* Poetry. Perhaps very good Reasons may be suggested from the Nature of our *Passions*, to prove that a Poet should not draw his *Characters* perfectly *Virtuous*; these Characters indeed, abstractly consider'd, might give more Pleasure, and have more *Beauty* than the *imperfect* ones which occur in Life with a Mixture of Good and Evil: But it may suffice at present to suggest against this Choice,

that

that we have more lively Ideas of *imperfect* Sect. 4.
Men with all their Passions, than of *morally*
perfect Heroes, such as really never occur to
our Observation; and of which consequently
we cannot judge exactly as to their Agree-
ment with the Copy. And farther, thro'
Consciousness of our own State, we are
more nearly touch'd and affected by the *im-*
perfect Characters; since in them we see re-
presented, in the Persons of others, the *Con-*
trasts of Inclinations, and the *Struggles* be-
tween the Passions of *Self-Love* and those of
Honour and *Virtue*, which we often feel in
our own Breasts. This is the Perfection of
Beauty for which HOMER is justly admir'd,
as well as for the *Variety* of his Characters.

III. MANY other Beautys of Poetry may *Probabili-*
be reduc'd under this Class of *relative Beau-* ty, *Simile,*
ty: The *Probability* is absolutely necessary *Metaphor.*
to make us imagine *Resemblance*; it is by
Resemblance that the *Similitudes*, *Metaphors*
and *Allegorys* are made *beautiful*, whether
either the Subject or the Thing compar'd to
it have *Beauty* or not; the *Beauty* indeed is
greater, when both have some *original*
Beauty or *Dignity* as well as *Resemblance*:
and this is the Foundation of the Rule of
studying *Decency* in *Metaphors* and *Similes*
as well as *Likeness*. The *Measures* and *Ca-*
dence are Instances of *Harmony*, and come
under the Head of *absolute Beauty*.

Sect. 4. IV WE may here observe a strange
 ~~~~~ Proneness in our Minds to make perpetual  
 Proneness Comparisons of all things which occur to our  
 to compare. Observation, even of those which are very  
 different from each other. There are cer-  
 tain *Resemblances* in the Motions of all Ani-  
 mals upon like Passions, which easily found  
 a *Comparison*; but this does not serve to  
 entertain our Fancy: *Inanimate Objects* have  
 often such Positions as resemble those of the  
*human Body* in various Circumstances; these  
*Airs* or *Gestures* of the *Body* are Indications  
 of certain Dispositions in the *Mind*, so that  
 our very *Passions* and *Affections*, as well as  
 other Circumstances, obtain a Resemblance  
 to *natural inanimate Objects*. Thus a *Tem-  
 pest* at Sea is often an Emblem of *Wrath*;  
 a *Plant* or *Tree* drooping under the Rain, of  
 a Person in *Sorrow*; a *Poppy* bending its  
 Stalk, or a *Flower* withering when cut by  
 the Plow, resembles the Death of a *blooming  
 Hero*; an *aged Oak* in the Mountains shall  
 represent an *old Empire*, a *Flame* seizing a  
 Wood shall represent a *War*. In short,  
 every thing in *Nature*, by our strange  
 Inclination to *Resemblance*, shall be brought  
 to represent other things, even the most  
 remote, especially the Passions and Circum-  
 stances of human Nature in which we are  
 more nearly concern'd; and to confirm this,  
 and furnish Instances of it, one need only  
 look into HOMER or VIRGIL. A fruitful  
 Fancy



Fancy would find in a *Grove* or a *Wood*, Sect. 4.  
an Emblem of every *Character* in a *Commonwealth*, and every *Turn* of *Temper*, or  
*Station in Life*.

V. CONCERNING that kind of *compara-Intention*.  
*tive Beauty* which has a necessary relation  
to some establish'd Idea, we may observe,  
that some Works of *Art* acquire a *distinct*  
*Beauty* by their Correspondence to some  
universally suppos'd *Intention* in the Artificer,  
or the Persons who employ'd him : And to  
obtain this *Beauty*, sometimes they do not  
form their Works so as to attain the highest  
Perfection of *original Beauty* separately con-  
sider'd ; because a Composition of this *rela-*  
*tive Beauty*, along with some Degree of the  
*original Kind*, may give more Pleasure, than  
a more *perfect original Beauty* separately.  
Thus we see, that strict *Regularity* in  
laying out of Gardens in *Parterres*, *Vistas*,  
*parallel Walks*, is often neglected, to obtain  
an Imitation of *Nature* even in some of its  
*Wildnesses*. And we are more pleas'd with  
this *Imitation*, especially when the Scene is  
large and spacious, than with the more con-  
fin'd Exactness of *regular Works*. So likewise  
in the *Monuments* erected in Honour of de-  
ceased *Heroes*, altho' a *Cylinder*, or *Prism* or  
*regular Solid*, may have more *original Beauty*  
than a very acute *Pyramid* or *Obelisk*, yet  
the latter pleases more, by answering better  
the suppos'd Intentions of *Stability*, and be-  
ing

Sect. 4. *ing conspicuous.* For the same reason *Cubes*, or square *Prisms*, are generally chosen for the *Pedestals* of *Statues*, and not any of the more *beautiful Solids*, which do not seem so secure from rolling. This may be the Reason too, why *Columns* or *Pillars* look best when made a little taper from the middle or a third from the bottom, that they may not seem top-heavy, and in danger of falling.

VI. THE like Reason may influence Artists, in many other Instances, to depart from the Rules of *original Beauty*, as above laid down. And yet this is no Argument against our Sense of *Beauty* being founded, as was above explain'd, on *Uniformity amidst Variety*, but only an Evidence, that our Sense of *Beauty* of the *Original Kind* may be vary'd and over-balance'd by another kind of *Beauty*.

VII. THIS *Beauty* arising from Correspondence to *Intention*, would open to curious Observers a new Scene of *Beauty* in the Works of NATURE, by considering how the *Mechanism* of the various Parts known to us, seems adapted to the Perfection of that Part, and yet in Subordination to the Good of some *System* or *Whole*. We generally suppose the Good of the *greatest Whole*, or of *all Beings*, to have been the *Intention* of the AUTHOR of *Nature*; and cannot avoid being pleas'd when we see any Part of  
this

This *Design* executed in the *Systems* we are Sect. 4. acquainted with. The Observations already made on this Subject are in every one's Hand, in the Treatises of our late Improvers of *mechanical Philosophy*. We shall only observe here, that every one has a certain Pleasure in seeing any Design well executed by curious *Mechanism*, even when his own Advantage is no way concern'd; and also in discovering the Design to which any complex *Machine* is adapted, when he has perhaps had a general Knowledge of the *Machine* before, without seeing its Correspondence or Aptness to execute any Design.

THE Arguments by which we prove *Reason* and *Design* in any *Cause* from the *Beauty* of the *Effects*, are so frequently us'd in some of the highest Subjects, that it may be necessary to inquire a little more particularly into them, to see how far they will hold, and with what degree of Evidence.

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S E C T. V.

*Concerning our Reasonings about Design and Wisdom in the Cause, from the Beauty or Regularity of Effects.*

*Sense, arbitrary in its Author.*

I. THERE seems to be no necessary Connection of our pleasing Ideas of *Beauty* with the *Uniformity* or *Regularity* of the Objects, from the *Nature* of Things, antecedent to some *Constitution* of the *AUTHOR* of our Nature, which has made such Forms pleasant to us. Other *Minds* may be so fram'd as to receive no Pleasure from *Uniformity*; and we actually find, that the same regular Forms, seem not equally to please all the Animals known to us, as shall probably appear hereafter. Therefore let us make what is the most unfavourable Supposition to the present Argument, *viz.* That the Constitution of our Sense so as to approve *Uniformity*, is merely arbitrary in the *AUTHOR* of our Nature; and that there are an Infinity of *Tastes* or *Relishes* of *Beauty* possible; so that it would be impossible to throw together fifty or a hundred Pebbles, which should not make an agreeable Habitation for some Animal

Animal or other, and appear *beautiful* to it. Sect. 5.  
 And then it is plain, that from the Perception of *Beauty* in any one Effect, we should have no Reason to conclude *Design* in the Cause: for a Sense might be so constituted as to be pleas'd with such *Irregularity* as may be the Effect of an *undirected Force*\*. But then, as there are an Infinity of *Forms* possible into which any System may be reduc'd, an Infinity of *Places* in which Animals may be situated, and an Infinity of *Relishes* or *Senses* in these Animals is suppos'd possible; that in the immense Spaces any one Animal should by Chance be plac'd in a System agreeable to its Taste, must be improbable as *infinite* to one at least: And much more unreasonable is it to expect from Chance, that a Multitude of Animals agree-

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\* By undirected Force, or undesigning Force, is to be understood, That Force with which an Agent may put Matter into Motion, without having any Design or Intention to produce any particular Form. The Conatus ad motum, without an actual Line of Direction, seems such a gross Absurdity in the Cartesian Scheme, that it is below the Dignity of common Sense to vouchsafe to confute it. But Men have so many confus'd Notions of some Nature, or Chance impressing Motions without any Design or Intention of producing any particular Effect, that it may be useful to shew, that even this very absurd Postulatum, tho' it were granted them, is insufficient to answer the Appearances in the Regularity of the World: and this is what is attempted in the first fourteen Articles of this Section. These Arguments would really be useless, if all Men were persuaded of what, to a Man of just Thought, will appear pretty obvious, that there can be no Thoughtless Agent; and that Chance and Nature are mere empty Names, as they are us'd on this Occasion, relative only to our Ignorance.

Sect. 5. ing in their Sense of *Beauty* should obtain  
 agreeable Places.

Undirected  
 Force.

II. THERE is also the same Probability, that in any one System of Matter an *Undirected Force* will produce a *regular Form*, as any one given *irregular* one, of the same degree of Complication: But still the *irregular Forms* into which any System may be rang'd, surpass in Multitude the *Regular*, as *Infinite* does *Unity*; for what holds in one small System, will hold in a *Thousand*, a *Million*, a *Universe*, with more Advantage, viz. that the *irregular Forms* possible infinitely surpass the *Regular*. For Instance, the *Area* of an *Inch Square* is capable of an *Infinity* of *regular Forms*, the *Equilateral Triangle*, the *Square*, the *Pentagon*, *Hexagon*, *Hep-  
 tagon*, &c. but for each one regular Form, there are an *Infinity* of irregular, as an *Infinity* of *Scalena* for the one equilateral Triangle, an *Infinity* of *Trapezia* for the one Square, of irregular *Pentagons* for the one Regular, and so on: and therefore supposing any one System agitated by *undesigning Force*, it is infinitely more probable that it will resolve itself into an *irregular Form*, than a *regular*. Thus, that a System of *six* Parts upon Agitation shall not obtain the Form of a regular *Hexagon*, is at least *infinite* to *Unity*; and the more complex we make the System, the greater is the Hazard, from a very obvious Reason.

WE



## Order, Harmony, and Design.

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WE see this confirm'd by our constant Sect. 5. Experience, that *Regularity* never arises from any *undesign'd Force* of ours; and from this we conclude, that where-ever there is any *Regularity* in the Disposition of a System capable of many other Dispositions, there must have been *Design* in the *Cause*; and the Force of this Evidence increases, according to the Multiplicity of Parts employ'd.

BUT this Conclusion is too rash, unless some farther Proof be introduc'd; and what leads us into it is this. Men, who have a Sense of *Beauty* in *Regularity*, are led generally in all their Arrangements of Bodys to study some kind of *Regularity*, and seldom ever design *Irregularity*: hence we judge the same of other Beings too, viz. that they study *Regularity*; and presume upon *Intention* in the *Cause* where-ever we see it, making *Irregularity* always a Presumption of want of *Design*: whereas if other Agents have different Senses of *Beauty*, or if they have no Sense of it at all, *Irregularity* may as well be design'd as *Regularity*. And then let it be observ'd, that in this Case there is must the same Reason to conclude *Design* in the Cause from any one irregular Effect, as from a regular one: for since there are an Infinity of other *Forms* possible as well as this irregular one produc'd; and since to such a

E                      Being

Sect. 5. Being \* void of a Sense of *Beauty*, all Forms are as to its own Relish indifferent, and all agitated Matter meeting must make some Form or other, and all Forms, upon Supposition that the Force is apply'd by an Agent void of a Sense of *Beauty*, would equally prove *Design*; it is plain that no one Form proves it more than another, or can prove it at all; except from a general metaphysical Consideration, that there is no proper Agent without *Design* and *Intention*, and that every *Effect* flows from the *Intention* of some Cause.

Similar  
Forms by  
Chance,  
impossible.

III. THIS however follows from the above mention'd Considerations, that supposing a Mass of Matter surpassing a cubick Inch, as infinite of the first Power does Unity, and that this whole Mass were some way de-

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\* There is a great Difference between such a Being as is here mention'd, and a Being which has no Intention for any Reason whatsoever to produce one Form more than another. This latter sort of Being, as to the present Argument, would be the same with Chance, but not the former. For tho' a Being has no Sense of Beauty, he may notwithstanding be capable of Design, and of Intention to produce regular Forms; and the Observation of greater Regularity in any Number of Effects, than could be expected from undirected Force, is a Presumption of Design and Intention in the Cause, even where the Cause is suppos'd to have no Sense of Beauty in such Forms, since perhaps he may have other Reasons moving him to chuse such Forms. Thus, supposing the DEITY not immediately pleas'd with Regularity, Uniformity, or Similarity in Bodys, yet there may be Reasons moving him to produce such Objects, such as the pleasing his Creatures, having given them a Sense of Beauty founded on these Qualitys. See the two last Paragraphs of the last Section.

termin'd

## Order, Harmony, and Design.

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termin'd from its own Nature without any Sect. 5.  
*Design* in a *Cause* (which perhaps is scarce possible) to resolve itself into Parts whose solid Contents were each a *cubick* Inch, and into a *prismatick* Form whose *Base* should always be  $\frac{1}{2}$  of a *square* Inch; suppose these Conditions determin'd, and all others left to *undirected Force*; all which we could expect from *undirected Force* in this Case would be one equilateral *Prism*, or two perhaps: because there are an Infinity of Irregular *Prisms* possible of the same *Base*, and *solid Content*; and when we met with many such *Prisms*, we must probably conclude them produc'd by *Design*, since they are more than could have been expected by the Laws of *Hazard*.

IV. B U T if this *infinite* Mass was not determin'd to a *prismatick* Form, we could only expect from its *casual Concourse* one *Prism* of any Kind; since there is an Infinity of other Solids into which the Mass might be resolv'd; and if we found any great Number of *Prisms*, we should have reason to presume *Design*: So that in a Mass of Matter as infinite of the *first* Power, we could not from any *Concourse* or *Agitation* expect with any good ground a Body of any given Dimensions or Size, and of any given Form; since of any Dimension there are infinite Forms possible, and of any Form there are an Infinity of Dimensions; and if we found



Sect. 5. several Bodys of the same Dimension and Form, we should have so much Presumption for *Design*.

V. THERE is one trifling Objection which may perhaps arise from the *crystallizing* of certain Bodys, when the Fluid is evaporated in which they were swimming: for in this we frequently see *regular Forms* arising, tho' there is nothing suppos'd in this Affair but an *undirected Force of Attraction*. But to remove this Objection, we need only consider, that we have good Reason to believe, that the smallest Particles of *Crystalliz'd* Bodys have fix'd *regular Forms* given them in the Constitution of *Nature*; and then it is easy to conceive how their *Attractions* may produce *regular Forms*: but unless we suppose some preceding *Regularity* in the Figures of *attracting* Bodys, they can never form any regular Body at all. And hence we see how improbable it is, that the whole Mass of *Matter*, not only in this Globe, but in all the fixed Stars known to us by our Eyes or Glasses, were they a thousand times larger than our Astronomers suppose, could in any *Concourse* have produc'd any Number of *similar Bodys Regular or Irregular*.

Combinations by  
Chance,  
impossible.

VI. AND let it be here observ'd, that there are many Compositions of Bodys which the smallest Degree of *Design* could easily effect, which yet we would in vain expect from all the

the Powers of *Chance* or *undesign'd Force*, Sect. 5. after an *Infinity* of Rencounters; even sup-  
 posing a Dissolution of every Form except the *regular one*, that the Parts might be prepar'd for a new Agitation. Thus supposing we could expect *one* equilateral *Prism* of any *given* Dimensions should be form'd from *undirect'd Force*, in an *Infinity* of Matter some way determin'd to resolve itself into Bodys of a *given* solid Content, ( which is all we could expect, since it is *infinite* to *one* after the *solid Content* is obtain'd, that the Body shall not be *Prismatical*; and allowing it *Prismatical*, it is *infinite* to *one* that it shall not be *Equilateral*: ) And again, supposing another *Infinity* of Matter determin'd to resolve itself into *Tubes*, of *Orifices* exactly equal to the *Bases* of the former *Prisms*, it is again at least as the *second Power* of *Infinite* to *Unity*, that not one of these *Tubes* shall be both *Prismatick* and *Equiangular*; and then if the *Tube* were thus form'd, so as to be exactly capable of receiving one of the *Prisms*, and no more, it is *infinite* to *one* that they shall never meet in *infinite Space*; and should they meet, it is *infinite* to *one* that the *Axes* of the *Prism* and *Tube* shall never happen in the same strait *Line*; and supposing they did, it is again as *infinite* to *three*, that *Angle* shall not meet *Angle*, so as to enter. We see then how infinitely improbable it is, " That all the Powers of "  
*Chance* in *infinite Matter*, agitated thro'

Sect. 5. “ *infinite Ages*, could ever effect this small  
 “ Composition of a *Prism* entering a *Prismatick Bore*; and, that all our Hazard  
 “ for it would at most be but as *Three* is to  
 “ the *third Power of Infinite*.” And yet  
 the smallest *Design* could easily effect it.

VII. MAY we not then justly count it altogether absurd, and next to an absolute strict *Impossibility*, “ That all the Powers of  
 “ *undirected Force* should ever effect such a  
 “ complex Machine as the most imperfect  
 “ *Plant*, or the meanest *Animal*, even in  
 “ one Instance?” For the *Improbability* just increases, as the Complication of Mechanism in these *natural Bodys* surpasses that *simple Combination* above-mention’d.

VIII. LET it be here observ’d, “ That  
 “ the preceding Reasoning from the *Frequency of regular Bodys* of one Form in  
 “ the *Universe*, and from the *Combinations*  
 “ of various Bodys, is intirely independent  
 “ on any Perception of *Beauty*; and would  
 “ equally prove *Design* in the Cause, altho’  
 “ there were no *Being* which perceiv’d  
 “ *Beauty* in any Form whatsoever:” for it is in short this, “ That the recurring of any  
 “ Effect oftener than the *Laws of Hazard*  
 “ determine, gives *Presumption of Design*;  
 “ and, That *Combinations* which no undesign’d Force could give us Reason to expect,  
 “ must necessarily prove the same; and that  
 “ with



“with superior Probability, as the Multitude Sect. 5.  
“of Cases in which the contrary might hap-  
“pen, surpass all the Cases in which this  
“could happen:” which appears to be in  
the simplest Cases at least as *Infinite* does to  
*Unity*. And the Frequency of *similar irre-*  
*gular Forms*, or *exact Combinations* of them,  
is an equal Argument of *Design* in the Cause,  
since the *Similarity*, or *exact Combinations*  
of *irregular Forms*, are as little to be ex-  
pected from all the Powers of *undirected*  
*Force*, as any sort whatsoever.

IX. To bring this nearer to something  
like a *Theorem*, altho’ the *Idea* of *Infinite* be  
troublesom enough to manage in Reasoning:  
The Powers of *Chance*, with *infinite Mat-*  
*ter* in *infinite Ages*, may answer *Hazards* as  
the *fifth* Power of *Infinite*, and no more:  
thus the *Quantity* of Matter may be con-  
ceiv’d as the third Power of *Infinite*, and no  
more, the *various Degrees* of Force may  
make *another* Power of *Infinite*, and the  
*Number* of Rencounters may make the *fifth*.  
But this last only holds on Supposition, that  
after every Rencounter there is no *Cohesion*,  
but all is dissolv’d again for a new Con-  
course, except in *similar Forms* or *exact Com-*  
*binations*; which Supposition is intirely  
groundless, since we see *dissimilar Bodys* co-  
hering as strongly as any, and *rude Masses*  
more than any Combinations. Now to pro-  
duce any *given Body*, in a *given Place* or

Sect. 5. Situation, and of *given* Dimensions, or  
 Shape, the Hazards of the contrary are, *one*  
 Power of *Infinite* at least to obtain the *Place*  
 or Situation; when the *Situation* is obtain'd,  
 the *Solid Content* requires *another* Power of  
*Infinite* to obtain it; the *Situation* and *So-*  
*lidity* obtain'd require, for accomplishing  
 the *simplest given* Shape, at least the other  
*three* Powers of *Infinite*. For instance, let  
 the Shape be a four-sided *Prism* or *Paral-*  
*lelopiped*; that the *Surfaces* should be *Planes*  
 requires *one* Power; that they should be  
*Parallel* in this Case, or *inclin'd* in any *given*  
*Angle* in any other Case, requires *another*  
 Power of *Infinite*; and that they should  
 be in any *given Ratio* to each other, re-  
 quires at least the *third* Power: for in each  
 of these Heads there is still an *Infinity* at  
 least of other Cases possible beside the one  
*given*. So that all the Powers of *Chance*  
 could only produce perhaps *one* Body of  
 every simpler Shape or Size *at most*, and  
 this is all we could expect: we might ex-  
 pect one *Pyramid*, or *Cube*, or *Prism* per-  
 haps; but when we increase the Conditions  
 requir'd, the Prospect must grow more im-  
 probable, as in more *complex Figures*, and  
 in all *Combinations* of Bodys, and in *similar*  
*Species*, which we never could reasonably  
 hope from *Chance*; and therefore where we  
 see them, we must certainly ascribe them  
 to *Design*.

X. THE Combinations of *regular Forms*, or of *irregular ones* exactly adapted to each other, require such *vast Powers of Infinite* to effect them, and the Hazards of the *contrary* Forms are so *infinitely* numerous, that all *Probability* or *Possibility* of their being accomplish'd by *Chance* seems quite to vanish. Let us apply the Cases in *Art. vi.* in this *Section* about the *Prism* and *Tube*, to our simplest Machines, such as a *Pair of Wheels* of our ordinary Carriages; each *Circular*, *Spokes* equal in *Length*, *Thickness*, *Shape*; the *Wheels* set *parallel*, the *Axle-tree* fix'd in the *Nave* of both, and secured from coming out at either End: Now the Cases in which the contrary might have happen'd from *undirected Concourses*, were there no more requir'd than what is just now mention'd, must amount in Multitude to a Power of *Infinities equal* to every Circumstance requir'd. What shall we say then of a *Plant*, a *Tree*, an *Animal*, a *Man*, with such *Multitudes* of adapted Vessels, such *Articulations*, *Insertions* of *Muscles*, *Diffusion* of *Veins*, *Arterys*, *Nerves*? The *Improbability* that such Machines arising daily in such Numbers in all Parts of the Earth with such *Similarity* of Structure, should be the Effect of *Chance*, is beyond all Conception or Expression.

XI. FURTHER, were all the former Reasoning from *Similarity* of Forms and Combinations



Sect. 5. combinations groundless, and could *Chance* give us ground to expect such Forms, with exact Combination, yet we could only promise ourselves *one* of these Forms among an *Infinity* of others. When we see then such a *Multitude* of Individuals of a Species, *similar* to each other in a great number of Parts; and when we see in each *Individual*, the corresponding Members so exactly like each other, what possible room is there left for questioning *Design* in the *Universe*? None but the barest *Possibility* against an inconceivably great *Probability*, surpassing every thing which is not *strict Demonstration*.

XII. THIS Argument, as has been already observ'd \*, is quite abstracted from any Sense of *Beauty* in any particular Form; for the *exact Similarity* of a hundred or a thousand *Trapezia*, proves *Design* as well as the *Similarity* of *Squares*, since both are equally above all the Powers of *undirected Force* or *Chance*; and what is above the Powers of *Chance*, must give us proportionable *Presumption* for *Design*.

THUS, allowing that a *Leg*, or *Arm*, or *Eye*, might have been the Effect of *Chance*, (which was shewn to be *most absurd*, and next to absolutely *impossible*) that it should

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\* See above, *Art. viii.*

not have a corresponding *Leg, Arm, Eye*, Sect. 5.  
*exactly similar*, must be a Hazard of a Power  
 of *Infinite* proportion'd to the Complication  
 of Parts; for in Proportion to this is the  
 Multitude of Cases increas'd, in which it  
 would not have a corresponding Member  
*similar*: so that allowing twenty or thirty  
 Parts in such a Structure, it would be as the  
*twentieth* or *thirtieth* Power of *Infinite*  
 to Unity, that the corresponding Part should  
 not be *similar*. What shall we say then of  
 the *similar Forms* of a whole *Species*?

XIII. If it be objected, "That *natural* <sup>Gross Simi-  
larity by</sup> Bodys are not *exactly similar*, but only <sup>Chance,</sup>  
*grossly so* to our Senses; as that a *Vein*, an <sup>impossible.</sup>  
*Artery*, a *Bone* is not perhaps *exactly*  
*similar* to its Correspondent in the same  
 Animal, tho' it appears so to our Senses,  
 which judge only of the Bulk, and do  
 not discern the small constituent Parts;  
 and that in the several Individuals of a  
 Species the *Dissimilarity* is always sensible,  
 often in the internal Structure, and always  
 in the external Appearance:" To remove  
 this Objection it will be sufficient to shew,  
 That the Multitude of Cases wherein *sen-  
sible Dissimilitude* could have happen'd,  
 are still infinitely more than all the Cases  
 in which *sensible Similitude* might be  
 retained:" so that the same Reasoning  
 holds from *sensible Similarity*, as from the  
*mathematically exact*: And again, "That  
 " the

Sect. 5. " the Cases of *gross Dissimilarity* do in the  
 " same manner surpass the Cases of *gross*  
 " *Similarity* possible, as *infinite* does one.

XIV. To prove both these Assertions, let us consider a simple Instance. Suppose a *Trapezium* of a foot Square in *Area* should appear grossly *similar* to another, while no one *Side* differs, by  $\frac{1}{10}$  of an Inch; or no *Angle* in one surpasses the corresponding one in the other above ten Minutes: now this tenth of an Inch is *infinitely* divisible, as are also the ten Minutes, so that the Cases of *insensible Dissimilarity* under *apparent Similarity* are really *Infinite*. But then it is also plain that there are an *Infinity* of different sensibly dissimilar *Trapezia*, even of the same *Area*, according as we vary a *Side* by one Tenth, two Tenths, three Tenths, and so on, and vary the *Angles* and another *Side* so as to keep the *Area* equal. Now in each of these infinite Degrees of *sensible Dissimilitude* the several Tenths are *infinitely* divisible as well as in the first Case; so that the Multitude of *sensible Dissimilarities* are to the Multitude of *insensible Dissimilarities* under *apparent Resemblance*, still as the *second Power of Infinite* to the *first*, or as *Infinite* to *Unity*. And then how vastly greater must the Multitude be, of all possible *sensible Dissimilarities* in such complex Bodys as *Legs, Arms, Eyes, Arterys, Veins, Skeletons*?

XV. As



XV. As to the *Diffimilaritys* of Animals Sect. 5.

of the same Species, it is in the same manner plain, that the possible Cases of *gross Diffimilarity* are Infinite; and then every Case of *gross Diffimilarity* contains also all the Cases of *insensible Diffimilarity*. Thus, if we would count all Animals of a Species *grossly similar*, while there was no Limb which in Length or Diameter did exceed the ordinary Shape by above a Third of the Head; it is plain that there are an Infinity of sensibly different *gross Diffimilaritys* possible, and then in each of these Cases of *gross Diffimilarity*, there are an Infinity of Cases of *nicer Diffimilarity*, since  $\frac{1}{3}$  of the Head may be infinitely divided. To take a low but easy Instance; two *Cockle-Shells* which fitted each other naturally, may have an Infinity of *insensible Differences*, but still there are an Infinity of possible *sensible Differences*; and then in any one of the *sensibly different* Forms, there may be the same Infinity of *insensible Differences* beside the *sensible one*: so that still the Hazard for even *gross Similarity* from *Chance* is *Infinite to one*, and this always increases by a Power of Infinite for every distinct Member of the Animal, in which even *gross Similarity* is retain'd; since the Addition of every Member or Part to a complex Machine, makes a new Infinity of Cases, in which *sensible Diffimilarity* may happen; and this Infinity combin'd with

Sect. 5. with the infinite Cases of the former Part  
 raises the Hazard by a Power of Infinite.

Now this may sufficiently shew us the Absurdity of the *Cartesian* or *Epicurean Hypothesis*, even granting their *Postulatum* of *undirected Force* impress'd on *Infinite Matter*; and seems almost a *Demonstration of Design* in the *Universe*.

XVI. ONE Objection more remains to be remov'd, viz. "That some imagine, this  
 " Argument may hold better *à Priori* than  
 " *à Posteriori*; that is, we have better  
 " Reason to believe, when we see a *Cause*  
 " about to act, without Knowledge, that  
 " he will not attain any given, or desir'd  
 " *End*; than we have on the other hand to  
 " believe, when we see the *End* actually at-  
 " tain'd, that he acted with Knowledge.  
 " Thus, say they, when a particular Per-  
 " son is about to draw a Ticket in a *Lot-*  
 " *tery*, where there is but one *Prize* to a  
 " thousand *Blanks*, it is highly probable that  
 " he shall draw a *Blank*; but suppose we  
 " have seen him actually draw for himself  
 " the *Prize*, we have no ground to con-  
 " clude that he had *Knowledge* or *Art* to  
 " accomplish this End." But the Answer  
 is obvious: In such Contrivances we ge-  
 nerally have, from the very Circumstances  
 of the Lottery, very strong moral Argu-  
 ments, which almost demonstrate that *Art*  
 can

can have no Place; so that a Probability of *Sec. 5.*  
*a thousand to one,* may not surmount those  
 Arguments: But let the Probability be in-  
 creas'd, and it will soon surmount all Argu-  
 ments to the contrary. For instance, If we  
 saw a Man ten times successively draw Prizes,  
 in a Lottery where there were but ten Prizes  
 to ten thousand Blanks, I fancy few would  
 question whether he us'd *Art* or not: much  
 less would we imagine it were *Chance*; if  
 we saw a Man draw for his own Gain suc-  
 cessively a hundred, or a thousand Prizes,  
 from among a proportionably greater Num-  
 ber of Blanks. Now in the Works of Na-  
 ture the Case is intirely different: we have  
 not the least Argument against *Art* or *De-*  
*sign.* An *Intelligent Cause* is surely at least  
 as probable a Notion as *Chance*, *general*  
*Force*, *Conatus ad Motum*, or the *Clinamen*  
*Principiorum*, to account for any Effect  
 whatsoever: And then all the *Regularity*,  
*Combinations*, *Similaritys* of Species, are so  
 many Demonstrations, that there was *De-*  
*sign* and *Intelligence* in the CAUSE of this  
 Universe: Whereas in fair Lotterys, all *Art*  
 in drawing is made, if not actually impossi-  
 ble, at least highly improbable.

XVII. LET it be here observ'd also, *Irregulari-*  
 " That a *rational Agent* may be capable of *ty does not*  
 " impressing Force without intending to *prove*  
 " produce any particular Form, and of de- *want of*  
 " signedly producing *irregular* or *dissimilar* *Design.*  
 " *Forms,*



## 64 *An Inquiry concerning Beauty,*

Sect. 5. "Forms, as well as *regular* and *similar*:"  
 And hence it follows, "That altho' all the  
 " *Regularity, Combination* and *Similarity* in  
 " the *Universe*, are Presumptions of *Design*,  
 " yet *Irregularity* is no Presumption of the  
 " contrary: unless we suppose that the  
 " *Agent* is determin'd from a Sense of *Beau-*  
 " *ty* always to act *regularly*, and delight in  
 " *Similarity*; and that he can have no other  
 " inconsistent Motive of Action:" Which  
 last is plainly absurd. We do not want in  
 the *Universe* many Effects which seem to  
 have been left to the general *Laws* of *Mo-*  
*tion* upon some great *Impulse*, and have ma-  
 ny Instances where *Similarity* has been plainly  
 design'd in some respects, and probably neg-  
 lected in others; or even *Dissimilarity* de-  
 sign'd. Thus we see the general exact *Re-*  
*semblance* between the two *Eyes* of most  
 Persons; and yet perhaps no other third  
*Eye* in the World is *exactly* like them. We  
 see a gross *Conformity* of Shape in all Persons  
 in innumerable Parts, and yet no two *Indi-*  
*viduals* of any Species are undistinguishable;  
 which perhaps is intended for valuable  
 Purposes to the whole Species.

*Wisdom,*  
*Prudence.*

XVIII. HITHERTO the Proof amounts  
 only to *Design* or *Intention*, barely, in Oppo-  
 sition to *blind Force* or *Chance*; and we see  
 the Proof of this is independent on the *arbi-*  
*trary Constitution* of our *internal Sense* of  
*Beauty*. *Beauty* is often suppos'd an *Argu-*  
 ment

ment of more than *Design*, to wit, *Wisdom* Sect. 5.  
and *Prudence* in the *Cause*. Let us inquire  
also into this.

WISDOM denotes *the pursuing of the best Ends by the best Means*; and therefore, before we can from any Effect prove the *Cause* to be *wise*, we must know what is *best* to the *Cause* or *Agent*. Among Men who have Pleasure in contemplating *Uniformity*, the *Beauty* of Effects is an Argument of *Wisdom*, because this is good to them; but the same Argument would not hold as to a *Being void* of this *Sense* of *Beauty*. And therefore the *Beauty* apparent to us in *Nature*, will not of itself prove *Wisdom* in the *Cause*, unless this *Cause* or AUTHOR of *Nature* be suppos'd BENEVOLENT; and then indeed the Happiness of Mankind is desirable or *Good* to the SUPREME CAUSE; and that Form which pleases us, is an Argument of his *Wisdom*. And the Strength of this Argument is increased always in proportion to the Degree of *Beauty* produc'd in *Nature*, and expos'd to the View of any *rational Agents*; since upon Supposition of a *Benevolent DEITY*, all the apparent *Beauty* produc'd is an Evidence of the Execution of a *Benevolent Design*, to give them the Pleasures of *Beauty*.

BUT what more immediately proves *Wisdom* is this; When we see any Machine with a great Complication of Parts actually obtaining

Sect. 5. *taining an End, we justly conclude, " That*  
 " since this could not have been the Effect  
 " of *Chance*, it must have been *intended* for  
 " that *End*, which is obtain'd by it;" and  
 then the *Ends* or *Intentions* being in part  
 known, the *Complication* of *Organs*, and  
 their nice *Disposition* adapted to this *End*,  
 is an *Evidence* " of a *comprehensive large*  
 " *Understanding* in the *Cause*, according to  
 " the *Multiplicity* of *Parts*, and the *Appo-*  
 " *fiteness* of their *Structure*, even when we  
 " do not know the *Intention* of the *Whole*."

General  
Causes.

XIX. THERE is another kind of *Beauty*  
 from which we conclude *Wisdom* in the  
*Cause*, as well as *Design*, when we see many  
*useful* or *beautiful Effects* flowing from one  
*general Cause*. There is a very good Reason  
 for this Conclusion among Men. *Interest*  
 must lead *Beings* of limited Powers, who are  
 incapable of a great Diversity of Operations,  
 and distracted by them, to choose this *frugal*  
*Oeconomy* of their Forces, and to look upon  
 such Management as an *Evidence* of *Wisdom*  
 in other *Beings* like themselves. Nor is this  
*speculative Reason* all which influences  
 them; for even beside this Consideration of  
*Interest*, they are determin'd by a *Sense* of  
*Beauty*, where that Reason does not hold; as  
 when we are judging of the Productions of  
 other *Agents* about whose *Oeconomy* we are  
 not solicitous. Thus, who does not ap-  
 prove of it as a *Perfection* in *Clock-work*, that



three or four Motions of the *Hour*, *Minute*, Sect. 5. and *second Hands*, and *monthly Plate*, should arise from *one Spring* or *Weight*, rather than from three or four *Springs* or *Weights*, in a very compound Machine, which should perform the same Effects, and answer all the same Purposes with equal Exactness? Now the Foundation of this *Beauty* plainly appears to be an *Uniformity*, or *Unity* of Cause amidst *Diversity* of Effects.

XX. WE shall \* hereafter offer some *General* Reasons, why the AUTHOR of *Nature* *Laws* may choose to operate in this manner by *General Laws* and *Universal extensive Causes*, altho' the Reason just now mention'd does not hold with an *Almighty Being*. This is certain, That we have some of the most delightful Instances of *Universal Causes* in the *Works of Nature*, and that the most studious Men in these Subjects are so delighted with the Observation of them, that they always look upon them as Evidences of *Wisdom* in the Administration of *Nature*, from a SENSE OF BEAUTY.

XXI. THE wonderfully simple *Mechanism* which performs all Animal Motions, was mention'd ‡ already; nor is *that* of the inanimate Parts of *Nature*, less admirable. How innumerable are the Effects of that one

\* See the last Section.

‡ See above, Sect. ii. Art. 8.

Sect. 5. Principle of *Heat*, deriv'd to us from the *Sun*, which is not only delightful to our Sight and Feeling, and the Means of discerning Objects, but is the Cause of *Rains*, *Springs*, *Rivers*, *Winds*, and the universal Cause of *Vegetation*! The *uniform Principle of Gravity* preserves at once the *Planets* in their *Orbits*, gives *Cohesion* to the Parts of each *Globe*, and *Stability* to *Mountains*, *Hills*, and *artificial Structures*; it raises the *Sea* in *Tides*, and sinks them again, and restrains them in their *Channels*; it drains the *Earth* of its superfluous *Moisture*, by *Rivers*; it raises the *Vapours* by its Influence on the *Air*, and brings them down again in *Rains*; it gives an *uniform Pressure* to our *Atmosphere*, necessary to our *Bodys* in general, and more especially to *Inspiration* in *Breathing*; and furnishes us with an *universal Movement*, capable of being apply'd in innumerable *Engines*. How incomparably more *beautiful* is this *Structure*, than if we suppos'd so many *distinct Volitions* in the DEITY, producing every particular Effect, and preventing some of the accidental Evils which casually flow from the *general Law*! We may rashly imagine that this latter manner of Operation might have been more useful to us; and it would have been no Distraction to *Omnipotence*: But then the great *Beauty* had been lost, and there had been no more Pleasure in the Contemplation of this Scene, which is now so delightful. One would rather

rather choose to run the Hazard of its *casual* Sect. 5. *Evils*, than part with that *harmonious Form*, which has been an unexhausted Source of Delight to the successive Spectators in all Ages.

XXII. HENCE we see, "That how-*Miracles*.  
 " ever *Miracles* may prove the Superin-  
 " tendency of a *voluntary Agent*, and that  
 " the *Universe* is not guided by *Necessity* or  
 " *Fate*, yet that *Mind* must be *weak* and  
 " *inadvertent*, which needs them to confirm  
 " the Belief of a *Wise* and Good DEITY;  
 " since the Deviation from *general Laws*,  
 " unless upon very extraordinary Occasions,  
 " must be a Presumption of *Inconstancy*  
 " and *Weakness*, rather than of *steady Wis-*  
 " *dom* and *Power*, and must weaken the  
 " best Arguments we can have for the Sa-  
 " *gacity* and *Power* of the *universal MIND*."



SECT. VI.

Of the Unversality of the Sense of  
Beauty among Men.

Internal  
Sense not  
an imme-  
diate  
Source of  
Pain.

I. **W**E before \*insinuated, " That all  
" *Beauty* has a relation to some  
" *perceiving Power* ;" and consequently since  
we know not how great a *Variety* of Senses  
there may be among Animals, there is no  
Form in *Nature* concerning which we can  
pronounce, " That it has no *Beauty* ;" for  
it may still please some *perceiving Power*.  
But our *Inquiry* is confin'd to Men ; and be-  
fore we examine the *Unversality* of this  
*Sense of Beauty*, or their Agreement in ap-  
proving *Uniformity*, it may be proper to  
consider, " Whether, as the other *Senses*  
" which give us Pleasure, do also give us  
" Pain, so this *Sense of Beauty* does make  
" some Objects disagreeable to us, and the  
" Occasion of Pain."

**T**HAT many Objects give no pleasure to  
our *Sense* is obvious ; many are certainly  
void of *Beauty* : But then there is no Form  
which seems necessarily disagreeable of it-  
self, when we dread no other Evil from it,

\* See above Sect. i. Art. 17. Sect. iv. Art. 1.

and compare it with nothing better of the Sect. 6. Kind. Many Objects are naturally displeasing, and distasteful to our *external Senses*, as well as others pleasing and agreeable; as *Smells, Tastes, and some separate Sounds*: but as to our *Sense of Beauty*, no Composition of Objects which give not unpleasant simple Ideas, seems positively unpleasant or painful of itself, had we never observ'd any thing better of the Kind. *Deformity* is only the *Absence of Beauty*, or *Deficiency in the Beauty expected in any Species*: Thus *bad Musick* pleases *Rusticks* who never heard any better, and the *finest Ear* is not offended with *tuning* of Instruments, if it be not too tedious, where no *Harmony* is expected; and yet much smaller *Dissonancy* shall offend amidst the Performance, where *Harmony* is expected. A *rude Heap* of Stones is no way offensive to one who shall be displeas'd with *Irregularity in Architecture*, where *Beauty* was expected. And had there been a Species of that Form which we now call *ugly* or *deform'd*, and had we never seen or expected greater *Beauty*, we should have receiv'd no Disgust from it, altho' the Pleasure would not have been so great in this Form as in those we now admire. Our *Sense of Beauty* seems design'd to give us positive Pleasure, but not a positive Pain or Disgust, any farther than what arises from Disappointment.

Sect. 6.

Approba-  
tion and  
Dislike  
from As-  
sociations  
of Ideas.

II. THERE are indeed many Faces which at first View are apt to raise Dislike; but this is generally not from any Deformity which of itself is positively displeasing, but either from want of *expected Beauty*, or much more from their carrying some natural Indications of *morally bad Dispositions*, which we all acquire a Faculty of discerning in *Countenances, Airs, and Gestures*. That this is not occasion'd by any Form positively disgusting, will appear from this, That if upon long Acquaintance we are sure of finding *Sweetness of Temper, Humanity and Cheerfulness*, altho' the bodily Form continues, it shall give us no Disgust or Displeasure; whereas, if any thing were naturally disagreeable, or the Occasion of Pain, or positive Distaste, it would always continue so, even altho' the Aversion we might have toward it were counterbalanc'd by other Considerations. There are Horrors rais'd by some Objects, which are only the Effect of *Fear* for ourselves, or *Compassion* towards others, when either *Reason*, or some foolish *Association of Ideas*, makes us apprehend Danger, and not the Effect of any thing in the Form itself: for we find that most of those Objects which excite Horror at first, when Experience or Reason has remov'd the Fear, may become the Occasions of Pleasure; as *ravenous Beasts, a tempestuous Sea, a craggy Precipice, a dark shady Valley*.

III. WE



III. WE shall see \* hereafter, " That Sect. 6.  
 " *Associations of Ideas* make Objects plea-  
 " sant and delightful, which are not na- *Associati-*  
 " turally apt to give any such Pleasures; *ons.*  
 " and the same way, the *casual Conjunctions*  
 " of *Ideas* may give a Disgust, where there  
 " is nothing disagreeable in the Form it-  
 " self." And this is the Occasion of many  
 fantastick Aversions to Figures of some Ani-  
 mals, and to some other Forms: Thus  
*Swine, Serpents* of all Kinds, and some *In-*  
*sects* really beautiful enough, are beheld  
 with Aversion by many People, who have  
 got some *accidental Ideas associated* to them.  
 And for *Distastes* of this Kind, no other  
 Account can be given.

IV. BUT as to the *universal Agreement* *Universa-*  
 of Mankind in their *Sense of Beauty* from *lity of this*  
*Uniformity amidst Variety*, we must consult *Sense.*  
 Experience: and as we allow all Men Rea-  
 son, since all Men are capable of understand-  
 ing simple Arguments, tho' few are capable  
 of complex Demonstrations; so in this Case  
 it must be sufficient to prove *this Sense of*  
*Beauty universal*, " if all Men are better  
 " pleas'd with *Uniformity* in the simpler  
 " Instances than *the contrary*, even when  
 " there is no Advantage observ'd attending  
 " it; and likewise if all Men, according as

\* See below Art. 11, 12. of this Section.

" their

Sect. 6. " their Capacity enlarges, so as to receive  
 " and compare more complex Ideas, have  
 " a greater Delight in *Uniformity*, and are  
 " pleas'd with its more complex Kinds,  
 " both *Original* and *Relative*."

Now let us consider if ever any Person was void of *this Sense* in the simpler Instances. Few Trials have been made in the simplest Instances of *Harmony*, because, as soon as we find an *Ear* incapable of relishing complex Compositions, such as our *Tunes* are, no farther Pains are employ'd about such. But in *Figures*, did ever any Man make choice of a *Trapezium*, or any irregular *Curve*, for the *Ichnography* or Plan of his House, without Necessity, or some great Motive of Convenience? or to make the opposite Walls *not parallel*, or *unequal* in Height? Were ever *Trapeziums*, irregular *Polygons* or *Curves* chosen for the Forms of *Doors* or *Windows*, tho' these Figures might have answer'd the Uses as well, and would have often sav'd a great Part of the Time, Labour and Expence to Workmen, which is now employ'd in suiting the Stones and Timber to the *regular* Forms? Among all the fantastick Modes of *Dress*, none was ever quite void of *Uniformity*, if it were only in the *Resemblance* of the two Sides of the same *Robe*, and in some general *Aptitude* to the human Form. The *Pictish Painting* had always *relative Beauty*, by Resemblance

## Order, Harmony, and Design. 75

to other Objects, and often those Objects Sect. 6.  
 were *originally beautiful*: however justly we  
 might here apply HORACE's Censure of im-  
 pertinent Descriptions in *Poetry*,

*Sed non erat his locus —\*.*

But never were any so extravagant as to  
 affect such Figures as are made by the ca-  
 sual *spilling* of liquid Colours. Who was  
 ever pleas'd with an *Inequality* of Heights in  
*Windows* of the same Range, or *dissimilar*  
*Shapes* of them? with *unequal Legs* or *Arms*,  
*Eyes* or *Cheeks* in a *Mistress*? It must however  
 be acknowledg'd, "That *Interest* may often  
 "counterbalance our *Sense of Beauty*, in  
 "this Affair as well as in others, and supe-  
 "rior good *Qualitys* may make us overlook  
 "such Imperfections."

V. NAY farther, it may perhaps appear, *Real Beau-*  
 "That *Regularity* and *Uniformity* are so co-<sup>ty alone</sup>  
 "piously diffus'd thro' the *Universe*, and we <sup>pleases.</sup>  
 "are so readily determin'd to pursue *this* as  
 "the Foundation of *Beauty* in *Works of Art*,  
 "that there is scarcely any thing ever fan-  
 "sy'd as *Beautiful*, where there is not really  
 "something of this *Uniformity* and *Regula-*  
 "rity." We are indeed often mistaken in  
 "imagining that there is the greatest possible  
 "*Beauty*, where it is but very imperfect; but

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\* Hor. de Arte Poet. v. 19.



~ Sect. 6. still it is some Degree of *Beauty* which pleases, altho' there may be higher Degrees which we do not observe; and our *Sense* acts with full Regularity when we are pleas'd, altho' we are kept by a false Prejudice from pursuing Objects which would please us more.

A GOTH, for instance, is mistaken, when from Education he imagines the *Architecture* of his Country to be the most perfect; and a *Conjunction* of some *hostile Ideas*, may make him have an Aversion to *Roman Buildings*, and study to demolish them, as some of our *Reformers* did the *Popish Buildings*, not being able to separate the Ideas of the superstitious Worship from the Forms of the Buildings where it was practis'd: and yet it is still *real Beauty* which pleases the GOTH, founded upon *Uniformity amidst Variety*. For the *Gothick Pillars* are *uniform* to each other, not only in their *Sections*, which are *Lozenge-form'd*; but also in their *Heights* and *Ornaments*: Their *Arches* are not one *uniform Curve*, but yet they are *Segments of similar Curves*, and generally equal in the same Ranges. The very *Indian Buildings* have some kind of *Uniformity*, and many of the *EASTERN NATIONS*, tho' they differ much from us, yet have great *Regularity* in their Manner, as well as the *ROMANS* in their. Our *Indian Screens*, which wonderfully supply our Imaginations with Ideas of Deformity, in which *Nature* is very chur-

lish and sparing, do want indeed all the Sect. 6.  
*Beauty* arising from Proportion of Parts, and  
 Conformity to *Nature*; and yet they cannot  
 divest themselves of all *Beauty* and *Uniformity*  
 in the separate Parts: And this diversify-  
 ing the human Body into various Contor-  
 tions, may give some wild Pleasure from  
*Variety*, since some *Uniformity* to the human  
 Shape is still retained.

VI. THERE is one sort of *Beauty* which *History*  
 might perhaps have been better mention'd *pleases in*  
 before, but will not be impertinent here, *like man-*  
 because the Taste or Relish of it is *universal*  
 in all Nations, and with the Young as well  
 as the Old, and that is the *Beauty* of *History*.  
 Every one knows how dull a Study it is to  
 read over a Collection of *Gazettes*, which  
 shall perhaps relate all the same Events with  
 the *Historian*: The superior Pleasure then  
 of *History* must arise, like that of *Poetry*,  
 from the *Manners*; when we see a *Character*  
 well drawn, wherein we find the secret Causes  
 of a great Diversity of seemingly inconsistent  
 Actions; or an *Interest of State* laid open, or  
 an *artful View* nicely unfolded, the Execution  
 of which influences very different and oppo-  
 site Actions as the Circumstances may alter.  
 Now this reduces the whole to an *Unity* of  
 Design at least: And this may be observ'd in  
 the very Fables which entertain Children,  
 otherwise we cannot make them relish them.

## VII. WHAT

## Sect. 6.

VII. WHAT has been said will probably be assented to, if we always remember in our Inquiries into the *Universality* of the *Sense of Beauty*, "That there may be *real Beauty*,  
 " where there is not the *greatest*; and that  
 " there are an *Infinity* of different *Forms*  
 " which may all have some *Unity*, and yet  
 " differ from each other." So that Men may have different *Fancys* of *Beauty*, and yet *Uniformity* be the *universal Foundation* of our *Approbation* of any *Form* whatsoever as *Beautiful*. And we shall find that it is so in the *Architecture*, *Gardening*, *Dress*, *Equipage*, and *Furniture* of *Houses*, even among the most uncultivated Nations; where *Uniformity* still pleases, without any other *Advantage* than the *Pleasure* of the *Contemplation* of it.

*Diversity  
 of Judg-  
 ments con-  
 cerning our  
 Senses.*

VIII. IT will deserve our Consideration on this Subject, how, in like Cases, we form very different Judgments concerning the *internal* and *external Senses*. Nothing is more ordinary among those, who after Mr. LOCKE have rejected *innate Ideas*, than to alledge, "That all our Relish for *Beauty*  
 " and *Order*, is either from Prospect of *Ad-  
 vantage*, *Custom*, or *Education*," for no other Reason but the *Variety* of *Fancys* in the World: and from this they conclude, "That our *Fancys* do not arise from any  
 " *natural Power* of *Perception*, or *Sense*."

And



And yet all allow our *external Senses* to be Sect. 6. *Natural*, and that the Pleasures or Pains of their Sensations, however they may be increas'd or diminish'd by *Custom* or *Education*, and counterbalanc'd by *Interest*, yet are really antecedent to *Custom*, *Habit*, *Education*, or Prospect of *Interest*. Now it is certain, "That there is at least as great a Variety of Fancys about their Objects, as the Objects of *Beauty*:" Nay, it is much more difficult, and perhaps impossible, to bring the Fancys or Relishes of the *external Senses* to any general Foundation at all, or to find any Rule for the *Agreeable* or *Disagreeable*: and yet we all allow, "that these are *natural Powers of Perception*."

IX. THE Reason of this different Judgment can be no other than this, That we <sup>The Reason of it.</sup> have got distinct Names for the *external Senses*, and none, or very few, for the *Internal*; and by this are led, as in many other Cases, to look upon the former as some way more *fix'd*, and *real*, and *natural*, than the latter. The *Sense* of *Harmony* has got its Name, *viz.* a *good Ear*; and we are generally brought to acknowledge this a *natural Power of Perception*, or a *Sense* some way distinct from *Hearing*: now it is certain, "That there is as necessary a Perception of *Beauty* upon the Presence of *regular Objects*, as of *Harmony* upon hearing certain *Sounds*."

X. BUT

Sect. 6. X. BUT let it be observ'd here once for all, "That an *internal Sense* no more pre-  
 An inter-  
 nal Sense  
 does not  
 presuppose  
 innate  
 Ideas.  
 "supposes an *innate Idea*, or Principle of  
 "Knowledge, than the *external*." Both are  
*natural Powers of Perception*, or *Determinations of the Mind* to receive necessarily certain  
 Ideas from the Presence of Objects. The  
*Internal Sense* is, a *passive Power of receiving*  
*Ideas of Beauty from all Objects in which there*  
*is Uniformity amidst Variety*. Nor does there  
 seem any thing more difficult in this matter,  
 than that the Mind should be always deter-  
 min'd to receive the Idea of *Sweet*, when Par-  
 ticles of such a Form enter the Pores of the  
 Tongue; or to have the Idea of *Sound* upon  
 any quick Undulation of the Air. The one  
 seems to have as little Connection with its  
 Idea, as the other: And the *same Power*  
 could with equal Ease constitute the former  
 the Occasion of Ideas, as the latter.

Associati-  
 ons Cause  
 of Disagree-  
 ment.

XI. THE *Association* of Ideas \* above  
 hinted at, is one great Cause of the apparent  
 Diversity of Fancys in the *Sense of Beauty*, as  
 well as in the *external Senses*; and often  
 makes Men have an Aversion to Objects of  
*Beauty*, and a Liking to others void of it, but  
 under different Conceptions than those of  
*Beauty* or *Deformity*. And here it may not  
 be improper to give some Instances of some

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\* See above Art. 3. of this Section.

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of these *Associations*. The *Beauty of Trees*, Sect. 6. their *cool Shades*, and their *Aptness* to conceal from Observation, have made *Groves* and *Woods* the usual Retreat to those who love *Solitude*, especially to the *Religious*, the *Pensive*, the *Melancholy*, and the *Amorous*. And do not we find that we have so join'd the Ideas of these Dispositions of Mind with those external Objects, that they always recur to us along with them? The Cunning of the *Heathen Priests* might make such obscure Places the Scene of the fictitious Appearances of their *Deitys*; and hence we join Ideas of something *Divine* to them. We know the like Effect in the Ideas of our *Churches*, from the perpetual Use of them only in *religious Exercises*. The faint Light in *Gothick Buildings* has had the same Association of a very foreign Idea, which our Poet shews in his *Epithet*,

——— *A dim religious Light*\*.

In like manner it is known, That often all the Circumstances of *Actions*, or *Places*, or *Dresses* of Persons, or *Voice*, or *Song*, which have occur'd at any time together, when we were strongly affected by any Passion, will be so connected that any one of these will make all the rest recur. And this is often the occasion both of great Pleasure

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\* Milt. Il Penseroso.



Se<sup>ct</sup>. 6. and Pain, Delight and Aversion to many Objects, which of themselves might have been perfectly indifferent to us: but these *Approbations*, or *Disastes*, are remote from the Ideas of *Beauty*, being plainly different Ideas

*Musick,*  
*how it*  
*pleases*  
*differently.*

XII. THERE is also another Charm in *Musick* to various Persons, which is distinct from the *Harmony*, and is occasion'd by its raising agreeable Passions. The *human Voice* is obviously vary'd by all the stronger Passions; now, when our *Ear* discerns any Resemblance between the *Air* of a *Tune*, whether sung or play'd upon an Instrument, either in its *Time*, or *Modulation*, or any other Circumstance, to the Sound of the *human Voice*, in any Passion, we shall be touch'd by it in a very sensible manner, and have *Melancholy*, *Joy*, *Gravity*, *Thoughtfulness*, excited in us by a sort of *Sympathy* or *Contagion*. The same Connexion is observable between the very *Air* of a *Tune*, and the *Words* expressing any Passion which we have heard it fitted to, so that they shall both recur to us together, tho' but one of them affects our *Senses*.

Now in such a Diversity of pleasing or displeasing Ideas, which may be join'd with Forms of *Bodys*, or *Tunes*, when Men are of such different Dispositions, and prone to such a Variety of Passions, it is no Wonder, "that they should often disagree in their Fancy"

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“ of Objects, even altho’ their *Sense of Beau-* Sect. 6.  
“ *ty and Harmony were perfectly uniform;*”  
because many other Ideas may either please  
or displease, according to Persons Tempers,  
and past Circumstances. We know how  
agreeable a very *wild Country* may be to any  
Person who has spent the chearful Days of  
his Youth in it, and how disagreeable very  
*beautiful Places* may be, if they were the  
Scenes of his Misery. And this may help  
us in many Cases to account for the Diver-  
sitys of Fancy, without denying the *Unifor-*  
*mity of our internal Sense of Beauty.*

XIII. GRANDEUR and *Novelty* are two  
Ideas different from *Beauty*, which often re-  
commend Objects to us. The Reason of  
this is foreign to the present Subject. See  
*Spectator*; N<sup>o</sup> 412.

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## S E C T. VII.

*Of the Power of Custom, Education,  
and Example, as to our internal  
Senses.*

I. **C**USTOM, *Education*, and *Example* are so often alledg'd in this Affair, as the Occasion of our Relish for *beautiful Objects*, and for our Approbation of, or Delight in, a certain *Conduct in Life* in a *moral Species*, that it is necessary to examine these three particularly, to make it appear,  
“ that there is a *natural Power of Perception*, or *Sense of Beauty* in Objects, antecedent to all *Custom, Education*, or *Example*.”

*Custom  
gives no  
new Sense.*

II. CUSTOM, as distinct from the other two, operates in this manner. As to Actions, it only gives a Disposition to the Mind or Body more easily to perform those Actions which have been frequently repeated; but never leads us to apprehend them under any other View, than what we were capable of apprehending them under at first; nor gives us any new Power of Perception about them. We are naturally capable of Sentiments of *Fear*, and *Dread* of any powerful *Presence*; and



and so *Custom* may connect the Ideas of religious *Horror* to certain Buildings: but *Custom* could never have made a *Being* naturally incapable of *Fear*, receive such Ideas. So, had we no other Power of perceiving, or forming Ideas of Actions, but as they were *advantageous* or *disadvantageous*, *Custom* could only have made us more ready at perceiving the *Advantage* or *Disadvantage* of Actions. But this is not to our present Purpose.

As to our Approbation of, or Delight in external Objects; When the *Blood* or *Spirits*, of which *Anatomists* talk, are rous'd, quicken'd, or fermented as they call it, in any agreeable manner, by Medicine or Nutrimment; or any *Glands* frequently stimulated to Secretion; it is certain, that to preserve the Body easy, we shall delight in Objects of Taste, which of themselves are not immediately pleasant to it, if they promote that agreeable State, which the Body had been *accustom'd* to. Farther, *Custom* will so alter the State of the Body, that what at first rais'd uneasy Sensations, will cease to do so, or perhaps raise another agreeable Idea of the same Sense; but *Custom* can never give us any Idea of a Sense different from those we had antecedent to it: It will never make the *Blind* approve Objects as *coloured*, or those who have no *Taste* approve Meats as *delicious*, however they might approve them as *strengthening* or *exhilarating*. Were our

Sect. 7. *Glands*, and the Parts about them, void of Feeling, did we perceive no Pleasure from certain brisker Motions in the *Blood*, *Custom* could never make stimulating or intoxicating Fluids or Medicines agreeable, when they were not so to the Taste: So, by like Reasoning, had we no *natural Sense* of *Beauty* from *Uniformity*, *Custom* could never have made us imagine any *Beauty* in Objects; if we had had no Ear, *Custom* could never have given us the Pleasures of *Harmony*. When we have these *natural Senses* antecedently, *Custom* may make us capable of extending our Views farther, and of receiving more complex Ideas of *Beauty* in Bodys, or *Harmony* in Sounds, by increasing our Attention, and Quickness of Perception. But however *Custom* may increase our Power of receiving or comparing complex Ideas, yet it seems rather to weaken than strengthen the Ideas of *Beauty*, or the Impressions of Pleasure from regular Objects; else how is it possible that any Person could go into the open Air on a sunny Day, or clear Evening, without the most extravagant Raptures, such as MILTON \* represents our *Ancestor* in, upon his first Creation? For such any Person would certainly fall into, upon the first Representation of such a Scene.

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\* See *Paradise Lost*, Book 8.

CUSTOM in like manner may make it Sect. 7.  
easier for any Person to discern the Use of  
a complex Machine, and approve it as *ad-  
vantagous*; but he would never have ima-  
gin'd it *beautiful*, had he no *natural Sense*  
of *Beauty*. *Custom* may make us quicker  
in apprehending the Truth of complex *The-  
orems*, but we all find the Pleasure or *Beauty*  
of *Theorems* as strong at first as ever. *Custom*  
makes us more capable of retaining and com-  
paring complex Ideas, so as to discern more  
complicated *Uniformity*, which escapes the  
Observation of *Novices* in any Art; but all  
this presupposes a *natural Sense* of *Beauty* in  
*Uniformity*: for, had there been nothing in  
Forms, which was constituted the necessary  
Occasion of Pleasure to our Senses, no Repe-  
tition of indifferent Ideas as to Pleasure or  
Pain, *Beauty* or *Deformity*, could ever have  
made them grow pleasing or displeasing.

III. THE EFFECT of EDUCATION is this, *Nor Edu-  
cation.*  
that thereby we receive many speculative  
Opinions, which are sometimes true, and  
sometimes false; and are often led to believe,  
that Objects may be naturally apt to give  
Pleasure or Pain to our external Senses,  
which in reality have no such *Qualitys*. And  
farther, by *Education* there are some strong  
Associations of Ideas without any Reason,  
by mere Accident sometimes, as well as by  
Design, which it is very hard for us ever



Sect. 7. after to break asunder. Thus Aversions are rais'd to Darknes, and to many kinds of Meat, and to certain innocent Actions: Approbations without Ground are rais'd in like manner. But in all these Instances, *Education* never makes us apprehend any Quality in Objects, which we have not *naturally* Senses capable of perceiving. We know what Sicknes of the Stomach is, and may without Ground believe, that very healthful Meats will raise this; we by our Sight and Smell receive disagreeable Ideas of the Food of Swine, and their Styres, and perhaps cannot prevent the recurring of these Ideas at Table: but never were Men naturally *blind* prejudic'd against Objects as of a disagreeable Colour, or in favour of others as of a beautiful Colour; they perhaps hear Men dispraise one Colour, and may imagine this Colour to be some quite different sensible Quality of the other Senses, but that is all. And the same way, a Man naturally void of *Taste* could by no *Education* receive the Ideas of Taste, or be prejudic'd in favour of Meats as delicious: So, had we no *natural Sense* of *Beauty* and *Harmony*, we could never be prejudic'd in favour of Objects or Sounds as *beautiful* or *harmonious*. *Education* may make an unattentive GOTH imagine that his *Countrymen* have attain'd the Perfection of *Architecture*; and an Aversion to their Enemys the ROMANS, may have join'd some disagreeable Ideas to their very Buildings, and  
excited

excited them to their Demolition; but he Sect. 7.  
had never form'd these Prejudices, had he  
been void of a *Sense* of *Beauty*. Did ever  
*blind Men* debate whether *Purple* or *Scarlet*  
were the finer *Colour*? or could any *Educa-*  
*tion* prejudice them in favour of either as  
*Colours*?

THUS *Education* and *Custom* may influ-  
ence our *internal Senses*, where they are  
antecedently, by enlarging the Capacity of  
our Minds to retain and compare the Parts  
of complex Compositions: And then, if the  
finest Objects are presented to us, we grow  
conscious of a Pleasure far superior to what  
common Performances excite. But all this  
presupposes our *Sense* of *Beauty* to be *natural*.  
Instruction in *Anatomy*, Observation of *Na-*  
*ture*, and of those *Airs* of the Countenance,  
and *Attitudes* of Body, which accompany  
any *Sentiment*, *Action*, or *Passion*, may en-  
able us to know where there is a just Imita-  
tion: but why should an exact Imitation please  
upon Observation, if we had not *naturally* a  
*Sense* of *Beauty* in it, more than the observ-  
ing the Situation of fifty or a hundred Peb-  
bles thrown at random? and should we ob-  
serve them ever so often, we should never  
dream of their growing *beautiful*.

IV. THERE is something worth our Ob-  
servation as to the manner of rooting out the  
*Prejudices* of *Education*, not quite foreign to  
the <sup>*Prejudices*  
*how remo-*  
*ved.*</sup>

Sect. 7. the present Purpose. When the *Prejudice* arises from Associations of Ideas without any natural Connection, we must frequently force ourselves to bear Representations of those Objects, or the Use of them when separated from the disagreeable Idea; and this may at last disjoin the unreasonable Association, especially if we can join new agreeable Ideas to them: Thus, Opinions of *Superstition* are best remov'd by pleasant Conversation of Persons we esteem for their *Virtue*, or by observing that they despise such Opinions. But when the *Prejudice* arises from an Apprehension or Opinion of *natural Evil*, as the Attendant, or Consequent of any Object or Action; if the *Evil* be apprehended to be the constant and immediate Attendant, a few Trials, without receiving any Damage, will remove the *Prejudice*, as in that against *Meats*: But where the *Evil* is not represented as the perpetual Concomitant, but as what may possibly or probably at some time or other accompany the Use of the Object, there must be frequent Reasoning with ourselves, or a long Series of Trials without any Detriment, to remove the *Prejudice*; such is the Case of our Fear of *Spirits* in the Dark, and in *Church-yards*. And when the *Evil* is represented as the Consequence perhaps a long time after, or in a *future State*, it is then hardest of all to remove the *Prejudice*, and this is only to be effected by slow Processes of Reason, because in this Case there



can be no Trials made: and this is the Case Sect. 7.  
 of *superstitious Prejudices* against Actions  
 apprehended as offensive to the DEITY; and  
 hence it is that they are so hard to be root-  
 ed out.

V. EXAMPLE seems to operate in this *Example*  
 manner. We are conscious that we act *not the*  
 very much for *Pleasure*, or *private Good*; *Cause of*  
 and are thereby led to imagine that others do *internal*  
*Sense*.  
 so too: hence we conclude there must be  
 some *Perfection* in the Objects which we see  
 others pursue, and *Evil* in those which we  
 observe them constantly shunning. Or, the  
*Example* of others may serve to us as so many  
 Trials to remove the Apprehension of *Evil* in  
 Objects to which we had an Aversion. But  
 all this is done upon an Apprehension of  
 Qualitys perceivable by the Senses which  
 we have; for no *Example* will induce the  
*Blind* or *Deaf* to pursue Objects as *colour'd*  
 or *sonorous*; nor could *Example* any more  
 engage us to pursue Objects as *beautiful* or  
*harmonious*, had we no *natural Sense* of  
*Beauty* or *Harmony*.

EXAMPLE may make us conclude with-  
 out Examination, that our Countrymen have  
 obtain'd the Perfection of *Beauty* in their  
*Works*, or that there is less *Beauty* in the Or-  
 ders of *Architecture* or *Painting*, us'd in other  
*Nations*, and so content ourselves with very  
 imperfect Forms. And Fear of Contempt as  
 void

Sect. 7. void of *Taste* or *Genius*, often makes us join  
in approving the Performances of the reputed Masters in our Country, and restrains those who have *naturally* a fine *Genius*, or the *internal Senses* very acute, from studying to obtain the greatest Perfection; it makes also those of a bad *Taste* pretend to a livelier Perception of *Beauty* than in reality they have: But all this presupposes some *natural Power* of receiving Ideas of *Beauty* and *Harmony*. Nor can *Example* effect any thing farther, unless it be to lead Men to pursue Objects by implicit Faith, for some Perfection which the Pursuer is conscious he does not know, or which perhaps is some very different Quality from the Idea perceiv'd by those of a good *Taste* in such Affairs.

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## S E C T. VIII.

*Of the Importance of the internal Senses in Life, and the final Causes of them.*

I. **T**H E busy part of Mankind may look upon these things as airy Dreams of an inflam'd Imagination, which a wise Man should despise, who rationally pursues more solid Possessions independent on Fancy: but a little Reflection will convince us, "That the Gratifications of our *internal Senses* are as *natural, real, and satisfying* Enjoyments as any sensible Pleasure whatsoever; and that they are the chief Ends for which we commonly pursue *Wealth* and *Power*." For how is *Wealth* or *Power* advantageous? How do they make us *happy*, or prove *good* to us? No otherwise than as they supply Gratifications to our *Senses*, or Facultys of perceiving Pleasure. Now, are these *Senses* or Facultys only the *external ones*? No: Every body sees, that a small portion of *Wealth* or *Power* will supply more Pleasures of the *external Senses* than we can enjoy; we know that Scarcity often heightens these Perceptions more than Abundance, which cloyes that Appetite which

is



Sect. 8. is necessary to all Pleasure in Enjoyment:  
 and hence the *Poet's* Advice is perfectly  
 just;

—————*Tu pulmentaria quære*  
*Sudando* ————— \*

In short, the only Use of a great Fortune above a very small one (except in *good Offices*, and *moral Pleasures*) must be to supply us with the Pleasures of *Beauty*, *Order*, and *Harmony*.

IT is true indeed, that the noblest Pleasures of the *internal Senses*, in the Contemplation of the Works of *Nature*, are expos'd to every one without Expence; the *Poor* and the *Low*, may have as free Use of these Objects, in this way, as the *Wealthy* or *Powerful*. And even in Objects which may be appropriated, the *Property* is of little Consequence to the Enjoyment of their Beauty, which is often enjoy'd by others beside the *Proprietor*. But then there are other Objects of these *internal Senses*, which require *Wealth* or *Power* to procure the Use of them as frequently as we desire; as appears in *Architecture*, *Musick*, *Gardening*, *Painting*, *Dress*, *Equipage*, *Furniture*; of which we cannot have the full Enjoyment without

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\* Hor. Lib. 2. Sat. 2. v. 20.

## Order, Harmony, and Design. 95

*Property*. And there are some confus'd *Ima-* Sect. 8.  
*inations*, which often lead us to pursue  
*Property*, even in Objects where it is not  
 necessary to the true Enjoyment of them.  
 These are the *ultimate Motives* of our pur-  
 suing the greater Degrees of *Wealth*, where  
 there are no generous Intentions of virtuous  
 Actions.

THIS is confirm'd by the constant Prac-  
 tice of the very Enemy to these *Senses*.  
 As soon as they think they are got above  
 the *World*, or extricated from the Hurrys  
 of *Avarice* and *Ambition*; banish'd Na-  
 ture will return upon them, and set them  
 upon Pursuits of *Beauty* and *Order* in their  
*Houses, Gardens, Dress, Table, Equipage*.  
 They are never easy without some Degree of  
 this; and were their Hearts open to our  
 View, we should see *Regularity, Decency,*  
*Beauty*, as what their Wishes terminate  
 upon, either to themselves or to their  
 Posterity; and what their Imagination is al-  
 ways presenting to them as the possible Effects  
 of their Labours. Nor without this could  
 they ever justify their Pursuits to themselves.

THERE may perhaps be some Instances  
 of human Nature perverted into a thorow  
*Miser*, who loves nothing but Money, and  
 whose Fancy arises no higher than the cold  
 dull Thought of Possession; but such an In-  
 stance in an Age, must not be made the  
 Stan-

IF we examine the Pursuits of the *Luxurious*, who is imagin'd wholly devoted to his Belly; we shall generally find that the far greater part of his Expence is employ'd to procure other Sensations than those of Taste; such as *fine Attendants*, *regular Apartments*, *Services of Plate*, and the like. Besides, a large Share of the Preparation must be suppos'd design'd for some sort of generous friendly Purposes, to please *Acquaintance*, *Strangers*, *Parasites*. How few would be contented to enjoy the same Sensations alone, in a Cottage, or out of earthen Pitchers? To conclude this Point, however these *internal Sensations* may be overlook'd in our Philosophical Inquiries about the human Facultys, we shall find in Fact, "That they  
" employ us more, and are more efficacious  
" in *Life*, either to our *Pleasure* or *Uneasiness*,  
" *fineness*, than all our *external Senses* taken  
" together."

Final  
Cause of  
the internal  
Senses.

II. As to the *final Causes* of this *internal Sense*, we need not inquire, "Whether, to  
" an *Almighty*, and *All-knowing Being*, there  
" be any real Excellence in *regular Forms*,  
" in acting by *general Laws*, in knowing by  
" *Theorems*?" We seem scarce capable of  
answering such Questions any way; nor  
need we inquire, "Whether other Animals  
" may




may not discern *Uniformity* and *Regularity* in Objects which escape our Observation, and may not perhaps have their Senses constituted so as to perceive *Beauty* from the same Foundation which we do, in Objects which our Senses are not fit to examine or compare?" We shall confine ourselves to a Subject where we have some certain Foundation to go upon, and only inquire, "if we can find any Reasons worthy of the great AUTHOR of *Nature*, for making such a Connection between regular Objects, and the Pleasure which accompanies our Perceptions of them; or, what Reasons might possibly influence him to create the *World*, as it at present is, as far as we can observe, every-where full of *Regularity* and *Uniformity*." Sect. 8.

LET it be here observ'd, that as far as we now concerning any of the great Bodys of the *Universe*, we see Forms and Motions all *beautiful* to our Senses; and if we were plac'd in any *Planet*, the *apparent* *surfaces* would still be *regular* and *uniform*, and consequently *beautiful* to us. Now this gives us no small Ground to imagine, that the Senses of their Inhabitants are in the same manner adapted to their Habitations, and the Objects occurring to their View, as ours are here, their Senses must be upon the same general Foundation with ours.

H

BUT



BUT to return to the Questions: What occurs to resolve them, may be contain'd in the following Propositions.

1. THE Manner of Knowledge by *universal Theorems*, and of Operation by *universal Causes*, as far as we can attain it, must be most convenient for *Beings* of limited Understanding and Power; since this prevents Distraction in their Understanding thro' the Multiplicity of Propositions, and Toil and Weariness to their Powers of Action; and consequently their *Reason*, without any *Sense* of *Beauty*, must approve of such Methods when they reflect upon their apparent *Advantage*.

2. THOSE Objects of Contemplation which there is *Uniformity amidst Variety*, are more distinctly and easily comprehended and retain'd, than *irregular Objects*; because accurate Observation of one or two Parts often leads to the Knowledge of the Whole. Thus we can from a *Pillar* or two, with intermediate *Arch*, and *Cornice*, form a distinct Idea of a whole *regular Building*, if we know of what Species it is, and have its *Length* and *Breadth*: From a *Side* and *Angle*, we have the whole *regular Solid*; the measuring one *Side*, gives the whole *Square*; one *Radius*, the whole *Circle*; one *Diameter*, an *Oval*; one *Ordinate* and

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*scissa*, the *Parabola*; thus also other Fi- Sect. 8.  
 gures, if they have any Regularity, are in every Point determin'd from a few *Data*: Whereas it must be a long Attention to a vast Multiplicity of Parts, which can ascertain or fix the Idea of any *irregular Form*, or give any distinct Idea of it, or make us capable of retaining it; as appears in the Forms of *rude Rocks*, and *Pebbles*, and *confus'd Heaps*, even when the Multitude of sensible Parts is not so great as in the *regular Forms*: for such *irregular Objects* distract the *Mind* with *Variety*, since for every sensible Part we must have a quite different Idea.

3. FROM these two Propositions it follows, "That *Beings* of limited Understanding and Power, if they act rationally for their own *Interest*, must choose to operate by the *simplest Means*, to invent *general Theorems*, and to study *regular Objects*, if they be as useful as *irregular ones*; that they may avoid the endless Toil of producing each Effect by a separate Operation, of searching out each different Truth by a different Inquiry, and of imprinting the endless *Variety* of dissimilar Ideas in *irregular Objects*."

4. BUT then, beside this Consideration of *Interest*, there does not appear to be any necessary Connection, antecedent to the Constitution of the *AUTHOR* of *Nature*, be-



Sect. 8. *tween regular Forms, Actions, Theorems,*  
 and that sudden sensible *Pleasure* excited in  
 us upon Observation of them, even when we  
 do not reflect upon the Advantage mention'd  
 in the former Proposition. And possibly,  
 the DEITY could have form'd us so as to  
 have receiv'd no immediate Pleasure from  
 such Object, or connected Pleasure to those  
 of a quite contrary Nature. We have a  
 tolerable Presumption of this in the *Beautys*  
 of various Animals; they give some small  
 Pleasure indeed to every one who views them;  
 but then every one seems far more delighted  
 with the peculiar *Beautys* of its own *Species*,  
 than with those of a different one, which  
 seldom raise any Desire. This makes it pro-  
 bable, that the *Pleasure* is not the necessary  
 Result of the *Form* itself, otherwise it would  
 equally affect all Apprehensions in what *Spe-*  
*cies* soever; but depends upon a voluntary  
*Constitution*, adapted to preserve the *Regu-*  
*larity* of the *Universe*, and is probably not  
 the Effect of *Necessity*, but *Choice*, in the  
 SUPREME AGENT, who constituted our  
*Senses*.

From the  
 divine  
 Goodness.

5. Now from the whole we may con-  
 clude, " That supposing the DEITY so kind  
 " as to connect *sensible Pleasure* with certain  
 " Actions or Contemplations, beside the  
 " *rational Advantage* perceivable in them  
 " there is a great *moral Necessity*, from his  
 " *Goodness*, that the *internal Sense* of Me-  
 " shoul

“ should be constituted as it is at present, so Sect. 8.

“ as to make *Uniformity amidst Variety* the

“ Occasion of Pleasure.” For were it not so,

but on the contrary, if *irregular Objects*,

*particular Truths* and *Operations* pleased us,

beside the endless Toil this would involve us

in, there must arise a perpetual Dissatisfac-

tion in all rational Agents with themselves;

since *Reason* and *Interest* would lead us to

simple *general Causes*, while a *contrary Sense*

of *Beauty* would make us disapprove them:

*Universal Theorems* would appear to our Un-

derstanding the best Means of increasing our

Knowledge of what might be useful; while

a *contrary Sense* would set us on the search

after *particular Truths*: *Thought* and *Re-*

*flexion* would recommend Objects with *Uni-*

*formity amidst Variety*, and yet this *perverse*

*Instinct* would involve us in Labyrinths of

*Confusion* and *Dissemblance*. And hence we

see “ how suitable it is to the *sagacious Bounty*

“ which we suppose in the DEITY, to con-

“ stitute our *internal Senses* in the manner in

“ which they are; by which Pleasure is join'd

“ to the Contemplation of *those Objects* which

“ a finite *Mind* can best imprint and retain

“ the Ideas of with the least Distraction; to

“ *those Actions* which are most efficacious,

“ and fruitful in useful Effects; and to *those*

“ *Theorems* which most enlarge our *Minds*.”

III. As to the other Question, “ What <sup>Reason of</sup>

Reason might influence the DEITY, whom <sup>general</sup>

Laws.

Sect. 8. "no Diversity of Operation could distract or  
 "weary, to choose to operate by *simplest*  
 "Means, and *general Laws*, and to diffuse  
 "Uniformity, *Proportion*, and *Similitude*  
 "thro' all the Parts of *Nature* which we  
 "can observe?" Perhaps there may be some  
 real Excellence in this Manner of Operation,  
 and in these Forms, which we know not;  
 but this we may probably say, that since the  
*divine Goodness*, for the Reasons above-men-  
 tion'd, has constituted our *Sense of Beauty*  
 as it is at present, the same *Goodness* might  
 have determined the *Great ARCHITECT* to  
 adorn this stupendous *Theatre* in a manner  
 agreeable to the Spectators, and that Part  
 which is expos'd to the Observation of Men,  
 so as to be pleasant to them; especially if  
 we suppose, that he design'd to discover him-  
 self to them as *Wise* and *Good*, as well as  
*Powerful*: for thus he has given them greater  
 Evidences, thro' the whole *Earth*, of his  
*Art, Wisdom, Design*, and *Bounty*, than they  
 can possibly have for the *Reason, Counsel*  
 and *Good-will* of their Fellow-Creatures  
 with whom they converse, with full Per-  
 suasion of these Qualities in them, about  
 their common Affairs.

As to the Operations of the DEITY by  
*general Laws*, there is still a farther Reason  
 from a *Sense* superior to these already con-  
 sider'd, even that of VIRTUE, or the *Beauty*  
 of *Action*, which is the Foundation of a  
 greater



greatest Happiness. For were there no *general Laws* fix'd in the Course of *Nature*, there could be no *Prudence* or *Design* in Men, no *rational Expectation* of Effects from Causes, no *Schemes* of Action projected, or any *regular Execution*. If then, according to the *Frame* of our *Nature*, our greatest Happiness must depend upon our Actions, as it may perhaps be made appear it does, "the *Universe* must be govern'd, not by " *particular Wills*, but by *general Laws*, " upon which we can found our Expecta- " tions, and project our Schemes of Action." Nay farther, tho' *general Laws* did ordinarily obtain, yet if the DEITY usually stopp'd their Effects whenever it was necessary to prevent any particular Evils; this would effectually, and justly supersede all human *Prudence* and *Care* about Actions; since a superior *Mind* did thus relieve Men from their Charge.

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TREATISE II.

AN

INQUIRY

CONCERNING

MORAL GOOD *and* EVIL.

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INTRODUCTION.

THE Word MORAL GOOD-<sup>Moral</sup>  
NESS, in this Treatise, denotes <sup>Good and</sup>  
our Idea of *some Quality appre-* <sup>Evil.</sup>  
*hended in Actions, which procures*  
*Approbation, attended with Desire of the*  
*Agent's Happiness.* MORAL EVIL denotes  
our Idea of a *contrary Quality, which excites*  
*Condemnation or Dislike.* Approbation and  
Condemnation are probably simple Ideas,  
which cannot be farther explained. We  
must be contented with these imperfect De-  
scriptions, until we discover whether we  
really have such Ideas, and what general  
*Foundation* there is in Nature for this Diffe-  
rence of Actions, as *morally Good or Evil.*

THESE



THESE Descriptions seem to contain an universally acknowledg'd Difference of *Moral Good* and *Evil*, from *Natural*. All Men who speak of *moral Good*, acknowledge that it procures *Approbation* and *Good-will* toward those we apprehend possess'd of it; whereas *natural Good* does not. In this matter Men must consult their own Breasts. How differently are they affected toward these they suppose possess'd of *Honesty*, *Faith*, *Generosity*, *Kindness*; and those who are possess'd of the *natural Goods*, such as *Houses*, *Lands*, *Gardens*, *Vineyards*, *Health*, *Strength*, *Sagacity*? We shall find that we necessarily love and approve the Possessors of the former; but the Possession of the latter procures no *Approbation* or *Good-will* at all toward the Possessor, but often contrary Affections of *Envy* and *Hatred*. In the same manner, whatever *Quality* we apprehend to be *morally evil*, raises our Dislike toward the Person in whom we observe it, such as *Treachery*, *Cruelty*, *Ingratitude*; whereas we heartily love, esteem, and pity many who are expos'd to *natural Evils*, such as *Pain*, *Poverty*, *Hunger*, *Sickness*, *Death*.

Now the first Question on this Subject is, "Whence arise these different Ideas of Actions?"

BECAUSE we shall afterwards frequently *Interest*.  
 use the Words *Interest*, *Advantage*, *natural* *Advantage*.  
*Good*, it is necessary here to fix their Ideas.

The Pleasure in our sensible Perceptions of any kind, gives us our first Idea of *natural Good* or *Happiness*; and then all Objects which are apt to excite this Pleasure are call'd *immediately good*. Those Objects which may procure others immediately pleasant, are call'd *Advantageous*: and we pursue both Kinds from a View of *Interest*, or from *Self-Love*.

OUR *Sense* of Pleasure is antecedent to *Advantage* or *Interest*, and is the Foundation of it. We do not perceive Pleasure in Objects, because it is our *Interest* to do so; but Objects or Actions are *advantageous*, and are pursu'd or undertaken from *Interest*, because we receive *Pleasure* from them. Our Perception of Pleasure is necessary, and nothing is *advantageous* or *naturally good* to us, but what is apt to raise Pleasure *mediately*, or *immediately*. Such Objects as we know either from Experience of Sense, or Reason, to be *immediately* or *mediately advantageous*, or apt to minister Pleasure, we are said to pursue from *Self-Interest*, when our Intention is only to enjoy this Pleasure, which they have the Power of exciting. Thus *Meats*, *Drink*, *Harmony*, *sine Prospects*, *Painting*, *Statues*, are perceiv'd by our Senses to be *immediately good*;

## An Inquiry concerning

good; and our Reason shews *Riches* and *Power* to be *mediately so*, that is, apt to furnish us with Objects of immediate Pleasure: and both Kinds of these *natural Goods* are pursu'd from *Interest*, or *Self-Love*.

Opinions  
about our  
Sense of  
moral Good  
and Evil.

N o w the greatest Part of our latter *Moralists* establish it as undeniable, " That all *moral Qualities* have necessarily some Relation to the *Law* of a *Superior*, of sufficient *Power* to make us *happy* or *miserable*;" and since all *Laws* operate only by *Sanctions* of *Rewards*, or *Punishments*, which determine us to *Obedience* by *Motives* of *Self-Interest*, they suppose, " that it is thus that *Laws* do constitute some *Actions* *mediately Good*, or *Advantageous*, and others the same way *disadvantageous*." They say indeed, " That a *benevolent Legislator* constitutes no *Actions* *advantageous* to the *Agent* by *Law*, but such as in their own *Nature* tend to the *natural Good* of the *Whole*, or, at least, are not inconsistent with it; and that therefore we approve the *Virtue* of others, because it has some small *Tendency* to our *Happiness*, either from its own *Nature*, or from this general Consideration, That *Obedience* to a *benevolent Legislator* is in general *advantageous* to the *Whole*, and to us in particular; and that for the contrary Reasons alone, we disapprove the *Vice* of others, " that is, the prohibited *Action*, as tending

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“to our particular *Detriment* in some degree.” And then they maintain, “That we are determin’d to Obedience to *Laws*, or deterr’d from Disobedience, merely by Motives of *Self-Interest*, to obtain either the *natural Good* arising from the commanded Action, or the *Rewards* promised by the Sanction; or to avoid the *natural evil* Consequences of Disobedience, or at least the *Penaltys* of the *Law*.”

SOME other Moralists suppose “an immediate *natural Good* in the Actions call’d *virtuous*; that is, That we are determin’d to perceive some *Beauty* in the Actions of others, and to love the Agent, even without reflecting upon any *Advantage* which can any way redound to us from the Action; that we have also a secret Sense of Pleasure arising from Reflection upon such of our own Actions as we call *virtuous*, even when we expect no other *Advantage* from them.” But they alledge at the same time, “That we are excited to perform these Actions, even as we pursue, or purchase *Pictures, Statues, Landskips*, from *Self-Interest*, to obtain this Pleasure which arises from Reflection upon the Action, or some other future Advantage.” The Design of the following Sections is to inquire into this Matter; and perhaps the Reasons to be offered may prove,

I. “That

## An Inquiry concerning

I. "THAT some Actions have to Merit  
 " an *immediate Goodness*; or, that by a  
 " *superior Sense*, which I call a *Moral one*,  
 " we *approve* the Actions of others, and  
 " perceive them to be their *Perfection* and  
 " *Dignity*, and are determin'd to love the  
 " Agent; a like Perception we have in re-  
 " flecting on such Actions of our own, with-  
 " out any View of *natural Advantage* from  
 " them."

II. IT may perhaps also appear, "That  
 " the *Affection, Desire, or Intention*, which  
 " gains *Approbation* to the Actions flowing  
 " from it, is not an Intention to obtain even  
 " this *sensible Pleasure*; much less the *future*  
 " *Rewards* from Sanctions of Laws, or any  
 " other *natural Good*, which may be the  
 " Consequence of the *virtuous Action*; but  
 " an intirely different Principle of Action  
 " from *Self-Love*, or Desire of private  
 " Good."

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# Moral Good and Evil.

III

Sect. I.

## SECT. I.

*Of the Moral Sense by which we perceive Virtue and Vice, and approve or disapprove them in others.*

I. THAT the Perceptions of *moral* Different  
*Good and Evil*, are perfectly different Ideas of  
from those of *natural Good or Advantage*, Moral and  
every one must convince himself, by reflect- Natural  
ing upon the different Manner in which he Good.  
finds himself affected when these Objects  
occur to him. Had we no *Sense* of *Good*  
distinct from the *Advantage* or *Interest*  
arising from the external Senses, and the  
Perceptions of *Beauty* and *Harmony*; the  
Sensations and Affections toward a *fruitful*  
*Field*, or *commodious Habitation*, would be  
much the same with what we have toward  
a *generous Friend*, or any *noble Character*;  
for both are or may be *advantageous* to us:  
And we should no more admire any Action,  
or love any Person in a distant *Country*, or  
*Age*, whose Influence could not extend to  
us, than we love the *Mountains* of *PERU*,  
while we are unconcern'd in the *Spanish*  
*Trade*. We should have the same Senti-  
ments and Affections toward *inanimate*  
*Beings*, which we have toward *rational*  
*Agents*, which yet every one knows to be  
false.



Sect. I. false. Upon Comparison, we say, "Why  
 " should we approve or love *inanimate*  
 " *Beings*? They have no Intention of Good  
 " to us, or to any other Person; their *Nature*  
 " makes them fit for our Uses, which they  
 " neither know nor study to serve. But it  
 " is not so with *rational Agents*: they  
 " study the *Interest*, and desire the *Happiness*  
 " of other Beings with whom they con-  
 " verse."

WE are all then conscious of the Difference between that *Approbation* or Perception of *moral Excellence*, which *Benevolence* excites toward the Person in whom we observe it, and that Opinion of *natural Goodness*, which only raises *Desire* of Possession toward the good Object. Now "what should make  
 " this Difference, if all Approbation, or  
 " *Sense of Good* be from Prospect of *Advantage*? Do not *inanimate Objects* promote  
 " our *Advantage* as well as *benevolent Persons*, who do us Offices of *Kindness* and  
 " *Friendship*? should we not then have the  
 " same endearing Approbation of both? or  
 " only the same cold Opinion of *Advantage*  
 " in both?" The Reason why it is not so, must be this, "That we have a distinct  
 " Perception of *Beauty* or *Excellence* in the  
 " kind Affections of *rational Agents*; whence  
 " we are determin'd to admire and love such  
 " *Characters* and *Persons*."

SUPPOSE we reap the same *Advantage* <sup>*In Actions done to our-  
selves.*</sup> from two Men, one of whom serves us from an *ultimate Desire* of our Happiness, or Good-will toward us; the other from Views of *Self-Interest*, or by *Constraint*: both are in this Case equally beneficial or *advantageous* to us, and yet we shall have quite different Sentiments of them. We must then certainly have other Perceptions of *moral Actions*, than those of *Advantage*: And that Power of receiving these Perceptions may be call'd a MORAL SENSE, since the Definition agrees to it, *viz. a Determination of the Mind, to receive any Idea from the Presence of an Object which occurs to us, independent on our Will* \*.

THIS perhaps will be equally evident <sup>*of Evil,  
Moral and  
Natural.*</sup> from our Ideas of *Evil*, done to us design-  
edly by a *rational Agent*. Our Senses of *natural Good and Evil* would make us receive, with equal Serenity and Composure, an *Assault*, a *Buffet*, an *Affront* from a *Neighbour*, a *Cheat* from a *Partner*, or *Trustee*, as we would an equal Damage from the Fall of a *Beam*, a *Tile*, or a *Tempest*; and we should have the same Affections and Sentiments on both Occasions. *Villainy*, *Treachery*, *Cruelty*, would be as meekly resented as a *Blast*, or *Mildew*, or an *overflowing*

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\* See the Preface, Page 6.

Se<sup>ct.</sup> I. *Stream.* But I fancy every one is very differently affected on these Occasions, tho' there may be equal *natural Evil* in both. Nay, Actions no way detrimental may occasion the strongest Anger and Indignation, if they evidence only impotent Hatred or Contempt. And, on the other hand, the Intervention of *moral Ideas* may prevent our *Condemnation* of the Agent, or bad moral Apprehension of that Action, which causes to us the greatest *natural Evil*. Thus the Opinion of *Justice* in any Sentence, will prevent all Ideas of *moral Evil* in the Execution, or Hatred toward the *Magistrate*, who is the immediate Cause of our greatest Sufferings.

In Actions  
toward  
others.


II. IN our Sentiments of Actions which affect ourselves, there is indeed a Mixture of the Ideas of *natural* and *moral Good*, which require some Attention to separate them. But when we reflect upon the Actions which affect other Persons only, we may observe the *moral Ideas* unmix'd with those of *natural Good* or *Evil*. For let it be here observ'd, that those Senses by which we perceive Pleasure in natural Objects, whence they are constituted *Advantageous*, could never raise in us any Desire of *publick Good*, but only of what was good to ourselves in particular. Nor could they ever make us approve an Action merely because of its promoting the Happiness of others. And yet, as soon as any Action is represented to us



as flowing from *Love, Humanity, Gratitude*, Sect. 1.  
*Compassion*, a *Study* of the Good of others,  
 and an ultimate Desire of their Happiness,  
 altho' it were in the most distant Part of the  
 World, or in some past Age, we feel Joy  
 within us, admire the lovely Action, and  
 praise its Author. And on the contrary,  
 every Action represented as flowing from  
 Ill-will, Desire of the Misery of others  
 without View to any prevalent Good to the  
 Publick, or *Ingratitude*, raises Abhorrence  
 and Aversion.


It is true indeed, that the Actions we ap-  
 prove in others, are generally imagin'd to  
 tend to the *natural Good* of *Mankind*, or of  
 some *Parts* of it. But whence this *secret*  
*Chain* between *each Person* and *Mankind*?  
 How is my *Interest* connected with the most  
 distant *Parts* of it? And yet I must admire  
 Actions which shew Good-will toward them,  
 and love the Author. Whence this *Love*,  
*Compassion*, *Indignation* and *Hatred* toward  
 even *feign'd Characters*, in the most distant  
 Ages, and Nations, according as they appear  
*kind, faithful, compassionate*, or of the *op-*  
*posite Dispositions*, toward their imaginary  
 Contemporaries? If there is no *moral Sense*,  
 which makes benevolent Actions appear  
*Beautiful*; if all Approbation be from the  
*Interest* of the Approver,

Sect. I.

 What's HECUBA to us, or we to HECUBA? \*Moral  
Ideas not  
from Inte-  
rest.

III. SOME refin'd Explainers of *Self-Love* may tell us, "That we approve or condemn *Characters*, according as we apprehend we should have been supported, or injur'd by them, had we liv'd in their Days." But how obvious is the Answer, if we only observe, that had we no Sense of *moral Good* in *Humanity*, *Mercy*, *Faithfulness*, why should not *Self-Love*, and our Sense of *natural Good* engage us always to the victorious Side, and make us admire and love the successful *Tyrant*, or *Traitor*? Why do not we love *SINON* or *PYRRHUS*, in the *Æneid*? for, had we been *GREEKS*, these two would have been very *advantageous Characters*. Why are we affected with the Fortunes of *PRIAMUS*, *POLITES*, *CHOROEBUS* or *ÆNEAS*? Would not the *Parimony* of a Miser be as advantageous to his Heir, as the *Generosity* of a worthy Man is to his Friend? And cannot we as easily imagine ourselves Heirs to Misers, as the Favourites of Heroes? Why don't we then approve both alike? It is plain we have some *secret Sense* which determines our Approbation without regard to *Self-Interest*; otherwise we should always favour the *fortunate* Side without regard to

\* Tragedy of Hamlet.

Virtue, and suppose ourselves engaged with Sect. 1.  
that Party. 

SUPPOSE any great Destruction occasion'd by mere *Accident*, without any Design, or Negligence of the Person who casually was the Author of it: This Action might have been as *disadvantageous* to us as design'd *Cruelty*, or *Malice*; but who will say he has the same Idea of both Actions, or Sentiments of the Agents? Thus also an easy, indolent *Simplicity*, which exposes a Man of Wealth as a Prey to others, may be as advantageous a Disposition as the most *prudent Generosity*, to those he converses with; and yet our Sentiments of this latter Temper are far nobler than of the former. "Whence then this Difference?"

AND farther, Let us make a Supposition, which perhaps is not far from Matter of Fact, to try if we cannot approve even *disadvantageous Actions*, and perceive *moral Good* in them. A few ingenious *Artisans*, persecuted in their own Country, flee to ours for Protection; they instruct us in *Manufactures* which support Millions of Poor, increase the Wealth of almost every Person in the *State*, and make us formidable to our *Neighbours*. In a *Nation* not far distant from us, some resolute *Burgomasters*, full of Love to their *Country*, and Compassion toward their *Fellow-Citizens*, oppress'd in Body and



Sect. 1. Soul by a *Tyrant* and *Inquisition*, with *indefatigable Diligence*, *publick Spirit*, and *Courage*, support a tedious perilous War against the *Tyrant*, and form an *industrious Republick*, which rivals us in *Trade*, and almost in *Power*. All the World sees whether the *former* or the *latter* have been more *advantageous* to us: and yet let every Man consult his own Breast, which of the two Characters he has the most agreeable Idea of? whether of the *useful Refugee*, or the *publick-spirited Burgomaster*, by whose Love to his own *Country*, we have often suffer'd in our *Interests*? And I am confident he will find some other Foundation of Esteem than *Advantage*, and will see a just Reason, why the Memory of our *Artisans* is so obscure among us, and yet that of our *Rivals* is immortal.

Self-Love  
not the  
Ground of  
Approba-  
tion.

IV. SOME *Moralists*, who will rather twist *Self-Love* into a thousand Shapes, than allow any other Principle of Approbation than *Interest*, may tell us, "That whatever profits  
" one Part without Detriment to another,  
" profits *the Whole*, and then some small  
" Share will redound to *each Individual*;  
" that those Actions which tend to the Good  
" of *the Whole*, if universally perform'd,  
" would most effectually secure to *each In-*  
" *dividual* his own Happiness; and that con-  
" sequently, we may approve such Actions,  
" from the Opinion of their tending ulti-  
" mately to our own *Advantage*."

We

## Moral Good *and* Evil.

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Sect. I.

WE need not trouble these *Gentlemen* to shew by their nice Train of Consequences, and Influences of Actions by way of Precedent in particular Instances, that we in this Age reap any *Advantage* from ORESTES's killing the *treacherous* ÆGYSTHUS, or from the Actions of CODRUS or DECIUS. Allow their Reasonings to be perfectly good, they only prove, that after long Reflection and Reasoning, we may find out some Ground to judge certain Actions advantageous to us, which every Man admires as soon as he hears of them; and that too under a quite different Conception.

SHOULD any of our Travellers find some old *Grecian Treasure*, the *Miser* who hid it, certainly perform'd an Action more to the Traveller's *Advantage*, than CODRUS or ORESTES; for he must have but a small Share of Benefit from their Actions, whose Influence is so dispers'd, and lost in various Ages and Nations: Surely then this *Miser* must appear to the Traveller a prodigious Hero in *Virtue*! For *Self-Interest* will recommend Men to us only according to the *Good* they do to *our Selves*, and not give us high Ideas of *publick Good*, but in proportion to our Share of it. But must a Man have the Reflection of CUMBERLAND or PUFENDORF, to admire *Generosity, Faith, Humanity, Gratitude?*

**SECT. I.** Or reason so nicely to apprehend the Evil in Cruelty, Treachery, Ingratitude? Do not the former excite our *Admiration*, and *Love*, and *Study* of Imitation, where-ever we see them, almost at first View, without any such Reflection, and the latter, our *Contempt*, and *Abhorrence*? Unhappy would it be for Mankind, if a *Sense* of *Virtue* was of as narrow an Extent, as a Capacity for such *Metaphysics*.

Our Moral  
Sense can-  
not be  
brib'd.

V. THIS *moral Sense*, either of our own Actions, or of those of others, has this in common with our other Senses, that however our Desire of *Virtue* may be counterbalanc'd by *Interest*, our Sentiment or Perception of its *Beauty* cannot; as it certainly might be, if the only Ground of our Approbation were Views of *Advantage*. Let us consider this both as to our own Actions, and those of others.

In judging  
of our own  
Actions.

A COVETOUS Man shall dislike any Branch of Trade, how useful soever it may be to the Publick, if there is no Gain for himself in it; here is an Aversion from *Interest*. Propose a sufficient Premium, and he shall be the first who sets about it, with full Satisfaction in his own Conduct. Now is it the same way with our *Sense* of *moral Actions*? Should any one advise us to wrong a *Minor*, or *Orphan*, or to do an ungrateful Action, toward a *Benefactor*?

we



we at first View abhor it: Assure us that it will be very *advantageous* to us, propose even a *Reward*; our *Sense* of the Action is not alter'd. It is true, these Motives may make us undertake it; but they have no more Influence upon us to make us approve it, than a Physician's Advice has to make a nauseous Potion pleasant to the Taste, when we perhaps force ourselves to take it for the Recovery of Health.

HAD we no Notion of Actions, beside our Opinion of their *Advantage* or *Disadvantage*, could we ever choose an Action as *advantageous*, which we are conscious is still *evil*? as it too often happens in human Affairs. Where would be the need of such *high Bribes* to prevail with Men to abandon the Interests of a ruin'd Party, or of *Tortures* to force out the Secrets of their Friends? Is it so hard to convince Mens Understandings, if that be the only Faculty we have to do with, that it is probably more advantageous to secure present Gain, and avoid present Evils, by joining with the prevalent Party, than to wait for the remote Possibility of future Good, upon a Revolution often improbable, and sometimes unexpected? And when Men are over-persuaded by *Advantage*, do they always approve their own Conduct? Nay, how often is their remaining Life odious, and shameful, in their *own Sense* of it, as well as in that

Sect. I. that of *others*, to whom the base Action  
 was profitable?

IF any one becomes satisfy'd with his own Conduct in such a Case, upon what Ground is it? How does he please himself, or vindicate his Actions to others? Never by reflecting upon his *private Advantage*, or alledging this to others as a Vindication; but by gradually warping into the *moral Principles* of his *new Party*; for no Party is without them. And thus Men become pleas'd with their Actions under some Appearance of *moral Good*, distinct from *Advantage*.

Our Moral  
 Sense not  
 founded on  
 Religion.

It may perhaps be alledg'd, "That in those Actions of our own which we call *good*, there is *this* constant *Advantage*, superior to all others, which is the Ground of our Approbation, and the Motive to them from *Self-Love*, viz. That we suppose the DEITY will reward them." This will be more fully consider'd \* hereafter: At present it is enough to observe, that many have high Notions of *Honour*, *Faith*, *Generosity*, *Justice*, who have scarce any Opinions about the DEITY, or any Thoughts of *future Rewards*; and abhor any thing which is *treacherous*, *cruel*, or *unjust*, without any regard to *future Punishments*.

\* See Sect. ii. Art. 7.

BUT farther, tho' these Rewards and Sect. 1.  
Punishments, may make my own Actions  
appear *advantageous* to me, yet they would  
never make me approve, and love *another*  
Person for the like Actions, whose Merit  
would not be imputed to me. Those Ac-  
tions are *advantageous* indeed to the *Agent* ;  
but his *Advantage* is not my *Advantage* :  
and *Self-Love* could never recommend  
to me Actions as *advantageous* to others,  
or make me like the Authors of them on  
that account.

THIS is the second thing to be con-  
sider'd, " Whether our *Sense* of the *moral* <sup>Our Moral</sup>  
" *Good* or *Evil* in the Actions of others, <sup>Sense of</sup>  
" can be overbalanc'd, or brib'd by Views <sup>the Ac-</sup>  
" of *Interest*." Now I may indeed easily <sup>tions of</sup>  
be capable of wishing, that another would <sup>others, not</sup>  
do an Action I abhor as *morally evil*, if <sup>to be</sup>  
it were very *advantageous* to me: *Interest* <sup>brib'd.</sup>  
in that Case may overbalance my Desire of  
*Virtue* in another: But no *Interest* to my-  
self, will make me approve an Action as  
morally good, which without that *Inte-*  
*rest* to myself, would have appear'd mo-  
rally evil; if upon computing its whole  
Effects, it appears to produce as great a  
Moment of Good in the Whole, when it  
is not beneficial to me, as it did before, when  
it was. In our *Sense* of *moral Good* or  
*Evil*, our own private Advantage or Loss  
is



Sect. 1. is of no more moment, than the Advantage or Loss of a third Person, to make an Action appear *Good* or *Evil*. This Sense therefore cannot be over-balanc'd by *Interest*. How ridiculous an Attempt would it be, to engage a Man by Rewards or Threatnings into a good Opinion of an Action, which was contrary to his *moral Notions*? We may procure Diffimulation by such means, and that is all.

Not occasion'd by Praise,

VI. A LATE witty Author \* says, " That the Leaders of Mankind do not really admire such Actions as those of REGULUS, or DECIUS, but only observe, that Men of such Dispositions are very useful for the Defence of any State; and therefore by *Panegyricks*, and *Statues*, they encourage such Tempers in others, as the most *tractable* and *useful*." Here first let us consider, If a *Traitor*, who would sell his own Country to us, may not often be as *advantageous* to us, as an *Hero* who defends us: And yet we can love the Treason, and hate the Traitor. We can at the same time praise a *gallant Enemy*, who is very *pernicious* to us. Is there nothing in all this but an Opinion of *Advantage*?

\* See the Fable of the Bees, Page 34, 36. 3d. Edition.

AGAIN, upon this Scheme what could Sect. 1.  
 a Statue or Panegyrick effect? — Men love Praise — They will do the Actions which they observe to be *praised* — Praise, with Men who have no other Idea of Good but *Self-Interest*, is the Opinion which a Nation or Party have of a Man as useful to them — REGULUS, or CATO, or DECIUS, had no Advantage by the Actions which profited their Country, and therefore they themselves could not admire them, however the Persons who reap'd the Advantage might praise such Actions. — REGULUS or CATO could not possibly praise or love another Hero for a virtuous Action; for this would not gain them the Advantage of Honour; and their own Actions they must have look'd upon as the hard Terms on which Honour was to be purchas'd, without any thing amiable in them, which they could contemplate or reflect upon with Pleasure. Nay, what should excite a CATO or a DECIUS to desire Praise, if it is only the cold Opinion of others that they were useful to the State, without any Perception of Excellence in such Conduct? — Now how unlike is this to what the least Observation would teach a Man concerning such Characters?

BUT says \* he, "These wondrous cunning Governors made Men believe, by

\* See the same Author in the same Place.

" their

Sect. 1. " their *Statues* and *Panegyricks*, that there  
 " was *publick Spirit*, and that this was in it-  
 " self *excellent*; and hence Men are led to  
 " admire it in others, and to imitate it in  
 " themselves, forgetting the Pursuit of their  
 " own *Advantage*." So easy a matter it  
 seems to him, to quit judging of others by  
 what we feel in ourselves! — for a Person  
 who is wholly *selfish*, to imagine others to  
 be *publick-spirited*! — for one who has  
 no Ideas of *Good* but in his own *Advantage*,  
 to be led by the Persuasions of others, into a  
 Conception of *Goodness* in what is avowedly  
 detrimental to himself, and profitable to  
 others; nay, so intirely, as not to approve  
 the Action thorowly, but so far as he was  
 conscious that it proceeded from a *disinterested*  
*Study* of the *Good* of others! — Yet this  
 it seems *Statues* and *Penegyricks* can ac-  
 complish!

*Nil intra est oleam, nil extra est in nucē  
 duri! \**

IT is an easy matter for Men to assert any  
 thing in Words; but our own Hearts must  
 decide the Matter, " Whether some *moral*  
 " *Actions* do not at first View appear *ami-*  
 " *able* even to those who are unconcern'd  
 " in their Influence? Whether we do not

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\* Hor. Ep. 1. Lib. 2. v. 31.

" sincere-



"sincerely *approve* and love a generous kind Sect. I.  
"Friend, or Patriot, whose Actions pro-  
"cure *Honour* to him only, without any  
"Advantage to ourselves?" It is true, that  
the Actions which we approve, are useful  
to Mankind; but not always to the Appro-  
ver. It would perhaps be useful to the  
Whole, that all Men agreed in performing  
such Actions; and then every one would  
have his Share of the *Advantage*: But this  
only proves, that *Reason* and *calm Reflection*  
may recommend to us, from *Self-Interest*,  
those Actions, which at first View our *moral*  
*Sense* determines us to admire, without  
considering this *Interest*. Nay, our *Sense*  
shall operate even where the *Advantage*  
to ourselves does not hold. We can approve  
the Justice of a Sentence against ourselves:  
A condemn'd *Traitor* may approve the Vi-  
gilance of a C I C E R O in discovering Con-  
spiracies, tho' it had been for the Traitor's  
Advantage, that there never had been in the  
World any Men of such Sagacity. To say  
that he may still approve such Conduct as  
tending to the *publick Good*, is a Jest from  
one whose only Idea of *Good* is *Self-Inter-*  
*est*. Such a Person has no Approbation of  
*publick Spirit*, nor Desire of *publick Good*,  
farther than it tends to his own *Advantage*,  
which it does not at all in the present  
Case.

Sect. I. VII. IF what is said makes it appear, *that we have some other amiable Idea of Actions than that of advantageous to ourselves, we may conclude, "That this Perception of moral Good is not deriv'd from " Custom, Education, Example, or Study." These give us no new Ideas: They might make us see private Advantage in Actions whose Usefulness did not at first appear; or give us Opinions of some Tendency of Actions to our Detriment, by some nice Deductions of Reason, or by a rash Prejudice, when upon the first View of the Action we should have observ'd no such thing: but they never could have made us apprehend Actions as amiable or odious, without any Consideration of our own Advantage.*

VIII. IT remains then, "That as the " AUTHOR of Nature has determin'd us " to receive, by our external Senses, pleasant or disagreeable Ideas of Objects, according as they are useful or hurtful to our Bodys; and to receive from uniform Objects the Pleasures of Beauty and Harmony, to excite us to the Pursuit of Knowledge, and to reward us for it; or to be an Argument to us of his Goodness, as the Uniformity itself proves his Existence, whether we had a Sense of Beauty in Uniformity or not; in the same manner he has given us a MORAL SENSE,

" to

“ to direct our Actions, and to give us still Sect. 1.  
 “ *nobler Pleasures*: so that while we are  
 “ only intending the *Good* of others, we  
 “ undesignedly promote our own greatest  
 “ *private Good*.”

We are not to imagine, that this *moral* <sup>This Moral Sense</sup> Sense, more than the other Senses, supposes <sup>does not</sup> any *innate Ideas*, *Knowledge*, or *practical* <sup>infer in-</sup> Proposition: We mean by it only a *De-* <sup>nate Ideas</sup> <sup>or Proposi-</sup> termination of our Minds to receive the *simple* <sup>tions.</sup> Ideas of *Approbation* or *Condemnation*, from *Actions observ'd*, antecedent to any *Opinions* of *Advantage* or *Loss* to redound to ourselves from them; even as we are pleas'd with a *regular Form*, or an *harmonious Composition*, without having any *Knowledge* of *Mathe-* *matics*, or seeing any *Advantage* in that *Form* or *Composition*, different from the immediate *Pleasure*.

THAT we may discern more distinctly the Difference between *moral Perceptions* and others, let us consider, when we taste a pleasant Fruit, we are conscious of *Pleasure*; when another tastes it, we only conclude or form an *Opinion* that he enjoys *Pleasure*; and, abstracting from some previous *Good-Will* or *Anger*, his enjoying this *Pleasure* is to us a Matter wholly indifferent, raising no new *Sentiment* or *Affection*. But when we are under the Influence of a *virtuous Temper*, and thereby engaged in

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
virtuous



Sect. 1. virtuous Actions, we are not always conscious of any Pleasure, nor are we only pursuing private Pleasures, as will appear hereafter: 'tis only by *reflex Acts* upon our Temper and Conduct that we enjoy the Delights of Virtue. When also we judge the Temper of another to be virtuous, we do not necessarily imagine him *then* to enjoy Pleasure, tho' we know *Reflection* will give it to him: And farther, our Apprehension of his virtuous Temper raises Sentiments of *Approbation*, *Esteem* or *Admiration*, and the Affection of *Good-will* toward him. The Quality approved by our moral Sense is conceived to reside in the Person approved, and to be a Perfection and Dignity in him: *Approbation* of another's Virtue is not conceived as making the Approver happy, or virtuous, or worthy, tho' 'tis attended with some small Pleasure. Virtue is then called *amiable* or *lovely*, from its raising *Good-will* or *Love* in Spectators toward the Agent; and not from the Agent's perceiving the virtuous Temper to be advantageous to him, or desiring to obtain it under that View. A virtuous Temper is called *good* or *beatifick*, not that it is always attended with Pleasure in the Agent; much less that some small Pleasure attends the Contemplation of it in the Approver: but from this, that every Spectator is persuaded that the *reflex Acts* of the virtuous Agent upon his own Temper will give him the highest Pleasures. The admired Quality

lity is conceived as the Perfection of the Agent, and such a one as is distinct from the *Pleasure* either in the Agent or the Approver; tho' 'tis a sure Source of Pleasure to the Agent. The Perception of the Approver, tho' attended with Pleasure, plainly represents something quite distinct from this Pleasure; even as the Perception of *external Forms* is attended with Pleasure, and yet represents something distinct from this Pleasure. This may prevent many Cavils upon this Subject.

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## S E C T. II.

Concerning the immediate Motive to  
virtuous Actions.

Nature.

THE *Motives* of human Actions; or their *immediate Causes*, would be best understood after considering the *Passions* and *Affections*; but here we shall only consider the *Springs* of the Actions which we call *virtuous*, as far as it is necessary to settle the general Foundation of the *Moral Sense*.

*Affections,*  
*the Motives*  
*to Actions.*

I. EVERY Action, which we apprehend as either *morally good* or *evil*, is always suppos'd to flow from some *Affection* toward sensitive Natures; and whatever we call *Virtue* or *Vice*, is either some such *Affection*, or some *Action* consequent upon it. Or it may perhaps be enough to make an Action or Omission, appear *vitious*, if it argues the Want of such *Affection* toward rational Agents, as we expect in Characters counted *morally good*. All the Actions counted *religious* in any Country, are suppos'd, by those who count them so, to flow from some *Affections* toward the DEITY; and whatever we call *social Virtue*, we still sup-



suppose to flow from Affections toward our Sect. 2.  
*Fellow-Creatures*: for in this all seem to agree, "That external Motions, when accompanied with no Affections toward GOD or Man, or evidencing no Want of the *expected* Affections toward either, can have no *moral Good* or *Evil* in them."

Ask, for instance, the most *abstemious* Hermit, if *Temperance* of itself would be *morally good*, supposing it shew'd no Obedience toward the DEITY, made us no fitter for Devotion, or the Service of Mankind, or the Search after Truth, than *Luxury*; and he will easily grant, that it would be no *moral Good*, tho' still it might be *naturally good* or *advantageous* to Health: And mere *Courage*, or Contempt of Danger, if we conceive it to have no regard to the Defence of the Innocent, or repairing of Wrongs or Self-Interest, would only entitle its Possessor to *Bedlam*. When such sort of Courage is sometimes admir'd, it is upon some secret Apprehension of a good Intention in the Use of it, or as a natural Ability capable of an useful Application. *Prudence*, if it was only employ'd in promoting *private Interest*, is never imagin'd to be a *Virtue*: and *Justice*, or observing a strict Equality, if it has no regard to the *Good* of Mankind, the Preservation of *Rights*, and securing *Peace*, is a Quality properer for its ordinary *Gestamen*,

Sect. 2. *men*, a *Beam* and *Scales*, than for a *rational Agent*. So that these four *Qualities*, commonly call'd *Cardinal Virtues*, obtain that Name, because they are *Dispositions* universally necessary to promote *publick Good*, and denote *Affections* toward *rational Agents*; otherwise there would appear no *Virtue* in them.

*Affections*  
*disinterest-*  
*ed.*

II. Now, if it can be made appear, that none of these *Affections* which we approve as *virtuous*, are either *Self-love*, or *Desire of private Interest*; since all *Virtue* is either some such *Affections*, or *Actions* consequent upon them; it must necessarily follow, "That *Virtue* springs from some other  
" *Affection* than *Self-Love*, or *Desire of pri-*  
" *vate Advantage*. And where *Self-Interest*  
" *excites* to the same *Action*, the *Appro-*  
" *bation* is given only to the *disinterested*  
" *Principle*."

*Love of*  
*Compla-*  
*cence, and*  
*Hatred of*  
*Displacence,*

THE *Affections* which are of most Importance in *Morals*, are commonly included under the Names *LOVE* and *HATRED*. Now in discoursing of *Love*, we need not be caution'd not to include that *Love* between the *Sexes*, which, when no other *Affections* accompany it, is only *Desire of Pleasure*, and is never counted a *Virtue*. *Love* toward *rational Agents*, is subdivided into *Love of Complacence* or *Esteem*, and *Love of Benevolence*: And *Hatred* is subdivided

vided into *Hatred of Displacence* or *Contempt*, and *Hatred of Malice*. *Complacence* denotes *Approbation of any Person by our Moral Sense*; and is rather a Perception than an Affection; tho' the Affection of Good-will is ordinarily subsequent to it. *Benevolence* is the Desire of the Happiness of another. Their Opposites are called *Dislike* and *Malice*. Concerning each of these separately we shall consider, "Whether they can be influenc'd by Motives of *Self-Interest*." Sect. 2.

COMPLACENCE, *Esteem*, or Good-liking, at first View appears to be *disinterested*, and so *Displacence* or *Dislike*; and are intirely excited by some *moral Quality*, Good or Evil, apprehended to be in the Objects; which *Quality* the very *Frame* of our *Nature* determines us to approve or disapprove, according to the *moral Sense* \*above explain'd. Propose to a Man all the Rewards in the World, or threaten all the Punishments, to engage him to *Esteem* and *Complacence* toward a Person intirely *unknown*, or if known, apprehended to be *cruel, treacherous, ungrateful*; you may procure external *Obsequiousness*, or good Offices, or *Disimulation*; but *real Esteem* no Price can purchase. And the same is obvious as to *Contempt*, which no Motive

*Are intirely disinterested.*

\* See Sect. i.



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*Displacence,*

THE *Affections* which are of most Importance in *Morals*, are commonly included under the Names *LOVE* and *HATRED*. Now in discoursing of *Love*, we need not be caution'd not to include that *Love* between the *Sexes*, which, when no other *Affections* accompany it, is only Desire of *Pleasure*, and is never counted a *Virtue*. *Love* toward *rational Agents*, is subdivided into *Love of Complacence* or *Esteem*, and *Love of Benevolence*: And *Hatred* is subdivided

vided into *Hatred of Displacence* or *Contempt*, and *Hatred of Malice*. *Complacence* denotes *Approbation of any Person by our Moral Sense*; and is rather a Perception than an Affection; tho' the Affection of Good-will is ordinarily subsequent to it. *Benevolence* is the Desire of the Happiness of another. Their Opposites are called *Dislike* and *Malice*. Concerning each of these separately we shall consider, "Whether they can be influenc'd by Motives of *Self-Interest*." Sect. 2.

*COMPLACENCE, Esteem, or Good-liking*, at first View appears to be *disinterested*, and so *Displacence* or *Dislike*; and are intirely excited by some *moral Qualities, Good or Evil*, apprehended to be in the Objects; which Qualities the very *Frame* of our *Nature* determines us to approve or disapprove, according to the *moral Sense* \*above explain'd. Propose to a Man all the Rewards in the World, or threaten all the Punishments, to engage him to *Esteem* and *Complacence* toward a Person intirely *unknown*, or if known, apprehended to be *cruel, treacherous, ungrateful*; you may procure external *Obsequiousness*, or good Offices, or *Disimulation*; but *real Esteem* no Price can purchase. And the same is obvious as to *Contempt*, which no Motive

\* See Sect. i.

Sect. 2. of *Advantage* can prevent. On the contrary, represent a Character as *generous, kind, faithful, humane*, tho' in the most distant Parts of the World, and we cannot avoid *Esteem* and *Complacence*. A *Bribe* may possibly make us attempt to ruin such a Man, or some strong Motive of *Advantage* may excite us to oppose his Interest; but it can never make us disapprove him, while we retain the same Opinion of his Temper and Intentions. Nay, when we consult our own Hearts, we shall find, that we can scarce ever persuade ourselves to attempt any Mischief against such Persons, from any Motive of *Advantage*; nor execute it without the strongest Reluctance and Remorse, until we have blinded ourselves into a false Opinion about his Temper.

*Benevolence disinterested.*

III. As to the *Love* of *Benevolence*, the very Name excludes *Self-Interest*. We never call that Man *benevolent*, who is in Fact useful to others, but at the same time only intends his *own Interest*, without any ultimate Desire of the *Good* of *others*. If there be any *Benevolence* at all, it must be *disinterested*; for the most useful Action imaginable loses all Appearance of *Benevolence*, as soon as we discern that it only flowed from *Self-Love*, or *Interest*. Thus, never were any human Actions more *advantageous*, than the Inventions of *Fire*, and *Iron*; but if these were casual, or if the In-

ventor



mentor only intended his own *Interest* in them, Sect. 2. there is nothing which can be call'd *benevolent* in them. Where-ever then *Benevolence* is suppos'd, there it is imagin'd *disinterest-ed*, and design'd for the *Good* of others. To raise *Benevolence*, no more is required than calmly to consider any *sensitive Nature* not pernicious to others. *Gratitude* arises from Benefits conferred from Good-will on ourselves, or those we love; *Complacence* is a Perception of the moral Sense. *Gratitude* includes some *Complacence*, and *Complacence* still raises a stronger Good-will than that we have toward indifferent Characters, where there is no Opposition of Interests.

BUT it must be here observ'd, That as Self-Love all Men have *Self-Love*, as well as *Bene-*<sup>join'd with</sup>  
*volence*, these two Principles may jointly <sup>Benevo-</sup>  
 excite a Man to the same Action; and then  
 they are to be consider'd as two Forces im-  
 pelling the same Body to Motion; sometimes  
 they conspire, sometimes are indifferent to  
 each other, and sometimes are in some de-  
 gree opposite. Thus, if a Man have such  
 strong *Benevolence*, as would have produc'd  
 an Action without any Views of *Self-Inte-*  
*rest*; that such a Man has also in View  
*private Advantage*, along with *publick Good*,  
 as the Effect of his Action, does no way  
 diminish the *Benevolence* of the Action.  
 When he would not have produc'd so much  
*publick*

Sect. 2. *publick Good*, had it not been for Prospect of *Self-Interest*, then the Effect of *Self-Love* is to be deducted, and his *Benevolence* is proportion'd to the Remainder of *Good*, which pure *Benevolence* would have produc'd. When a Man's *Benevolence* is hurtful to himself, then *Self-Love* is opposite to *Benevolence*, and the *Benevolence* is proportion'd to the Sum of the *Good* produc'd, added to the Resistance of *Self-Love* surmounted by it. In most Cases it is impossible for Men to know how far their Fellows are influenc'd by the one or other of these Principles; but yet the general Truth is sufficiently certain, That this is the way in which the *Benevolence* of Actions is to be computed.

*Benevolence is disinterested.*

IV. THERE are two ways in which some may deduce *Benevolence* from *Self-Love*, the one supposing that "we voluntarily bring this Affection upon ourselves, when ever we have an Opinion that it will be for our Interest to have this Affection, either as it may be immediately pleasant, or may afford pleasant Reflection afterwards by our Moral Sense, or it may tend to procure some external Reward from GOD or Man." The other Scheme alledges no such Power in us of raising Desire or Affection of any kind by our Choice or Volition; but "supposes our Minds determined by the Frame of the Nature to desire whatever is apprehended

" as the *Means* of any private Happiness; Sect. 2.  
 " and that the *Observation of the Hap-*  
 " *piness of other Persons*, in many Cases is  
 " made the necessary Occasion of Pleasure  
 " to the Observer, as their *Misery* is the  
 " Occasion of his Uneasiness: and in con-  
 " sequence of this Connexion, as soon as we  
 " have observed it, we begin to desire the  
 " Happiness of others as the *Means* of ob-  
 " taining this Happiness to ourselves, which  
 " we expect from the Contemplation of  
 " others in a happy State. They alledge it  
 " to be impossible to desire either the Hap-  
 " piness of another, or any Event whatso-  
 " ever, without conceiving it as the *Means*  
 " of some Happiness or Pleasure to *our-*  
 " *selves*; but own at the same time, that  
 " Desire is not raised in us directly by any  
 " *Volition*, but arises necessarily upon our  
 " apprehending any Object or Event to be  
 " conducive to our Happiness."

THAT the former Scheme is not just, *The first*  
 may appear from this general Considera- *contrary*  
 tion, that "neither Benevolence nor any *Opinion*  
 " other Affection or Desire can be directly *confuted.*  
 " raised by *Volition*." If they could, then  
 we could be bribed into any Affection  
 whatsoever toward any Object, even the  
 most improper: we might raise *Jealousy*,  
*Fear*, *Anger*, *Love*, toward any sort of Per-  
 sons indifferently by an Hire, even as we  
 engage Men to external Actions, or to the  
 Dis-



Se<sup>ct</sup>. 2. Diffimulation of Passions; but this every Person will by his own Reflection find to be impossible. The Prospect of any Advantage to arise to us *from having any Affection*, may indeed turn our Attention to those *Qualitys* in the Object, which are naturally constituted the necessary *Causes* or *Occasions* of the advantageous Affection; and if we find such Qualitys in the Object, the Affection will certainly arise. Thus *indirectly* the Prospect of Advantage may tend to raise any Affection; but if these Qualitys be not found or apprehended in the Object, no *Volition* of ours, nor *Desire*, will ever raise any Affection in us.

BUT more particularly, *that Desire* of the Good of others, which we approve as virtuous, cannot be alledged to be voluntarily raised from Prospect of any *Pleasure accompanying* the Affection itself: for 'tis plain that our Benevolence is not always accompanied with *Pleasure*; nay, 'tis often attended with Pain, when the Object is in Distress. Desire in general is rather uneasy then pleasant. 'Tis true, indeed, all the Passions and Affections *justify themselves*; while they continue, (as *Malebranch* expresses it) we generally approve our being thus affected on this Occasion, as an innocent Disposition, or a just one, and condemn a Person who would be otherwise affected on the like Occasion. So the *Sorrowful*, the *Angry*, the *Jealous*,

*Jealous*, the *Compassionate*, approve their se- Sect. 2.  
 veral Passions on the apprehended Occa-  
 sion; but we should not therefore conclude,  
 that *Sorrow*, *Anger*, *Jealousy* or *Pity* are  
 pleasant, or chosen for their concomitant  
 Pleasure. The Case is plainly thus: The  
 Frame of our Nature on the Occasions which  
 move these Passions, determines us to be  
 thus affected, and to approve our Affec-  
 tion at least as innocent. *Uneasiness* gene-  
 rally attends our Desires of any kind; and  
 this *Sensation* tends to fix our Attention,  
 and to continue the Desire. But the De-  
 sire does not terminate upon the *Removal*  
*of the Pain accompanying the Desire*, but  
 upon some other Event: the concomitant  
 Pain is what we seldom reflect upon, un-  
 less when it is very violent. Nor does  
 any Desire or Affection terminate upon the  
 Pleasure which may accompany the Affec-  
 tion; much less is it raised by an Act of  
 our Will, with a View to obtain this Plea-  
 sure.

THE same Reflection will shew, that  
 we do not by an Act of our Will raise in  
 ourselves that Benevolence which we ap-  
 prove as virtuous, with a View to obtain  
 future Pleasures of *Self-Approbation* by our  
 Moral Sense. Could we raise Affections in  
 this manner, we should be engaged to any  
 Affection by the *Prospect of an Interest*  
 equivalent

Se<sup>ct</sup>. 2. equivalent to this of *Self-Approbation*, such as Wealth or sensual Pleasure, which with many Tempers are more powerful; and yet we universally own, that *that* Disposition to do good Offices to others, which is raised by these Motives, is not virtuous: how can we then imagine, that the virtuous Benevolence is brought upon us by a Motive equally *selfish*?

BUT what will most effectually convince us of the Truth on this Point, is Reflection upon our own Hearts, whether we have not a *Desire* of the Good of others, generally without any Consideration or Intention of obtaining these *pleasant Reflections* on our own Virtue: nay, often this Desire is strongest where we least imagine Virtue, in *natural Affection* toward Offspring, and in Gratitude to a great Benefactor; the *Absence* of which is indeed the greatest *Vice*, but the Affections themselves are not esteemed in any considerable degree virtuous. The same Reflection will also convince us, that these Desires or Affections are not produced by *Choice*, with a View to obtain this private Good.

IN like manner, if no *Volition* of ours can directly raise Affections from the former Prospects of Interest, no more can any *Volition* raise them from Prospects of *eternal Rewards*, or to avoid *eternal Punishments*. The former Motives differ from these only



smaller from greater, shorter from more Sect. 2.  
 durable. If Affections could be directly raised by Volition, the same Consideration would make us *angry* at the most innocent or virtuous Character, and *jealous* of the most faithful and affectionate, or *sorrowful* for the Prosperity of a Friend; which we all find to be impossible. The Prospect of a *future State*, may, no doubt, have a greater indirect Influence, by turning our Attention to the Qualities in the Objects naturally apt to raise the required Affection, than any other Consideration \*.

'T I S

\*THESE several Motives of Interest, which, some alledge, excite us to Benevolence, operate upon us in a very different Manner. Prospect of external Advantage of any kind in this Life from our Fellows, is only a Motive to the Volition of external Actions immediately, and not to raise Desire of the Happiness of others. Now being willing to do external Actions which we know do in Fact promote the Happiness of others, without any Desire of their Happiness, is not approved as virtuous: Otherwise it were Virtue to do a beneficent Action for a Bribe of Money.

THE Prospect of Rewards from the DEITY, of future Pleasures from the Self-Approbation of our Moral Sense, or of any Pleasure attending an Affection itself, are only Motives to us to desire or wish to have the Affection of Benevolence in our Hearts; and consequently, if our Volition could raise Affections in us, these Motives would make us will or choose to raise benevolent Affections: But these Prospects cannot be Motives to us from Self-Love, to desire the Happiness of others; for, from Self-Love we only desire what we apprehend to be the Means of private Good. Now the having those Affections is the Means of obtaining these private Goods, and not the actual Happiness of others; for the Pleasure of Self-Approbation, and Divine Rewards,

wards,

Sect. 2. *W* **T**IS indeed probably true in Fact, that those who are engaged by Prospect of future Rewards to do good Offices to Mankind, have generally the *virtuous Benevolence* jointly exciting them to Action; because, as it may appear hereafter, Benevolence is natural to Mankind, and still operates where there is no *Opposition of apparent Interest*, or where any contrary apparent Interest is overbalanced by a greater *Interest*. Men, conscious of this, do generally approve good Offices, to which Motives of a future State partly excited the Agent. But that the Approbation is founded upon the Apprehension of a *disinterested Desire* partly exciting the Agent, is plain from this, that not only Obedience to an *evil Deity* in doing Mischief, or even in performing trifling Ceremonies, only from Hope of Reward, or Prospect of avoiding Punishment, but even Obedience to a good DEITY only from the same Motives, without any *Love* or *Gratitude* towards him, and with a perfect Indifference about the Happiness or Misery of Mankind, abstracting from this private Interest, would meet with no *Approbation*. We plainly see that

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wards, are not obtained or lost according as others are happy or miserable, but according to the Goodness of our Affections. If therefore Affections are not directly raised by Volition or Choice, Prospects of future Rewards, or of Self-Approbation, cannot directly raise them.

a Change of *external Circumstances* of In-Sect. 2.  
terest under an evil DEITY, without  
any Change in the *Disposition* of the Agent,  
would lead him into every Cruelty and  
Inhumanity.

GRATITUDE toward the DEITY is indeed disinterested, as it will appear hereafter. This Affection therefore may obtain our Approbation, where it excites to Action, tho' there were no other Benevolence exciting the Agent. But this Case scarce occurs among Men. But where the *Sanction of the Law* is the only Motive of Action, we could expect no more *Benevolence*, nor no other *Affection*, than those in one forced by the *Law* to be *Curator* to a Person for whom he has not the least Regard. The Agent would so manage as to save himself harmless if he could, but would be under no Concern about the *Success* of his Attempts, or the *Happiness* of the Person whom he served, provided he performed the Task required by Law; nor would any Spectator approve this Conduct.

V. THE other Scheme is more plausible: That Benevolence is not raised by any *Volition* upon Prospect of Advantage; but that we desire the Happiness of others, as conceiving it necessary to procure some *pleasant Sensations* which we expect to feel  
L upon

*The second  
Opinion  
confuted.*



Sect. 2. upon seeing others happy; and that for like  
 Reason we have Aversion to their Misery.


This Connection between the Happiness of others and our Pleasure, say they, is chiefly felt among *Friends, Parents and Children*, and eminently virtuous Characters. But this Benevolence flows as directly from *Self-Love* as any other Desire.

To shew that this Scheme is not true in Fact, let us consider, that if in our Benevolence we only desired the Happiness of others as the *Means* of this Pleasure to ourselves, whence is it that no Man *approves* the Desire of the Happiness of others as a means of procuring *Wealth* or *sensual Pleasure* to ourselves? If a Person had *wagered* concerning the future Happiness of a Man of such Veracity, that he would sincerely confess whether he were happy or not; would this Wagerer's Desire of the Happiness of another, in order to win the Wager, be *approved as virtuous*? If not, wherein does this Desire differ from the former? except that in one case there is one pleasant Sensation expected, and in the other case other Sensations: For by increasing or diminishing the Sum wagered, the Interest in this Case may be made either greater or less than that in the other.

REFLECTING on our own Minds again will best discover the Truth. Many have never thought upon this *Connection*: nor do  
 we

we ordinarily intend the obtaining of any Sect. 2.  
such Pleasure when we do generous Offices. ~~~~~  
We all often *feel* Delight upon seeing others  
happy, but during our Pursuit of their Hap-  
piness we have no *Intention* of obtaining this  
Delight. We often feel the Pain of Com-  
passion; but were our sole ultimate Inten-  
tion or Desire the *freeing ourselves* from this  
Pain, would the Deity offer to us either  
wholly to blot out all Memory of the Person  
in Distress, to take away this Connection,  
so that we should be easy during the Misery  
of our Friend on the one hand, or on the  
other would relieve him from his Misery, we  
should be as ready to choose the former way  
as the latter; since either of them would free  
us from *our Pain*, which upon this Scheme  
is the *sole End* proposed by the compassio-  
nate Person.— Don't we find in ourselves  
that our Desire does not terminate upon the  
Removal of our own Pain? Were this our  
sole Intention, we would run away, shut our  
Eyes, or divert our Thoughts from the mi-  
serable Object, as the readiest way of remov-  
ing our Pain: This we seldom do, nay, we  
croud about such Objects, and voluntarily  
expose ourselves to this Pain, unless *calm*  
*Reflection* upon our Inability to relieve the  
Miserable, countermand our Inclination, or  
some *selfish Affection*, as *Fear of Danger*,  
over-power it.

Sect. 2.



To make this yet clearer, suppose that the DEITY should declare to a good Man that he should be suddenly *annihilated*, but at the Instant of his Exit it should be left to his Choice whether his Friend, his Children, or his Country should be made happy or miserable for the future, when he himself could have no Sense of either Pleasure or Pain from their State. Pray would he be any more indifferent about their State now, that he neither hoped or feared any thing to himself from it, than he was in any prior Period of his Life? Nay, is it not a pretty common Opinion among us, that after our Decease we know nothing of what befalls those who survive us? How comes it then that we do not lose, at the Approach of Death, all Concern for our Families, Friends, or Country? Can there be any Instance given of our desiring any Thing only as the *Means of private Good*, as violently when we know that we shall not enjoy this Good many Minutes, as if we expected the Possession of this Good for many Years? Is this the way we compute the Value of *Annuities*?

How the disinterested Desire of the Good of others should seem inconceivable, 'tis hard to account: perhaps 'tis owing to the Attempts of some great Men to give Definitions of *simple Ideas*.—*Desire*, say they, is *Uneasiness, or uneasy Sensation upon the Absence* of



of any Good. — Whereas Desire is as distinct Sect. 2. from *Uneasiness*, as *Volition* is from Sensation. Don't they themselves often speak of our *desiring to remove Uneasiness*? Desire then is different from *Uneasiness*, however a Sense of *Uneasiness* accompanies it, as *Extension* does the Idea of *Colour*, which yet is a very distinct Idea. Now wherein lies the Impossibility of desiring the Happiness of another without conceiving it as the Means of obtaining any thing farther, even as we desire our own Happiness without farther View? If any alledge, that we desire our own Happiness as the *Means* of removing the *Uneasiness* we feel in the Absence of Happiness, then at least the Desire of *removing our own Uneasiness* is an *ultimate Desire*: and why may we not have other *ultimate Desires*?

“BUT can any Being be *concerned* about “the Absence of an Event which gives it no “*Uneasiness*?” Perhaps superior Natures desire without *uneasy Sensation*. But what if we cannot? We may be uneasy while a desired Event is in Suspence, and yet not desire this Event only as the *Means* of removing this *Uneasiness*: Nay, if we did not desire the Event without View to this *Uneasiness*, we should never have brought the *Uneasiness* upon ourselves by *desiring* it. So likewise we may feel *Delight* upon the Existence of a desired Event, when yet we did not desire the Event only as the *Means* of obtaining this

Sect. 2. Delight; even as we often receive Delight  
 from Events which we had an Aversion to.

VI. IF any one should ask, since none of these Motives of Self-Interest excite our Benevolence, but we are in virtuous Actions intending solely the Good of others, to what Purpose serves our *moral Sense*, our *Sense of Pleasure from the Happiness of others*? To what Purpose serves the *wise Order of Nature*, by which Virtue is even made generally advantageous in this Life? To what End are *eternal Rewards* appointed and revealed? The Answer to these Questions was given partly already: all these Motives may make us desire to have *benevolent Affections*, and consequently turn our *Attention* to those Qualities in Objects which excite them; they may overbalance all apparent *contrary Motives*, and all Temptations to Vice. But farther, I hope it will be still thought an End worthy of the DEITY, to make the Virtuous happy, by a wise Constitution of Nature, whether the Virtues were in every Action intending to obtain this Happiness or not. Beneficent Actions tend to the publick Good; it is therefore good and kind to give all possible *additional Motives* to them; and to excite Men, who have some weak Degrees of good *Affection*, to promote the publick Good more vigorously by Motives of *Self-Interest*; or even to excite those who have no Virtue at all to external Acts  
 of

f Beneficence, and to restrain them from Sect. 2.  
Vice\*.

FROM

\* LET it be also remembred, that every Consideration suggested in the Gospel, as an additional Motive to beneficent Actions, is not immediately to be looked upon as the proper Motive to Virtue, or what would engage our Approbation of Actions flowing from it alone. We have the Promises of this Life as well as of the next, and yet the former alone was never thought a virtuous Principle. Some Texts are also brought to confute this Scheme of disinterested Affections as the only truly virtuous Principle, such as 1 Corinth. Ch. XV. ver. 32. which imports no more than this, "That if there were no Resurrection, and consequently Christ had not risen, and therefore his Religion only an Imposture, it had been the greatest Folly in the Apostle to have exposed himself to Persecution:" Not that the Prospect of a future Reward was the only Motive to Virtue, or that the only Affection of Mind which made the Apostle bear Persecution was, Hope of Reward.

ANOTHER Text insisted on is, Heb. XI. ver. 6. But this only means, either "that no Man can perform religious Acts acceptably to God, who does not believe his Existence and Goodness," which is self-evident: Or it is to be understood of "embracing the true Religion, and adhering to it under the most severe Persecutions, which we may allow no Man could do without Hopes of future Reward." Now this does not prove either that our sole, or our strongest Incitement to virtuous Actions is a Prospect of Interest, nor even that any Action is approved, because it springs from Hope of Reward.

HEB. XII. ver. 2. is chiefly urged, but with least Ground: if we have it well translated, it only asserts, "That the Hope of future Joy was one Incitement to our Saviour in enduring Sufferings," not that this was the principal Spring of his beneficent Actions, or that they were made amiable by arising from it. Nay, this Joy may be understood metonymically, for its Object, viz. the Salvation of Mankind. Not to mention another Translation long ago known to Criticks; some of whom insist that *αὐτὴ* is seldom used for the final Cause; but means instead of, in this Place, as well as in Texts debated with the Socinians: And then this Verse may be thus translated;



## Sect. 2.

FROM the Whole it may appear, that there is in human Nature a *disinterested ultimate Desire* of the Happiness of others; and that our *Moral Sense* determines us only to approve Actions as virtuous, which are apprehended to proceed partly at least from such Desire.

Human  
Nature in-  
capable of  
sedate Ma-  
lice.

VII. As to Malice, *Human Nature* seems scarce capable of *malicious disinterested Hatred*, or a sedate ultimate Desire of the Misery of others, when we imagine them no way pernicious to us, or opposite to our *Interest*: And for that Hatred which makes us oppose *those* whose Interests are opposite to *ours*, it is only the Effect of *Self-Love*, and not of *disinterested Malice*. A sudden Passion may give us wrong Representations of our Fellow-Creatures, and for a little time represent them as *absolutely evil*; and during this

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“ Who instead of that Joy which was ready at hand, or in his Power to have enjoyed, as he had from the Beginning, he submitted to the Cross.” Nor is there any thing to confute this Translation; save that some Antithesis between our suffering from Faith in a Reward, and his suffering in like manner, is not kept up so well; as if it were a necessary Perfection in the Scriptures to abound in such Antitheses. For in this Translation there is good Reasoning, in shewing how our Saviour’s Sufferings are enhanced by his exchanging a State of Joy for them, parallel to Philip. II. ver. 6, 7.

WHOEVER would appeal to the general Strain of the Christian Exhortations, will find *disinterested Love* more inculcated, and Motives of Gratitude more frequently suggested, than any others.

Imagi-

Imagination perhaps we may give some Evidence of *disinterested Malice*: but as soon as we reflect upon *human Nature*, and form just Conceptions, this *unnatural* Passion is allay'd, and only *Self-Love* remains, which may make us, from *Self-Interest*, oppose our Adversarys.

EVERY one at present rejoices in the Destruction of our *Pirates*; and yet let us suppose a Band of such Villains cast in upon some desolate Island, and that we were assur'd some Fate would confine them there perpetually, so that they should disturb Mankind no more: Now let us calmly reflect, that these Persons are capable of Knowledge and Counsel, may be happy and joyful, or may be involv'd in Misery, Sorrow, and Pain; that they may return to a State of *Love, Humanity, Kindness*, and become *Friends, Citizens, Husbands, Parents*, with all the sweet Sentiments which accompany these Relations: then let us ask ourselves, when *Self-Love*, or Regard to the Safety of better Men, no longer makes us desire their Destruction, and when we cease to look upon them under the Ideas suggested by fresh Resentment of Injurys done to us or our Friends, as utterly incapable of any good *moral Quality*; whether we would wish them the Fate of CADMUS's *Army*, by plunging their Swords in each others Breast, or a worse Fate by the most exquisite Tortures;

Sect. 2. tures; or rather, that they should recover the ordinary Affections of Men, become *kind, compassionate, and friendly*; contrive *Laws, Constitutions, Governments, Propertys*; and form an honest happy Society with *Marriages*, and

*Relations dear, and all the Charities  
Of Father, Son, and Brother—\*?*

I fancy the latter would be the Wish of every Mortal, notwithstanding our present just Abhorrence of them from *Self-Interest*, or *publick Love*, and Desire of promoting the Interest of our Friends who are expos'd to their Fury. Now this plainly evidences, that we scarce ever have any *sedate Malice* against any Person, or ultimate Desire of his Misery. Our calm Ill-will is only from Opposition of *Interest*; or if we can entertain *sedate Malice*, it must be toward a Character apprehended *necessarily and unalterably Evil* in a *moral Sense*; such as a sudden Passion sometimes represents our Enemies to us: yet perhaps no *such Being* occurs to us among the Works of a good DEITY.

*Other Affections disinterested.*

VIII. HAVING offer'd what may perhaps prove, That neither our *Esteem* or *Benevolence* is founded on *Self-Love*, or Views of *Interest*; let us see "if some other Affec-

\* Milt. Par. Lost. B. iv. ver. 756.



tions, in which *Virtue* may be plac'd, do Sect. 2.  
 arise from *Self-Love* ;" such as *Fear*, or  
*Reverence*, arising from an Apprehension of  
*Goodness*, *Power*, and *Justice*. For no body  
 apprehends any *Virtue* in base *Dread* and  
*Servitude* toward a powerful evil Being:  
 This is indeed the meanest *Selfishness*. Now  
 the same Arguments which prove *Esteem* to  
 be *disinterested*, will prove this honourable  
*Reverence* to be so too ; for it plainly arises  
 from an Apprehension of amiable *Qualitys* in  
 the Person, and *Love* toward him, which  
 raises an *Abhorrence* of offending him. Could  
 we reverence a Being because it was our *In-*  
*terest* to do so, a third Person might bribe  
 us into *Reverence* toward a Being neither  
*good*, nor *powerful*, which every one sees  
 to be a Jest. And this we might shew to be  
 common to all other Passions, which have  
 been reputed virtuous.

IX. THERE is one Objection against *dis-* Objections  
*interested Good-Will*, which occurs from con-  
 sidering, " That nothing so effectually ex-  
 cites our *Love* toward rational Agents, as  
 their *Beneficence*, and especially toward  
 ourselves ; whence we are led to imagine,  
 that our *Love* of Persons, as well as irra-  
 tional Objects, flows intirely from *Self-*  
*Interest*." But let us here examine ourselves  
 more narrowly. Do we only wish well to the  
*Beneficent*, because it is our *Interest* to do so?  
 Or do we choose to love them, because our  
*Love*

Sect. 2. *Love* is the means of procuring their *Bounty*?

~~~~~ If it be so, then we could indifferently love any Character, even to obtain the *Bounty* of a third Person; or we could be brib'd by a third Person to love the greatest Villain heartily, as we may be brib'd to external Offices: Now this is plainly impossible. Nay, farther, is not our *Good-will* the Consequent of *Bounty*, and not the Means of procuring it? External Shew, Obsequiousness, and Diffimulation may precede an Opinion of *Beneficence*; but *real Love* always presupposes it, and will necessarily arise even when we expect no more, from Consideration of past Benefits.

OR can any one say he only loves the *Beneficent*, as he does a *Field* or *Garden*, because of its *Advantage*? His *Love* then must cease toward one who has ruin'd himself in kind Offices to him, when he can do him no more; as we cease to love an inanimate Object which ceases to be useful, unless a Poetical *Prosopopœia* animate it, and raise an imaginary Gratitude, which is indeed pretty common. *Beneficence* then must increase our *Good-will*, as it raises *Complacence*, which is still attended with stronger Degrees of Benevolence: and hence we love even those who are *beneficent* to others.

IN the Benefits which we receive ourselves, we are more fully sensible of their Value, and of the Circumstances of the Action, which are Evidences of a generous Temper in the *Donor*; and from the good Opinion we have of ourselves, we are apt to look upon the Kindness as better employ'd, than when it is bestow'd on others, of whom perhaps we have less favourable Sentiments. It is however sufficient to remove the Objection, that *Bounty* from a *Donor* apprehended as *morally evil*, or extorted by Force, or conferr'd with some View of *Self-Interest*, will not procure *real Good-will*; nay, it may raise *Indignation*, if we suspect Diffimulation of Love, or a Design to allure us into any thing dishonourable: whereas wisely employ'd *Bounty* is always approv'd, and gains Love to the Author from all who hear of it.

IF then no *Good-will* toward Persons *Virtue dis-* arises from *Self-Love*, or Views of *Interest*, *interested.* and all *Virtue* flows from *Good-will*, or some other Affection equally *disinterested*; it remains, "That there must be some other Affection than *Self-Love*, or *Interest*, which excites us to the Actions we call *Virtuous*."

HAD we no other *ultimate Desire* but that of *private Advantage*, we must imagine

Sect. 2. *gine that every rational Being acts only for its own Advantage; and however we may call a beneficent Being a good Being, because it acts for our Advantage, yet upon this Scheme we should not be apt to think there is any beneficent Being in Nature, or a Being who acts for the Good of others. Particularly, If there is no Sense of Excellence in publick Love, and promoting the Happiness of others, whence should this Persuasion arise, "That the DEITY will make the Virtuous "happy?" Can we prove that it is for the Advantage of the DEITY to do so? This I fancy will be look'd upon as very absurd, by many who yet expect Mercy and Beneficence in the DEITY. And if there be such Dispositions in the DEITY, where is the Impossibility of some small Degree of this publick Love in his Creatures? And why must they be suppos'd incapable of acting but from Self-Love?*

IN short, without acknowledging some other Principle of Action in rational Agents than *Self-Love*, I see no Foundation to expect *Beneficence*, or *Rewards* from God or Man, farther than it is the *Interest* of the *Benefactor*; and all Expectation of Benefit from a *Being* whose Interests are independent on us, must be *perfectly ridiculous*. What should engage the DEITY to reward *Virtue*? *Virtue* is commonly suppos'd, upon *this Scheme*, to be only a consulting our

own Happiness in the most artful way, consist- Sect. 2.
 ently with the Good of the Whole; and in
 Vice the same thing is foolishly pursu'd, in
 a manner which will not so probably suc-
 ceed, and which is contrary to the Good of
 the Whole. But how is the DEITY concern'd
 in this Whole, if every Agent always acts from
 Self-Love? And what Ground have we, from
 the Idea of infinite Power and Art, to believe
 the DEITY is good in the Christian Sense,
 that is, studious of the Good of his Creatures?
 Perhaps the Misery of his Creatures may
 give him as much Pleasure, as their Happi-
 ness: And who can find fault, or blame such
 a Being to study their Misery? for what else
 should we expect? A Manichean evil God,
 is a Notion which Men would as readily
 run into, as that of a good one, if there is
 no Excellence in disinterested Love, and no
 Being acts but for its own Advantage; un-
 less we prov'd, that the Happiness of Crea-
 tures was advantageous to the DEITY.

X. HAVING remov'd these false Springs The true
 of virtuous Actions, let us next establish the Spring of
 true one, viz. some Determination of our Na- Virtue.
 ture to study the Good of others; or some In-
 stinct, antecedent to all Reason from Interest,
 which influences us to the Love of others; even
 as the moral Sense, * above explain'd, deter-
 mines us to approve the Actions which flow

* See Sect. i.

Sect. 2. from *this Love* in ourselves or others. This *disinterested Affection*, may appear strange to Men impress'd with Notions of *Self-Love*, as the *sole* Spring of Action, from the Pulpit, the Schools, the Systems, and Conversations regulated by them: but let us consider it in its strongest and simplest Kinds; and when we see the Possibility of it in these Instances, we may easily discover its *universal Extent*.

*Natural
Affection.*

A N honest *Farmer* will tell you, that he studies the *Preservation* and *Happiness* of his Children, and loves them without any Design of Good to himself. But say some of our *Philosophers*, "The Happiness of their Children gives Parents Pleasure, and their Misery gives them Pain; and therefore to obtain the *former*, and avoid the *latter*, they study, from *Self-Love*, the Good of their Children." Suppose several Merchants join'd in Partnership of their whole Effects; one of them is employ'd abroad in managing the Stock of the Company; his Prosperity occasions Gain to all, and his Losses give them Pain for their Share in the Loss: Is this then the *same* Kind of Affection with *that* of Parents to their Children? Is there the same tender, personal Regard? I fancy no Parent will say so. In this Case of Merchants there is a plain Conjunction of Interest; but whence the Conjunction of Interest between the *Parent* and *Child*?

Child? Do the Child's *Sensations* give Plea-Sect. 2:
 sure or Pain to the Parent? Is the Parent
hungry, thirsty, sick, when his Children are
 so? No; but *his* naturally implanted De-
 sire of their Good, and Aversion to their
 Misery, makes him be affected with Joy or
 Sorrow from their Pleasures or Pains. This
 Desire then is antecedent to the Conjunction
 of Interest, and the Cause of it, not the
 Effect: it then must be *disinterested*. "No,
 " says another *Sophist*, Children are *Parts*
 " of ourselves, and in loving them we but
 " love *ourselves* in them." A very good
 Answer! Let us carry it as far as it will go.
 How are they *Parts* of ourselves? Not as
 a *Leg* or an *Arm*: We are not conscious
 of their Sensations. "But *their* Bodys were
 " form'd from *Parts* of *ours*." So is a *Fly*,
 or a *Maggot*, which may breed in any dis-
 charg'd Blood or Humour: Very dear Insects
 surely! there must be something else then
 which makes Children *Parts* of ourselves;
 and what is this but *that Affection*, which
 NATURE determines us to have toward
 them? *This Love* makes them *Parts* of
 ourselves, and therefore does not flow from
 their being so before. This is indeed a
 good Metaphor; and where-ever we find a
 Determination among several rational Agents
 to *mutual Love*, let *each Individual* be look'd
 upon as a *Part* of a great *Whole*, or *System*,
 and concern himself in the *publick Good* of it.

M

BUT

Sect. 2.

BUT a later Author observes, * " That
 " *natural Affection* in Parents is *weak*, till
 " the Children begin to give Evidences of
 " *Knowledge and Affections.*" Mothers say
 they feel it strong from the very first: and
 yet I could wish, for the Destruction of his
 Hypothesis, that what he alledges was true;
 as I fancy it is in some measure, tho' we may
 find in some Parents an Affection toward
 Idiots. The observing of *Understanding* and
Affections in Children, which make them
 appear *moral Agents*, can increase Love to-
 ward them without Prospect of *Interest*;
 for I hope, this Increase of Love is not from
 Prospect of Advantage from the Knowledge
 or Affections of Children, for whom Parents
 are still toiling, and never intend to be re-
 funded their Expences, or recompens'd for
 their Labour, but in Cases of extreme Ne-
 cessity. If then the observing a *Moral Capa-*
city can be the occasion of increasing Love
 without *Self-Interest*, even from the *Frame*
 of our *Nature*; pray, may not *this* be a
 Foundation of *weaker* degrees of Love, where
 there is no preceding Tie of Parentage, and
 extend it to *all Mankind*?

Publick
Affections,
natural.

XI. AND that this is so in Fact, will appear
 by considering some more distant Attachments
 If we observe any Neighbours, from whom

* See the Fable of the Bees, Pag. 68. 3d Ed.

perhaps we have receiv'd no good Offices, Sect. 2.
form'd into *Friendships, Familys, Partner-*
ships, and with *Honesty* and *Kindness* assist-
ing each other; pray ask any Mortal, if he
would not more desire their *Prosperity*, when
their *Interests* are no way inconsistent with
his own, than their *Misery* and *Ruin*?
and you shall find a *Bond of Benevolence* far-
ther extended than a *Family* and *Children*,
altho' the *Ties* are not so strong. Again,
suppose a Person, for *Trade*, had left his
native Country, and with all his *Kindred* had
settled his *Fortunes* abroad, without any
View of returning; and only imagine he
had receiv'd no *Injurys* from his *Country*:
ask such a Man, would he not rather desire
the *Prosperity* of his *Country*? Or could he,
now that his *Interests* are separated from
that of his *Nation*, as readily wish that it
was laid waste by *Tyranny*, or a *foreign*
Power? I fancy his Answer would shew us
a *Benevolence* extended beyond *Neighbour-*
hoods or *Acquaintances*. Let a Man of a
compos'd Temper, out of the *Hurry* of his
private Affairs, only read of the *Constitution*
of a *foreign Country*, even in the *most distant*
Parts of the *Earth*, and observe *Art, Design*,
and a *Study* of *publick Good* in the *Laws* of
this *Association*; and he shall find his *Mind*
mov'd in their *Favour*; he shall be *contriving*
Rectifications and *Amendments* in their *Con-*
stitution, and *regret* any unlucky *Part* of it,
which may be pernicious to their *Interest*;

Sect. 2. he shall *bewail* any Disaster which befalls them, and *accompany* all their Fortunes with the Affections of a Friend. Now this proves *Benevolence* to be in some degree extended to all Mankind, where there is no *interfering* Interest, which from *Self-Love* may obstruct it. And had we any Notions of *rational Agents*, capable of moral Affections, in the *most distant* Planets, our *good Wishes* would still attend them, and we should desire their Happiness. And that all these Affections, whether more or less extensive, are properly *disinterested*, not even founded on any Desire of that Happiness we may expect in seeing their prosperous Condition; may appear from this, that they would continue even at the Instant of our Death, or intire Destruction, as was already observed, *Art. IV.* of this Section.

National
Love.

XII. HERE we may transiently remark the Foundation of what we call *national Love*, or LOVE of one's *native Country*. Whatever Place we have liv'd in for any considerable time, there we have most distinctly remark'd the *various Affections* of *human Nature*; we have known many *lovely Characters*; we remember the *Associations*, *Friendships*, *Familys*, *natural Affections*, and other *human Sentiments*: our *moral Sense* determines us to approve these *lovely Dispositions*, where we have most distinctly observ'd them; and our *Benevolence* concerns

us

us in the Interests of those Persons possess'd Sect. 2.
 of them. When we come to observe the
 like as distinctly in *another* Country, we be-
 gin to acquire a *national Love* toward it also;
 nor has our *own* Country any other Pre-
 ference in our Idea, unless it be by an *Asso-*
ciation of the pleasant Ideas of our Youth,
 with the *Buildings, Fields, and Woods* where
 we receiv'd them. This may let us see how
Tyranny, Faction, a Neglect of Justice, a
Corruption of Manners, and anything which
 occasions the Misery of the Subjects, de-
 stroys this *national Love*, and the *dear Idea*
 of a COUNTRY.

WE ought here to observe, That the on-
 ly Reason of that *apparent Want* of natural
 Affection, among *collateral Relations*, is, that
 these *natural Inclinations*, in many Cases, are
 overpower'd by *Self-Love*, where there hap-
 pens any *Opposition* of Interests; but where
 this does not happen, we shall find all Man-
 kind under its Influence, tho' with different
 Degrees of Strength, according to the *nearer*
 or *more remote* Relations they stand in to each
 other; and according as the *natural Affection*
 of *Benevolence* is join'd with and strengthen'd
 by *Esteem, Gratitude, Compassion, or other*
kind Affections; or on the contrary, wea-
 ken'd by *Displacence, Anger, or Envy*.

*The Reason
 why natu-
 ral Affec-
 tions do not
 always ap-
 pear.*

S E C T. III.

The Sense of Virtue, and the various Opinions about it, reducible to one general Foundation. The Manner of computing the Morality of Actions.

*All Virtue
benevo-
lent.*

I. IF we examine all the Actions which are counted *amiable* any-where, and inquire into the Grounds upon which they are *approv'd*, we shall find that in the Opinion of the Person who approves them, they always appear as BENEVOLENT, or flowing from *Good-will to others*, and a Study of their Happiness, whether the Approver be one of the Persons *belov'd*, or *profited*, or not; so that all those *kind Affections* which incline us to make others happy, and all Actions suppos'd to flow from *such Affections*, appear *morally good*, if, while they are *benevolent* towards some Persons, they be not *pernicious* to others. Nor shall we find any thing *amiable* in any Action whatsoever, where there is no *Benevolence* imagin'd; nor in any Disposition, or Capacity, which is not suppos'd applicable to, and design'd for, *benevolent Purposes*. Nay, as was before ob-

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* See S

serv'd *, the Actions which in Fact are ex-Sect. 3.
ceedingly useful, shall appear void of *moral*
Beauty, if we know they proceeded from no
kind Intentions towards others; and yet an
unsuccessful Attempt of Kindness, or of pro-
moting *publick Good*, shall appear as ami-
able as the most successful, if it flow'd from
as strong *Benevolence*.

II. HENCE *those* Affections, which would *Religion*.
lead us to do Good to our Benefactor, shall
appear *amiable*, and the *contrary* Affections
odious, even when our Actions cannot possibly
be of any Advantage or Hurt to him. Thus
a *sincere Love* and *Gratitude* toward our Be-
nefactor, a *cheerful Readiness* to do whatever
he shall require, how burdensom soever, a
 hearty Inclination to comply with his Inten-
tions, and *Contentment* with the State he has
plac'd us in, are the strongest Evidences of
Benevolence we can shew to such a Person;
and therefore they must appear exceedingly
amiable. And under these is included all
the *rational Devotion*, or *Religion* toward a
DEITY apprehended as *good*, which we
can possibly perform.

WE may here transiently observe one
Circumstance in the *Frame* of our *Nature*,
which is wonderfully adapted to promote
Benevolence, viz. That as a Benefit conferr'd

* See Sect. ii. Art. 3. PAR. 1. Art. 9. PAR. 2.

Sect. 3. necessarily raises *Gratitude* in the Person who receives it, so the Expressions of this Gratitude, even from the meanest of Mankind, are *wonderfully delightful* to the Benefactor. Never were there any Mortals so poor, so inconsiderable, whose grateful Praise would not be some way delightful; and by whom we would not rather choose to be belov'd than hated, if their Love no way evidenc'd us to be Partners in their Vices, or concern'd in their Meanness. And thus the *most abject Person oblig'd* is capable, and inclin'd to make no small Addition to our Happiness by his *Love and Gratitude*, when he is utterly incapable of any other Return, and when we expect none from him: Thus,

————— *A grateful Mind*
By owing owes not, but still pays, at once
Indebted and discharg'd ————— *

As to *external Performances* of Religion, they are no doubt very various in different Nations and Ages; and *Education* may give Men Opinions, that certain Actions are pleasing, and others displeasing to the DEITY; but then, where-ever any external Rite of Worship is approv'd, there also it is look'd upon to proceed from *Love* toward the DEITY, or some other Affection necessarily join'd with *Love*, as *Reverence, Repentance, or Sorrow*.

* Par. Lost, B. iv. l. 55.

to have offended. So that the general Prin- Sect. 3.
 ciple of *Love* is the Foundation of all the
 apparent *moral Excellence*, even in the most
 fantastick Rites of Worship which were ever
 approv'd. For as to Rites design'd only to
 appease a *furious Being*, no Mortal, I fanfy,
 apprehends there is any *Virtue*, or *Excellence*
 in them; but that they are chosen only as
 the dishonourable Means of avoiding a
 greater Evil. Now as there are various spe-
 culative Opinions about what is acceptable to
 the DEITY, it necessarily follows, "That,
 "accordingly, *Practices*, and *Approbation*,
 "must be *various*; tho' all the *moral Good-*
 "ness of Actions is still presum'd to flow
 "from *Love*."

III. AGAIN, that we may see how *Bene- Social*
volence is the Foundation of all apprehended *Virtues*.
Excellence in social Virtues, let us only ob-
 serve, That amidst the Diversity of Senti-
 ments on this Head among various Sects,
 this is still allow'd to be the way of deciding
 the Controversy about any disputed Practice,
 viz. to inquire whether this Conduct, or
 the contrary, will most effectually promote
 the *publick Good*. The *Morality* is imme-
 diately adjusted, when the natural Tendency,
 or Influence of the Action upon the *univer-*
sal natural Good of Mankind, is agreed upon.
 That which produces more *Good* than *Evil*
 in the *Whole*, is acknowledg'd *good*; and
 what does not, is counted *evil*. In this
 Case,

Sect. 3. Case, we no other way regard the Good of the *Actor*, or that of those who are thus inquiring, than as they make a Part of the great *System*.

IN our late Debates about *Passive Obedience*, and the Right of *Resistance* in Defence of *Privileges*, the Point disputed among Men of Sense was, “ Whether *universal Submission* would probably be attended with greater *natural Evils*, than *temporary Insurrections*, when *Privileges* are invaded? and not, Whether what tended in the Whole to the *publick natural Good*, was also *morally good*?” And if a *divine Command* was alledg’d in Favour of the Doctrine of *Passive Obedience*, this would, no doubt, by its eternal Sanctions cast the Balance of *natural Good* to its own Side, and determine our Election from *Interest*; and yet our *Sense* of the *moral Good* in *Passive Obedience*, would still be founded upon some Species of *Benevolence*, such as *Gratitude* toward the DEITY, and *Submission* to his Will to whom we are so much oblig’d. But I fancy those, who believe the DEITY to be good, would not rashly alledge such a Command, unless they also asserted, that the thing commanded did tend more to the *universal Good*, than the contrary, either by preventing the external Evils of *Civil War*, or by enuring Men to *Patience*, or some other *Quality* which they apprehended necessary to

to their everlasting Happiness. And were it Sect. 3.
 not so, *Passive Obedience* might be recom-
 mended as an *inglorious Method* of escaping
 a greater Mischief, but could never have any
 thing *morally amiable* in it.

BUT let us quit the Disputes of the *Learned*,
 on whom, it may be alledg'd, *Custom* and
Education have a powerful Influence; and
 consider upon what Grounds, in common
 Life, Actions are *approv'd* or *condemn'd*,
vindicated or *excus'd*. We are universally
 inclin'd to say an Action is *just*, because it
 tends to my *Advantage*, or to the *Advantage*
 of the *Actor*: And we as seldom condemn a
beneficent kind Action, because it is not *ad-*
vantageous to us, or to the *Actor*. *Blame*
 and *Censure* are founded on a Tendency to
publick Evil, or a Principle of *private Ma-*
lice in the *Agent*, or *Neglect* at least of the
 Good of others; on *Inhumanity* of Temper,
 or at least such *strong Selfishness* as makes the
Agent careless of the Sufferings of others:
 and thus we *blame* and *censure* when the
 Action no way affects ourselves. All the
 moving and persuasive Vindications of Ac-
 tions, which may, from some *partial* evil
 Tendency, appear *evil*, are taken from this,
 that they were necessary to some *greater*
 Good, which counterbalanc'd the *Evil*: "Se-
 "verity toward a few, is *Compassion* to-
 "ward Multitudes — *Transitory Punish-*
 "ments are necessary for avoiding more
 "durable

Sect. 3. "*durable Evils*.— Did not *some* suffer on
 " such Occasions, there would be *no living*
 " for honest Men",—and such like. And
 even when an Action cannot be intirely justifi-
 fy'd, yet how greatly is the Guilt extenuated,
 if we can alledge, " That it was only the
 " Effect of *Inadvertence without Malice*, or
 " of *partial good Nature, Friendship, Com-*
 " *passion, natural Affection*, or *Love* of a
 " *Party?*" All these Considerations shew,
 what is the *universal Foundation* of our Sense
 of *moral Good*, or *Evil*, viz. *Benevolence* to-
 ward others on the one hand, and *Malice*, or
 even *Indolence*, and *Unconcernedness* about
 the *apparent publick Evil* on the other. And
 let it be here observ'd, that we are so far
 from imagining all Men to act only from
Self-Love, that we universally expect in others
 a Regard for the *Publick*; and do not look
 upon the Want of this, as barely the Absence
 of *moral Good*, or *Virtue*, but even as *posi-*
tively evil and hateful.

Moral
Evil not
always
Malice.

IV. CONTRARYS may illustrate each
 other; let us therefore observe the *general*
Foundation of our Sense of *moral Evil* more
 particularly. *Disinterested Malice*, or ulti-
 mate Desire of the Misery of others, is the
 highest Pitch of what we count *vicious*; and
 every Action appears *evil*, which is imagin'd
 to flow from any Degree of *this Affection*.
 Perhaps a *violent Passion* may hurry Men in-
 to it for a few Moments, and our *rash angry*
 Senti-

Sentiments of our Enemys, may represent Sect. 3. them as having such *odious Dispositions*; but it is very probable, from the Reasons offer'd above *, that there is no such Degree of Wick- edness in *human Nature*, as, in *cold Blood*, to desire the *Misery* of others, when it is conceiv'd no way useful to *our Interests*.

THE frequent, and seemingly unprovoked Cruelties of the NERO's and DOMITIAN's, are often alleged in Opposition to all this; but perhaps unjustly. Such Tyrants are conscious that they are hated by all those whom the World repute virtuous, and they apprehend Danger from them: A Tyrant looks upon such Men as designing, artful, or ambitious, under a false Shew of Virtue. He imagines the surest Means of his own Safety is to appear terrible, and to deprive his Enemys of all Hopes of escaping by his Compassion. The Fame of Virtue in eminent Subjects is matter of Envy, and is a Reproach upon the Tyrant: It weakens his Power, and makes them dangerous to him. *Power* becomes the Object of Delight to the Tyrant; and in Ostentation of it, he may break through all Regards to Justice and Humanity. Habits of Cruelty can be acquired in such a Course. Any of these apparent Interests seem better to account for the Crueltys of Tyrants, than

* See Sect. ii. Art. 4.

Sect. 3. the supposing in them a Principle of *calm*
 Malice without *Interest*, of which the *rest* of
Mankind seem intirely incapable.

*Temper of
 a Tyrant.*

THE Temper of a *Tyrant* seems a continu'd State of *Anger*, *Hatred*, and *Fear*. To form our Judgment then of his Motives of Action, and those of Men of like Tempers in lower Stations, let us reflect upon the Apprehensions we form of *Mankind*, when we are under any of those Passions which to the *Tyrant* are *habitual*. When we are under the fresh Impressions of an Injury, we find, that our Minds are wholly fill'd with Apprehensions of the Person who injur'd us, as if he were *absolutely evil*, and *delighted* in doing Mischief : We overlook the Virtues, which, when calm, we could have observ'd in him : we forget that perhaps he acted from *Self-Love*, and not *Malice*, or, it may be, some *generous* or *kind Intention* toward others. These, probably, are the Opinions which a *Tyrant* constantly forms concerning *Mankind*; and having very much weaken'd all *kind Affections* in himself, however he may pretend to them, he judges of the Tempers of others by his own. And were Men really such as he apprehends them, his Treatment of them would not be very unreasonable. We shall generally find our Passions arising suitably to the Apprehensions we form of others : if they are rashly form'd upon some sudden slight Views, it is no Wonder
 if

if we find Dispositions following upon them, Sect. 3.
very little suited to the *real State of human Nature*.

THE ordinary Spring of *Vice* then among Men, must be a *mistaken Self-Love*, made so violent, as to overcome *Benevolence*; or such strong *Appetites*, or Passions either selfish, or toward some narrow Systems, as overcome our Regard to Publick Good; or *Affections* arising from *false*, and *rashly form'd Opinions* of *Mankind*; which we run into thro' the Weakness of our *Benevolence*. When Men, who had good Opinions of each other, happen to have *contrary Interests*, they are apt to have their *good Opinions* of each other *abated*, by imagining a *design'd Opposition* from *Malice*; without this, they can scarcely *hate* one another. Thus two *Candidates* for the same Office wish each other *dead*, because that is an ordinary way by which Men make room for each other; but if there remains any Reflection on each other's Virtue, as there sometimes may in benevolent Tempers, then their Opposition may be without *Hatred*; and if another better Post, where there is no Competition, were bestow'd on one of them, the other shall rejoice at it.

V. ACTIONS which flow solely from *Self-Love* ^{Self-Love} *Love*, and yet evidence no want of *Benevolence*, ^{indifferent} having no hurtful Effects upon others, seem of

Sect. 3. of a middle Nature, neither virtuous nor vicious, and neither raise the *Love* or *Hatred* of the Observer. Our Reason can indeed discover certain Bounds, within which we may not only act from *Self-Love*, consistently with the *Good* of the *Whole*; but every Mortal's acting thus within these Bounds for his own *Good*, is absolutely necessary for the *Good* of the *Whole*; and the Want of such *Self-Love* would be *universally pernicious*. Hence, he who pursues his own *private Good*, with an Intention also to concur with that Constitution which tends to the *Good* of the *Whole*; and much more he who promotes his *own Good*, with a direct View of making himself more capable of serving *God*, or doing good to *Mankind*; acts not only *innocently*, but also *honourably*, and *virtuously*: for in both these Cases, *Benevolence* concurs with *Self-Love* to excite him to the Action. And thus a *Neglect* of our *own Good* may be *morally evil*, and argue a Want of *Benevolence* toward the *Whole*. But when *Self-Love* breaks over the Bounds above-mentioned, and leads us into Actions detrimental to *others*, and to the *Whole*; or makes us insensible of the *generous kind Affections*; then it appears *vitious*, and is *disapprov'd*. So also, when upon any small Injurys, or sudden Resentment, or any weak superstitious Suggestions, our *Benevolence* becomes so faint, as to let us entertain odious Conceptions of *Men*, or any Part of them, without

without just Ground, as if they were *wholly* evil, or *malicious*, or as if they were a worse Sort of Beings than they really are; these Conceptions must lead us into *malevolent Affections*, or at least weaken our *good ones*, and make us *really vicious*. Sect. 3.

VI. BENEVOLENCE is a Word fit enough in general, to denote the internal Spring of Virtue, as Bishop *Cumberland* always uses it. But to understand this more distinctly, 'tis highly necessary to observe, that under this Name are included very different Dispositions of the Soul. Sometimes it denotes a *calm, extensive Affection*, or Good-will toward all Beings capable of Happiness or Misery: Sometimes, 2. A calm deliberate Affection of the Soul toward the Happiness of certain smaller Systems or Individuals; such as Patriotism, or Love of a Country, Friendship, Parental-Affection, as it is in Persons of Wisdom and Self-Government: Or, 3. The several kind particular Passions of Love, Pity, Sympathy, Congratulation. This Distinction between the calm Motions of the Will, Affections, Dispositions, or Instincts of the Soul, and the several turbulent Passions, is elsewhere more fully considered*.

* See *Treatise* III. Sect. ii. Art. 3. and *Treatise* IV. Sect. vi. Art. 4.

Now tho' all these different Dispositions come under the general Character of Benevolent, yet as they are in Nature different, so they have very different Degrees of Moral Beauty. The first Sort is above all amiable and excellent: 'Tis perhaps the sole Moral Perfection of some superior Natures; and the more this prevails and rules in any human Mind, the more amiable the Person appears, even when it not only checks and limits our lower Appetites, but when it controuls our kind particular Passions, or counteracts them. The second Sort of *Benevolence* is more amiable than the third, when it is sufficiently strong to influence our Conduct: And the third Sort, tho' of a lesser Moral Dignity, is also beautiful, when it is no way opposite to these more noble Principles. And when it is opposite, tho' it does not justify such Actions as are really detrimental to greater Systems, yet it is a strong extenuating Circumstance, and much alleviates the Moral Deformity. We are all sensible of this, when any Person from Friendship, Parental-Affection, or Pity, has done something hurtful to larger Societies.

Self-Love
not exclu-
ded by Be-
nevolence.

VII. HERE we must also observe, that every *moral Agent* justly considers himself as a *Part* of this *rational System*, which may be useful to the *Whole*; so that he may be,
in

in part, an Object of his own universal *Bene-* Sect. 3.
volence. Nay farther, as was hinted above, he may see, that the Preservation of the *System* requires every one to be *innocently solicitous* about himself. Hence he may conclude, that an Action which brings *greater Evil* to the *Agent*, than *Good* to others, however it may evidence the Strength of some particular kind Attachment, or of a *virtuous Disposition* in the *Agent*, yet it must be founded upon a mistaken Opinion of its Tendency to *publick Good*; so that a Man who reason'd justly, and consider'd the Whole, would not be led into it, by the calm extensive *Benevolence*, how strong soever it were; nor would he recommend it to the Practice of others; however he might acknowledge, that the Detriment arising to the *Agent* from a *kind Action*, did evidence a strong virtuous Disposition. Nay farther, if any *Good* was propos'd to the Pursuit of an *Agent*, and he had a *Competitor* in every respect *only equal* to himself; the *highest* universal *Benevolence* possible would not lead a wise Man to prefer another to himself, were there no Ties of Gratitude, or some other external Circumstance, to move him to yield to his *Competitor*. A Man surely of the *strongest Benevolence*, may just treat himself as he would do a third Person, who was a *Competitor* of *equal Merit* with the other; and as his preferring one to another,

N in

Sect. 3. in such a Case, would argue no Weakness of *Benevolence*; so no more would he evidence it by preferring himself to a Man of only *equal Ability*s.

WHERE-EVER a Regard to *myself* tends as much to the Good of the *Whole*, as Regard to *another*; or where the *Evil* to myself is equal to the *Good* obtain'd for another; tho' by acting, in such Cases, for the Good of *another*, I really shew a very amiable Disposition; yet by acting in the contrary manner, from Regard to *myself*, I evidence no evil Disposition, nor any want of the most extensive *Benevolence*; since the *Moment* of Good to the *Whole* is, in both Cases, exactly equal. And let it be here observ'd, that this does not supersede the Necessity of *Liberality*, or *gratuitous Gifts*, altho' in such Actions the Giver loses what the other receives; since the *Moment* of Good to any Person, in any given Case, is in a compound Proportion of the *Quantity* of the Good itself, and the *Indigence* of the Person. Hence it appears, that a Gift may make a much greater *Addition* to the Happiness of the *Receiver*, than the *Diminution* it occasions in the Happiness of the *Giver*: And that the most useful and important Gifts are those from the *Wealthy* to the *Indigent*. Yet Gifts from *Equals* are not useless, since they often increase the
Hap-

Happiness of both, as they are strong Evidences of *mutual Love*: but Gifts from the *Poor* to the *Wealthy* are really foolish, unless they be only little Expressions of *Gratitude*, which are also fruitful of Joy on both Sides: for these Expressions of Gratitude are really delightful and acceptable to the *Wealthy*, if they have any Humanity; and their Acceptance of them is matter of Joy to the poor *Giver*.

IN like manner, when an Action does more Harm to the *Agent*, than Good to the *Publick*; the doing it evidences an amiable and truly virtuous Disposition in the *Agent*, tho' 'tis plain he acts upon a mistaken View of his Duty. But if the private Evil to the *Agent* be so great, as to make him incapable, at another time, of promoting a *publick Good* of greater moment than what is attain'd by this Action; the Action may really be evil, so far as it evidences a prior Neglect of a greater attainable *publick Good* for a smaller one; tho' at present this Action also flows from a virtuous Disposition.


VII. THE *moral Beauty*, or *Deformity* of Actions, is not alter'd by the *moral* ^{Benevolence, how affected by the Quality of its Object.} *Qualitys* of the Objects any farther than the *Qualitys* of the Objects increase or diminish the *Benevolence* of the Action, or the *publick Good* intended by it. Thus Benevolence

~ Sect. 3. *nevolence* toward the *worst* Characters, or the Study of their *Good*, may be as *amiable* as any whatsoever; yea, often more so than *that* toward the *Good*, since it argues such a strong Degree of *Benevolence* as can surmount the greatest Obstacle, the *moral Evil* in the Object. Hence the *Love* of *unjust Enemys*, is counted among the *highest Virtues*. Yet, when our *Benevolence* to the *Evil* encourages them in their bad Intentions, or makes them more capable of *Mischief*; this diminishes or destroys the *Beauty* of the Action, or even makes it *evil*, as it betrays a *Neglect* of the *Good* of *others* more valuable; *Beneficence* toward *whom*, would have tended more to the *publick Good*, than *that* toward our *Favourites*: But *Benevolence* toward *evil* Characters, which neither encourages nor enables them to do *Mischief*, nor diverts our *Benevolence* from Persons more useful, has as much *moral Beauty* as any whatsoever.

Qualitys
determin-
ing our
Election.

VIII. IN comparing the *moral Qualitys* of Actions, in order to regulate our *Election* among various Actions propos'd, or to find which of them has the greatest *moral Excellency*, we are led by our *moral Sense* of *Virtue* to judge thus; that in *equal Degrees* of Happiness, expected to proceed from the Action, the *Virtue* is in proportion to the *Number* of Persons to whom the Happiness shall extend; (and here the *Dignity*,

or

or *moral Importance* of Persons, may com- Sect. 3.
pensate Numbers) and in equal Numbers, 
the *Virtue* is as the *Quantity* of the Hap-
piness, or natural Good; or that the *Virtue*
is in a *compound Ratio* of the *Quantity* of
Good, and *Number* of Enjoyers. In the
same manner, the *moral Evil*, or *Vice*, is as
the Degree of Misery, and *Number* of Suf-
ferers; so that *That Action* is *best*, which
procures the *greatest Happiness* for the *great-
est Numbers*; and *that worst*, which, in like
manner, occasions *Misery*.

AGAIN, when the *Consequences* of Ac- Consequen-
ces, how
they affect
the Mora-
lity of Ac-
tions.
tions are of a *mix'd Nature*, partly *advanta-
geous*, and partly *pernicious*; *that Action* is
good, whose *good Effects* preponderate the *evil*
by being useful to many, and pernicious to
few; and *that evil*, which is otherwise.
Here also the *moral Importance* of Characters,
or *Dignity* of Persons may compensate Num-
bers; as may also the *Degrees* of Happiness
or Misery: for to procure an *inconsiderable*
Good to many, but an *immense Evil* to few,
may be *evil*; and an *immense Good* to few,
may preponderate a *small Evil* to many.

BUT the *Consequences* which affect the
Morality of Actions, are not only the direct
and natural Effects of the Actions them-
selves; but also all those *Events* which
otherwise would not have happen'd. For
many Actions which have no immediate or

Sect. 3. *natural evil Effects*, nay, which actually produce *good Effects*, may be *evil*; if a man foresees, that the evil Consequences, which will probably flow from the *Folly* of others, upon his doing of such Actions, are so great as to overbalance all the *Good* produc'd by those Actions, or all the *Evils* which would flow from the Omission of them: And in such Cases the *Probability* is to be computed on both sides. Thus, if an Action of mine will probably, thro' the Mistake or Corruption of others, be made a *Precedent* in unlike Cases, to very evil Actions; or when my Action, tho' good in itself, will probably provoke Men to very evil Actions, upon some *mistaken Notion* of their Right; any of these Considerations foreseen by me, may make such an Action of mine *evil*, whenever the Evils which will probably be occasion'd by the *Action*, are greater than the Evils occasion'd by the *Omission*.

AND this is the Reason, that many *Laws* prohibit Actions in general, even when some particular *Instances* of those Actions would be very useful; because an universal *Allowance* of them, considering the Mistakes Men would probably fall into, would be more pernicious than an universal *Prohibition*; nor could there be any more *special Boundarys* fix'd between the right and wrong Cases. In such Cases, it is the Duty of Persons to comply with the generally useful

Consti-

Constitution; or if in some very important Sect. 3. Instances, the Violation of the Law would be of less *evil Consequence*, than Obedience to it, they must patiently resolve to undergo those Penalties, which the State has, for valuable Ends to the Whole, appointed: and this Disobedience will have nothing criminal in it.

IX. 'Tis here to be observed, that tho' every *kind Affection* abstractly considered, is approved by our moral Sense, yet all sorts of Affections or Passions which pursue the Good of others are not equally approved, or do not seem in the same degree virtuous. Our *calm Affections*, either private or publick, are plainly distinct from our *particular Passions*; *calm Self-Love* quite distinct from *Hunger, Thirst, Ambition, Lust, or Anger*; so *calm Good-will* toward others is different from *Pity, passionate Love, the parental Affection*, or the *Passion of particular Friends*. Now every kind Passion, which is not pernicious to others, is indeed approved as virtuous and lovely: And yet a calm Good-will toward the same Persons appears more lovely. So calm Good-will toward a small System is lovely and preferable to more passionate Attachments; and yet a more extensive calm Benevolence is still more beautiful and virtuous; and the highest Perfection of Virtue is *an universal calm Good-will* toward all sensitive Natures. Hence it is, that we condemn particular Attachments, when inconsistent

N 4

with

Sect. 3. with the Interest of great Societies, because they argue some Defect in that more noble Principle, which is the Perfection of Virtue *.

Partial
Benevo-
lence, how
virtuous.

X. FROM these Observations, we may see what Actions our *moral Sense* would most recommend to our Election, as the most *perfectly virtuous*: viz. such as appear to have the most universal unlimited Tendency to the *greatest* and *most extensive Happiness* of all the *rational Agents*, to whom our Influence can reach. All *Benevolence*, even toward a *Part*, is amiable, when not inconsistent with the *Good* of the *Whole*: But this is a smaller Degree of *Virtue*, unless our Benevolence be restrain'd by want of Power, and not want of Love to the *Whole*. All strict Attachments to Partys, Sects, Factions, have but an imperfect Species of *Beauty*, even when the *Good* of the *Whole* requires a stricter Attachment to a *Part*, as in *natural Affection*, or *virtuous Friendships*; except when *some Parts* are so eminently useful to the *Whole*, that even *universal Benevolence* does determine us with special Care and Affection to study their Interests. Thus *universal Benevolence* would incline us to a more strong Concern for the Interests of *great* and *generous Characters* in a high Station, or

* See *Essay on Passions*, Sect. 2. Art. 3. And *Illustrations*, Sect. 6. Art. 4.

make us more earnestly study the Interests of Sect. 3. any *generous Society*, whose whole Constitution was contriv'd to promote *universal Good*. Thus a good Fancy in *Architecture* would lead a Man, who was not able to bear the Expence of a completely regular Building, to choose such a Degree of Ornament as he could keep uniformly thro' the *Whole*, and not move him to make a vain unfinish'd Attempt in *one Part*, of what he foresaw he could not succeed in as to *the Whole*. And he would condemn a great Profusion of Ornament on *one Part*, above the Proportion of *the Whole*, unless *that Part* be some eminent Place of the *Edifice*, such as the *chief Front*, or *publick Entrance*; the adorning of which would beautify the *Whole* more than an equal Expence of Ornament on any *other Part*.

THIS Constitution of our *Sense*, whereby the *moral Beauty* of Actions, or Dispositions, increases according to the *Number* of Persons to whom the good Effects of them extend; whence also Actions which flow from the *nearer Attachments* of Nature, such as *that* between the *Sexes*, and the *Love* of our *Offspring*, do not appear *so virtuous* as Actions of *equal Moment* of Good towards Persons less attach'd to us; has been chosen by the AUTHOR OF NATURE for this good Reason, "That the more limited *Instincts* tend to " produce a smaller Moment of Good, be-
" cause

Sect. 3. " cause confined to small Numbers. Where-
 " as the more *extensive calm Instinct* of Good-
 " will, attended with Power, would have
 " no Bounds in its good Effects, and would
 " never lead into any Evil, as the particular
 " Passions may : and hence it is made more
 " lovely to our *Sense*, that we might be in-
 " duced to cultivate and strengthen it ; and
 " make it check even *kind Passions*, when they
 " are opposite to a greater Good."

*Moral Dis-
 positions
 and Abi-
 litys.*

X. FROM this primary Idea of *moral Good* in Actions, may arise a Notion of moral Good in those Dispositions, whether *natural* or *acquir'd*, which enable us to do good to others; or which are presum'd to be design'd, and acquir'd or cultivated for that purpose; or are natural Indications of a good Temper, and usually accompany it. And hence those Abilitys, while nothing appears contrary to our Presumption, may increase our Approbation of the Possessor of them; but when they are imagin'd to be intended for *publick Mischief*, they make us hate him the more; Such are a *penetrating Judgment*, a *tenacious Memory*, a *quick Invention*; *Patience of Labour, Pain, Hunger, Watching*; a *Contempt of Wealth, Rumour, Death*. These may be rather call'd *natural Abilitys*, than *moral Qualitys*: And we seem to have a natural Relish for them distinct from moral Approbation. But if we plainly see them *maliciously* employ'd, they make the Agent more detestable.

XI. T^o

XI. To find a *universal Rule* to compute the *Morality* of any Actions, with all their Circumstances, when we judge of the Actions done by ourselves, or by others, we must observe the following *Propositions* or *Axioms*.

How we
compute
the Mora-
lity of Ac-
tions in
our Sense
of them.

1. THE moral *Importance* of any Agent, or the Quantity of publick Good he produces, is in a compound Proportion of his *Benevolence* and *Abilitys*. For 'tis plain that his good Offices depend upon these two jointly. In like manner, the Quantity of private Good which any Agent obtains for himself, is in a like compound Proportion of his *selfish Principles*, and his *Abilitys*. We speak here only of the external Goods of this World, which one pursues from some selfish Principles. For as to internal Goods of the Mind, these are most effectually obtain'd by the Exercise of other Affections than those called *Selfish*, even those which carry the Agent beyond himself toward the Good of others.

2. IN comparing the Virtues of different Agents, when the Abilitys are equal, the *Moments* of publick Good are proportioned to the Goodness of the Temper, or the *Benevolence*; and when the *Temper*s are equal, the Quantitys of Good are as the *Abilitys*.

3. THE Virtue then or Goodness of Temper is directly as the *Moment of Good*,
when

Sect. 3. when other Circumstances are equal, and *inversely* as the Abilitys. That is to say, where the Abilitys are greatest, there is less Virtue evidenced in any given Moment of Good produced.

4. BUT as the natural Consequences of our Actions are various, some *good* to ourselves, and *evil* to the Publick; and others *evil* to ourselves, and *good* to the Publick; or either *useful* both to ourselves and others, or *pernicious* to both; the intire Spring of good Actions is not always *Benevolence alone*; or of Evil, *Malice alone* (nay, sedate Malice is rarely found); but in most Actions we must look upon *Self-Love* as another Force, sometimes conspiring with *Benevolence*, and assisting it, when we are excited by Views of *private Interest*, as well as *publick Good*; and sometimes opposing *Benevolence*, when the good Action is any way *difficult* or *painful* in the Performance, or *detrimental* in its Consequences to the *Agent*.

THESE *selfish Motives* shall be * hereafter more fully explain'd; here we may in general denote them by the Word *Interest*: which when it concurs with *Benevolence*, in any Action capable of Increase or Diminution, must produce a greater Quantity of *Good*,

* Vide Sect. v.

than *Benevolence* alone in the same *Ability*s ; Sect. 3. and therefore when the *Moment* of Good, in an Action partly intended for the Good of the *Agent*, is but equal to the *Moment* of Good in the Action of another *Agent*, influenc'd only by *Benevolence*, the former is less *virtuous* ; and in this Case the *Interest* must be deducted to find the true Effect of the *Benevolence* or *Virtue*. In the same manner, when *Interest* is opposite to *Benevolence*, and yet is surmounted by it ; this *Interest* must be added to the *Moment*, to increase the *Virtue* of the Action, or the Strength of the *Benevolence*. By *Interest*, in this last Case, is understood all the *Advantage* which the *Agent* might have obtain'd by omitting the Action, which is a *negative Motive* to it ; and this, when subtracted, becomes *positive*.

BUT here we must observe, that no *Ad-* Intention
and Fore-
sight affect
Actions. *vantage*, not *intended*, altho' casually, or naturally, redounding to us from the Action, does at all affect its *Morality* to make it less *amiable* : nor does any *Difficulty* or *Evil* unforeseen, or not resolved upon, make a kind Action more *virtuous* ; since in such Cases *Self-Love* neither assists nor opposes *Benevolence*. Nay, *Self-Interest* then only diminishes the *Benevolence*, when without this View of *Interest* the Action would not have been undertaken, or so much Good would not have been produc'd by the *Agent* ; and it extenuates the *Vice* of an evil Action, only when

Sect. 3. when without this *Interest* the Action would not have been done by the *Agent*, or so much *Evil* have been produc'd by him.

THE sixth Axiom only explains the external Marks by which Men must judge, who do not see into each other's Hearts; for it may really happen in many Cases, that Men may have *Benevolence* sufficient to surmount any Difficulty, and yet they may meet with none at all: And in that Case, it is certain there is as much *Virtue* in the *Agent*, tho' he does not give such Proof of it to his Fellow-Creatures, as if he had surmounted Difficultys in his kind Actions. And this too must be the Case with the *DEITY*, to whom nothing is difficult.

*Perfect
Virtue.*

SINCE then, in judging of the Goodness of Temper in any Agent, the Abilitys must come into Computation, as is above-mentioned, and none can act beyond their natural Abilitys; that must be the Perfection of *Virtue*, where the *Moment* of Good produced equals the Ability, or when the *Being* acts to the utmost of his Power for the *publick Good*; and hence the Perfection of *Virtue*, in this Case, is as *Unity*. And this may shew us the only Foundation for the boasting of the *Stoicks*, "That a Creature suppos'd innocent, by pursuing *Virtue* with his utmost Power, may in *Virtue* equal the Gods." For in their Case, if the *Ability* be *infinite*,
unless

unless the *Good* to be produced in the whole, Sect. 3. be so too, the *Virtue* is not *absolutely perfect*; and the *Quotient* can never surmount *Unity*.

XII. IN the same Manner we may compute the Degree of Depravity of any Temper, ^{Moral Evil how corrupted.} *directly* as the Moment of Evil effected, and *inversely* as the Abilitys. The Springs of vicious Actions however are seldom any real ultimate Intention of Mischief, and never ultimate deliberate Malice; but only sudden Anger, Self-Love, some selfish Passion or Appetite, some kind Attachments to Parties, or particular kind Passions.

THE Motives of Interest may sometimes strongly cooperate with a depraved Temper, or may oppose it, in the same Manner that they cooperate with or oppose a good Temper. When they cooperate, they diminish the Moral Evil; when they oppose, they may argue the Depravity of Temper to be greater, which is able to surmount such Motives of Interest.

BUT we must observe, that not only *Innocence* is expected from all Mortals, but they are presum'd, from their *Nature*, in some measure inclin'd to *publick Good* *; so that a bare Absence of this Desire is enough to

* See *Treatise* IV. § 6.

Sect. 3. make an *Agent* be reputed evil : Nor is a direct Intention of *publick Evil* necessary to make an Action *evil*; it is enough that it flows from *Self-Love*, with a plain Neglect of the *Good* of others, or an Insensibility of their Misery, which we either *actually* foresee, or have a probable *Presumption* of.

IT is true indeed, that *that publick Evil* which I neither certainly foresee, nor have actual Presumptions of, as the Consequence of my Action, does not make my *present Action* criminal or odious ; even altho' I might have foreseen this Evil by a serious Examination of my own Actions ; because such Actions do not, at present, evidence either *Malice*, or *want of Benevolence*. But then it is also certain, that my *prior Negligence*, in not examining the Tendency of my Actions, is a plain Evidence of the Want of *that Degree of good Affections* which is necessary to a virtuous Character ; and consequently the *Guilt* properly lies in this *Neglect*, rather than in an *Action* which really flows from a *good Intention*. *Human Laws* however, which cannot examine the *Intentions*, or secret Knowledge of the *Agent*, must judge in gross of the Action itself ; presupposing all that Knowledge as actually attain'd, which we are oblig'd to attain.

IN like manner, no good Effect, which I did not actually foresee and intend, makes
my

my Action *morally good* ; however *Human* Sect. 3.
Laws or Governors, who cannot search into
Mens Intentions, or know their secret *De-*
signs, justly reward Actions which tend to
 the publick Good, altho' the Agent was
 engag'd to those Actions only by *selfish Views* ;
 and consequently had no virtuous Disposition
 influencing him to them.

THE Difference in *Degree of Guilt* between
Crimes of Ignorance, when the Ignorance is
vincible, and *faulty*, as to the natural Ten-
 dency of the Action ; and *Crimes of Malice*,
 or direct evil Intention ; consists in this, that
 the former, by a *prior Neglect*, argues a want
 of the due Degree of *Benevolence*, or *right*
Affection ; the latter evidences direct *evil*
Affections, which are vastly more odious.

XIII. FROM the former Reasonings we *Morality*
 may form almost a demonstrative Conclusion, *distinct*
 " That we have a *Sense of Goodness* and *mo-* *from Inte-*
 " *ral Beauty* in Actions, distinct from *Ad-*
 " *vantage* ;" for had we no other Foun-
 dation of Approbation of Actions, but the
Advantage which might arise to us from them,
 if they were done toward ourselves, we should
 make no Account of the *Abilitys* of the
Agent, but would barely esteem them accord-
 ing to their *Moment*. The *Abilitys* come
 in only to shew the Degree of *Benevolence*,
 which supposes *Benevolence* necessarily *amiable*.
 Who was ever the better pleas'd with a *barren*
 O *rocky*

Sect. 3. *rocky Farm*, or an *inconvenient House*, by being told that the *poor Farm* gave as great Increase as it could; or that the *House* accommodated its Possessor as well as it could? And yet in our Sentiments of Actions, whose *Moment* is very inconsiderable, it shall wonderfully increase the *Beauty* to alledge, "That it was " all the *poor Agent* could do for the *Publick*, " or his *Friend*."

Morality
of Cha-
racters.

XIV. THE *moral Beauty* of Characters arises from their Actions, or sincere Intentions of the *publick Good*, according to their Power. We form our Judgment of them according to what appears to be their *fix'd Disposition*, and not according to any particular *Sallys* of *unkind Passions*; altho' these abate the *Beauty* of good Characters, as the *Motions* of the *kind Affections* diminish the *Deformity* of the *bad ones*. What then properly constitutes a *virtuous Character*, is not some few accidental *Motions* of *Compassion*, *natural Affection*, or *Gratitude*; but such a *fix'd Humanity*, or *Desire* of the *publick Good* of all, to whom our Influence can extend, as uniformly excites us to all Acts of *Beneficence*; and makes us careful of informing ourselves right, concerning the truest Methods of serving their Interests. Every Motion indeed of the *kind Affections* appears in some degree *amiable*, but we denominate the *Character* from the *prevailing Principle*.

XV. SOME

XV. SOME will not allow that Virtue can spring from Passions, Instincts, or Affections of any Kind. 'Tis true, kind particular Passions are but a lower kind of Goodness, even when they are not opposite to the general Good. Those calmer Determinations of the Will, whether of greater or less Extent, or sedate strong Affections, or Desires of the Good of others, are more amiable. These may be as much rooted in the Frame of the Soul, or there may be as natural a Disposition to them as to particular Passions. They tell us, That "Virtue should wholly spring from Reason;" as if Reason or Knowledge of any true Proposition could ever move to Action where there is no End proposed, and no Affection or Desire toward that End *. For this see *Treatise IV. Sect. i. and ii.*

*Instinct
may be the
Spring of
Virtue.*

THE ultimate End, according to many of our Moralists, is to each one *his own Hap-*

* These Gentlemen should either remember the common Doctrine of the Schools, or else confute it better; that the προαίρεσις which is necessary in virtuous Actions is ὁρεξις βελουσιμη: And that Virtue needs not only the λογὸν ἀληθὴν, but the ὁρεξιν ὀρθήν. These very Authors who deny any Affections or Motions of the Will to be the proper Springs of sublime Virtue, yet, inconsistently with themselves, must allow in Men of sublime Virtue, and even in the Deity too, a settled Disposition of Will, or a constant Determination, or Desire to act in Conformity to Reason, or a fixed Affection toward a certain Manner of Conduct. Now an ill-natur'd Adversary would call this an Instinct, an Essential or Natural Disposition of Will, an Affectionate Determination toward a very sublime Object presented by the Understanding. See Aristotle's Magn. Moral. Lib. i. c. 18, 35. and Lib. ii. c. 7 & 8. and in many other Places.

Sect. 3. *pinefs*; and yet this he seeks by *Instinct*.
 Now may not another *Instinct* toward the
Publick, or the *Good* of others, be as proper
 a Principle of *Virtue*, as the *Instinct* toward
private Happiness? This is certain, that
 whereas we behold the *selfish* Actions of
 others, with *Indifference* at best, we see some-
 thing *amiable* in every Action which flows
 from *kind Affections* or *Passions* toward others;
 if they be conducted by *Prudence*, so as any
 way to attain their End, consistently with
 the general Good. If it be said, "That
 " Actions from *Instinct* are not the Effect
 " of *Prudence* and *Choice*;" this Objection
 holds full as strongly against the Actions
 which flow from *Self-Love*; since the Use of
 our Reason is as requisite to find the proper
 Means of promoting *publick Good*, as *private*
Good. And as it must be an *Instinct*, or a
Determination previous to Reason, which
 makes us pursue *private Good*, as well as *pub-*
lick Good as our End; there is the same Occa-
 sion for *Prudence* and *Choice*, in the Election
 of proper Means for promoting of either. I
 see no Harm in supposing, " That Men are
 " naturally dispos'd to *Virtue*, and not less
 " merely indifferent, until some Prospect of
 " Interest allures them to it." Surely, the
 Supposition of a *benevolent universal Instinct*
 would recommend *human Nature*, and its
 AUTHOR, more to the Love of a good
 Man, and leave Room enough for the Exer-
 cise of our Reason, in contriving and settling
 Rights,

Rights, Laws, Constitutions ; in inventing Sect. 3.
 Arts, and practising them so as to gratify, in
 the most effectual manner, that generous In-
 clination. And if we must bring in Self-
 Love to make *Virtue rational*, a little Re-
 flection will discover, as shall appear here-
 after, that this *Benevolence* is our greatest
Happiness ; and thence we may resolve to
 cultivate, as much as possible, this *sweet Dis-*
position, and to despise every *opposite Interest*.
 Not that we can be *truly virtuous*, if we
 intend only to obtain the Pleasure which arises
 from *Beneficence*, without the *Love of others* :
 Nay, this very Pleasure is founded on our
 being conscious of *disinterested Love to others*,
 as the *Spring* of our Actions. But *Self-In-*
terest may be our *Motive* in studying to raise
 these kind Affections, and to continue in this
 agreeable State ; tho' it cannot be the *sole*
 or *principal Motive* of any Action, which to
 our *moral Sense* appears *virtuous* *.

FROM

* 'Tis thus we must understand many Places of Plato, Aristotle, Cicero, and others of the Antients, when they speak of " a natural Instinct or Disposition in each Being, toward his own Preservation and highest Perfection, as the Spring of Virtue." 'Tis acknowledged by all, that we have such an Instinct, which must operate very indistinctly at first, till we come to consider our Constitution, and our several Powers. When we do so, we find, according to them, the natural Principles of Virtue, or the φυσικὰ ἀρετὰι, implanted in us : They appear to us the noblest Parts of our Nature ; such are our Desires of Knowledge, our Relish for Beauty, especially of the Moral Kind, our Sociable Affections. These upon Reflection we find to be natural Parts of our Constitution, and we desire to bring them to Perfection from the first-mentioned general Instinct. We must not thence conclude,

Sect. 3.


*Heroism in
all Sta-
tions.*

FROM the preceding *Reasonings* we shall only draw this one Inference, which seems the most joyful imaginable, even to the lowest Rank of Mankind, *viz.* "That no external Circumstances of Fortune, no involuntary Disadvantages, can exclude any Mortal from the *most heroick Virtue.*" For how small soever the *Moment* of *publick Good* be, which any one can accomplish, yet if his *Abilitys* are proportionably small, the *Virtue* may be as great as any whatsoever. Thus, not only the *Prince*, the *Statesman*, the *General*, are capable of *true Heroism*, tho' these are the chief Characters, whose Fame is diffus'd thro' various Nations and Ages: but when we find in an *honest Trader*, the kind *Friend*, the *faithful prudent Adviser*, the *charitable and hospitable Neighbour*, the *tender Husband*, and *affectionate Parent*, the *sedate yet chearful Companion*, the *generous Assistant* of *Merit*, the *cautious Allayer* of *Contention* and *Debate*, the *Promoter* of *Love* and good *Understanding* among *Acquaintances*; if we consider, that these were *all* the good Offices

elude, that all our Affections spring from Self-Love, or are ultimately pursuing private Good. Disinterested Affections are presupposed as natural Parts of our Constitution, and found in it upon Reflection, not raised by an Act of Choice for some private Good, nor ultimately pursuing it. (See Cicero de Finib. Lib. iii. & Lib. v.) This would be manifestly contrary to the most express Words of these great Men on Friendship, Patriotism, and other Subjects. See Aristotle in the Magn. Moral. & Nicom. on Friendship; and Cicero de Finib. Lib. ii. & Lib. v.

which

which his Station in the World gave him an Sect. 3.
Opportunity of performing to Mankind, we
must judge *this Character* really as *amiable*,
as those, whose external Splendor dazzles an
injudicious World into an Opinion, "That
they are the *only Heroes in Virtue*."



S E C T. IV.

All Mankind agree in this general Foundation of their Approbation of moral Actions. The Grounds of the different Opinions about Morals.

*This Moral Sense uni-
versal.*

I. **T**O shew how far Mankind agree in that which we have made the *universal Foundation* of this *moral Sense*, viz. *BENEVOLENCE*, we have observ'd already *, that when we are ask'd the Reason of our Approbation of any Action, we universally alledge its *Usefulness* to the *Publick*, and not to the *Actor* himself. If we are vindicating a censur'd Action, and maintaining it lawful, we generally make this one Article of our Defence, "That it injur'd nobody, or did more Good than *Harm*." On the other hand, when we blame any Piece of Conduct, we shew it to be *prejudicial* to others, besides the *Actor*; or to evidence at least a *Neglect* of their Interest, when it was in our Power to serve them; or when *Gratitude*, *natural Affection*, or some other *disinterested Tye* should have rais'd in us a Study of their Interest. If we sometimes blame foolish Conduct in others, without any Reflection upon its Tendency to


* See above, Sect. iii. Art. 3. Par. 3.

publick Evil, it is generally occasion'd by our Sect. 4. *Benevolence*, which makes us concern'd for the Evils befalling others *. We all know how great an Extenuation of Crimes it is, to allege, "That the poor Man does harm to nobody but himself;" and how often this turns Hatred into Pity. And yet we shall find, that the greatest part of the Actions which are *immediately prejudicial* to ourselves, and are often look'd upon as *innocent* toward others, do really tend to the *publick Detriment*, by making us incapable of performing the good Offices we could otherwise have done, and perhaps would have been inclin'd to do. This is the Case of *Intemperance* and *extravagant Luxury*.

II. AND farther, we may observe, that no Action of any other Person was ever approv'd by us, but upon some Apprehension, well or ill-grounded, of some *really good moral Quality*. If we observe the Sentiments of Men concerning Actions, we shall find, that it is always some *really amiable* and *benevolent Appearance* which engages their Approbation. We may perhaps commit Mistakes, in judging that Actions tend to the publick Good, which

Benevolence the sole ground of Approbation.

* Beside that moral Approbation or Commendation, we have also an immediate natural Relish for certain Powers and Abilities, and the regular Exercise of them; and a Dislike and Contempt of a Person who wants them, or has not cultivated them; when we don't think of any Subserviency to a publick Good. But this is rather perceiving a vigorous or a mean Character, than a virtuous or vitious one.

Sect. 4. do not ; or be so inadvertent, that while our  Attention is fix'd on some *partial good Effects*, we may quite overlook many *evil Consequences* which counterbalance the *Good*. Our *Reason* may be very deficient in its Office, by giving us partial Representations of the Tendency of Actions ; but it is still some *apparent Species* of *Benevolence* which commands our Approbation. And *this Sense*, like our other Senses, tho' counteracted by stronger Motives of *external Advantage*, ceases not to operate, but makes us *uneasy* and *dissatisfy'd* with ourselves ; even as the *Sense* of *Tasting* makes us loath and dislike the nauseous Potion, which we may force ourselves, from Interest, to swallow.

*False Ap-
probations.*

IT is therefore to no purpose to allege here, " That many Actions are really done, " and approv'd, which tend to the *universal* " *Detriment*." For the same way, Actions are often perform'd, and in the mean time approv'd, which tend to the *Hurt* of the *Actor*. But as we do not, from the latter, infer the *Actor* to be void of *Self-Love*, or a *Sense* of *Interest* ; no more should we infer from the former, that such Men are void of a *Sense* of *Morals*, or a Desire of *publick Good*. The Matter is plainly this: Men are often mistaken in the Tendency of Actions either to *publick*, or *private Good* : Nay, sometimes *violent Passions*, while they last, will make them approve very bad Actions by their *Moral* *Sense*,

Sense, and conceive very *pernicious ones* to Sect. 4.
 the *Agent*, to be *advantageous*: But this
 proves only, "That sometimes there may
 be some more *violent Motive* to Action,
 than a *Sense of moral Good*; or that Men
 by *Passion* may become blind even to
 their own *Interest*."

BUT to prove that Men are void of a
moral Sense, we should find some Instances
 of *cruel, malicious Actions*, done without
 any *Motive of Interest, real or apparent*; and
 approv'd without any Opinion of *Tendency to*
publick Good, or *flowing from Good-will*:
 We must find a Country where *Murder* in
 cold Blood, *Tortures*, and *every thing mali-*
cious, without any *Advantage*, is, if not ap-
 prov'd, at least look'd upon with *Indifference*,
 and raises no *Aversion* toward the Actors in
 the unconcern'd Spectators: We must find
 Men with whom the *Treacherous, Ungrate-*
ful, Cruel, are in the same account with the
Generous, Friendly, Faithful, and Humane;
 and who approve the *latter*, no more than
 the *former*, in all Cases where they are not
 affected by the Influence of these Dispositions,
 or when the *natural Good or Evil* befalls other
 Persons. And it may be question'd, whether
 the *Universe*, tho' large enough, and stor'd
 with no inconsiderable Variety of Characters,
 will yield us any Instance, not only of a *Na-*
tion, but even of a *Club*, or a *single Person*, who
 will think all Actions *indifferent*, but those
 which regard his own Concerns.

Sect. 4.

*Diversity
of Man-
ners ac-
counted
for.*

III. FROM what has been said, we may easily account for the *vast Diversity* of *moral Principles*, in *various Nations* and *Ages*; and the Grounds of *this Diversity* are principally these:

*From va-
rious No-
tions of
Happi-
ness.*

1st. DIFFERENT Opinions of *Happiness*, or *natural Good*, and of the most effectual Means to advance it. Thus in one Country, where there prevails a *courageous Disposition*, where *Liberty* is counted a great *Good*, and *War* an *inconsiderable Evil*, all Insurrections in Defence of Privileges will have the Appearance of *moral Good* to our *Sense*, because of their appearing *benevolent*; and yet the *same Sense* of *moral Good* in *Benevolence*, shall in another Country, where the Spirits of Men are more *abject* and *timorous*, where *Civil War* appears the *greatest natural Evil*, and *Liberty* no great *Purchase*, make the same Actions appear *odious*. So in SPARTA, where thro' Contempt of Wealth the Security of Possessions was not much regarded, but the Thing chiefly desir'd, as *naturally good to the State*, was to abound in a *hardy shifting Youth*; *Theft*, if dexterously perform'd, was so little odious, that it receiv'd the Countenance of a Law to give it Impunity.

BUT in these, and all other Instances of the like Nature, the Approbation is founded on *Benevolence*, because of some real, or ap-
parent

parent Tendency to the *publick Good*. For Sect. 4. we are not to imagine, that this *Sense* should give us, without Observation, Ideas of complex Actions, or of their natural Tendencies to *Good* or *Evil*: it only determines us to approve *Benevolence*, whenever it appears in any Action, and to hate *the contrary*. So our *Sense* of *Beauty* does not, without Reflection, Instruction or Observation, give us Ideas of the *regular Solids, Temples, Cirques, and Theatres*; but determines us to approve and delight in *Uniformity amidst Variety*, where-ever we observe it. Let us read the *Preambles* of any Laws we count unjust, or the *Vindications* of any disputed Practice by the *Moralists*, and we shall find, no doubt, that Men are often mistaken in computing the Excess of the *natural good* or *evil Consequences* of certain Actions; but the Ground on which any Action is approv'd, is still some Tendency to the *greater natural Good* of others, apprehended by those who approve it.

THE same Reason may remove also the *Travellers* Objections against the *Universality of this* ^{*Accounts of barbarous Customs.*} *Sense*, from some Storys of Travellers, concerning *strange Crueltys* practis'd toward the *Aged, or Children*, in certain Countrys. If such Actions be done in such angry Passions, they only prove, that other Motives, or Springs of Action, may overpower *Benevolence* in its *strongest Ties*: and if they really be universally allow'd, look'd upon as innocent,

Sect. 4. cent, and vindicated; it is certainly under
 some Appearance of *Benevolence*; such as to
 secure them from Insults of Enemies, to avoid
 the Infirmary's of Age, which perhaps appear
 greater Evils than Death, or to free the vigorous
 and useful Citizens from the Charge of maintain-
 ing them, or the Troubles of Attendance upon them.
 A Love of Pleasure and Ease, may in the immedi-
 ate Agents be stronger in some Instances, than
Gratitude toward Parents, or *natural Affec-
 tion* to Children. But that such Nations are
 continu'd, notwithstanding all the Toil in edu-
 cating their Young, is still a sufficient Proof
 of *natural Affection*: For I fancy we are not
 to imagine any nice Laws in such Places, com-
 pelling Parents to a proper Education of some
 certain Number of their Offspring. We know
 very well that an Appearance of *publick Good*
 was the Ground of Laws equally barbarous, en-
 acted by LYCURGUS and SOLON, of killing the
 deform'd, or Weak, to prevent a burdensome
 Croud of useless Citizens.

A LATE ingenious Author * has justly
 observ'd the Absurdity of the *monstrous Taste*,
 which has possess'd both the *Readers* and
Writers of *Travels*. They are sparing
 enough in Accounts of the *natural Affections*,
the Familys, Associations, Friendships, Clans,
 of the *Indians*; and as transiently do they

* *Ld. Shaftsbury, Vol. i. p. 346, 7, 8, 9, &c.*

mention their Abhorrence of *Treachery* Sect. 4.
among themselves; their *Proneness*, to mutual
Aid, and to the Defence of their several
States; their Contempt of Death in Defence
of their Country, or upon Points of *Honour*.
These are but *common Storys*.—No need
to travel to the *Indies* for what we see in
Europe every Day." The Entertainment
therefore in these ingenious Studys consists
chiefly in exciting *Horror*, and making Men
share. The ordinary Employment of the
Bulk of the *Indians* in Support of their Wives
and Offspring, or Relations, has nothing of
the *Prodigious*: But a *Human Sacrifice*, a
Feast upon Enemys Carcases, can raise an
Horror and Admiration of the wondrous
Barbarity of *Indians*, in Nations no Stran-
gers to the *Massacre at Paris*, the *Irish Re-*
bellion, or the Journals of the *Inquisition*.
These they behold with religious Veneration;
but the *Indian Sacrifices*, flowing from a like
Perversion of *Humanity* by *Superstition*, raise
the highest Abhorrence and Amazement.
What is most surprizing in these Studys, is the
wondrous *Credulity* of some Gentlemen of
great Pretensions in other Matters to Caution
of Assent, for these *marvellous Memoirs* of
Monks, Friars, Sea-Captains, Pirates; and
for the *Histories, Annals, Chronologys*, receiv'd
by oral Tradition, or Hieroglyphicks.

MEN have *Reason* given them, to judge ^{Use of}
of the Tendency of their Actions, that ^{Reason in}
they ^{Morals.}

Sect. 4. they may not stupidly follow the first Appearance of *publick Good*; but it is still some Appearance of *Good* which they pursue. And it is strange, that *Reason* is universally allow'd to Men, notwithstanding all the stupid ridiculous *Opinions* receiv'd in many Places; and yet absurd Practices, founded upon those very *Opinions*, shall seem an Argument against any *moral Sense*, altho' the bad Conduct is not owing to any Irregularity in the *moral Sense*, but to a wrong Judgment or *Opinion*. If putting the *Aged* to *Death*, with all its Consequences, really tends to the *publick Good*, and the *lesser Misery* of the *Aged*, it is, no doubt, *justifiable*; nay, perhaps the *Aged* choose it, in Hopes of a *future State*. If a *deform'd* or *weak Race* could never, by Ingenuity and Art, make themselves useful to Mankind, but should grow an absolutely unsupportable Burden, so as to involve a whole State in Misery, it is *just* to put them to Death. This all allow to be *just*, in the Case of an over-loaded Boat in a Storm. And as for *killing* of their Children, when Parents are sufficiently stock'd, it is perhaps practis'd, and allow'd from *Self-Love*; but I can scarce think it passes for a good Action any-where. If *Wood* or *Stone*, or *Metal* be DEITIES, have *Government*, and *Power*, and have been the *Authors* of *Benefits* to us; it is *morally amiable* to praise and worship them. Or if the true DEITY be pleas'd with Worship before *Statues*, or

any

any other Symbol of some more immediate Sect. 4th Presence or Influence; Image-Worship is virtuous. If he delights in Sacrifices, Penances, Ceremonys, Cringings; they are all laudable. Our Sense of Virtue generally leads us exactly enough according to our Opinions; and therefore the absurd Practices which prevail in the World, are much better Arguments that Men have no Reason, than that they have no moral Sense of Beauty in Actions.

IV. THE next Ground of Diversity in ^{Narrow} Sentiments, is the Diversity of Systems, to ^{Systems} which Men, from foolish Opinions, confine ^{pervert the} their Benevolence. We intimated above *, ^{moral} Sense. that it is regular and beautiful, to have stronger Benevolence toward the morally good Parts of Mankind, who are useful to the Whole, than toward the useless or pernicious. Now, if Men receive a low or base Opinion of any Body, or Sect of Men; if they imagine them bent upon the Destruction of the more valuable Parts, or but useless Burdens of the Earth; Benevolence itself will lead them to neglect the Interests of such, and to suppress them. This is the Reason why, among Nations who have high Notions of Virtue, every Action toward an Enemy may pass for just; why ROMANS and GREEKS could approve of making those they call'd Barbarians, Slaves.

* See Sect. iii. Art. 10. Par. 1.

Sect. 4.

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Sects pernicious to Virtue.

A L A T E ingenious Author * justly observes, " That the various *Sects, Parties, Factions, Cabals* of Mankind in larger Societys, are all influenc'd by a *publick Spirit*: That some generous Notions of *publick Good*, some strong friendly Dispositions, raise them at first, and excite Men of the same *Faction* or *Cabal* to the most disinterested mutual Succour and Aid: That all the Contentions of the different Factions, and even the fiercest Wars against each other, are influenc'd by a sociable *publick Spirit* in a limited System." But certain it is, that Men are little oblig'd to those, who often artfully raise and foment this Party Spirit; or cantonize them into several Sects for the Defence of very trifling Causes. Associations for innocent *Commerce*, or *Manufactures*; Cabals for Defence of *Liberty*, against a *Tyrant*; or even lower Clubs for *Pleasantry*, or *Improvement* by Conversation, are very amiable and good. But when Mens Heads are filled with some trifling Opinions; when designing Men raise in their Minds some unaccountable Notion of *Sanctity* and *Religion*, in Tenets or Practices, which neither increase our Love to G O D, or our own *Species*; when the several Factions are taught to look upon each other as *odious, contemptible, profane*, because of

* Ld: Shaftesbury's Essay on Wit and Humour, Part iii. Sect. ii. Vol. I. p. 110.

their different Tenets or Opinions ; even Sect. 4.
 when these Tenets, whether true or false, are
 perhaps perfectly useless to the publick Good ;
 when the keenest Passions are rais'd about
 such Trifles, and Men begin to hate each
 other for what, of itself, has no Evil in it ;
 and to love the Zealots of their own Sect for
 what is no way valuable ; nay, even for
 their Fury, Rage, and Malice against opposite
 Sects ; (which is what all Partys commonly call
Zeal) 'tis then no Wonder, if our *moral Sense* be
 much impair'd, and our *natural Notions* of
Good and *Evil* almost lost, when our *Admi-
 ration*, and *Love* or *Contempt*, and *Hatred*, are
 thus perverted from their natural Objects.


IF any Mortals are so happy as never to
 have heard of the *Party-Tenets* of most of
 our Sects ; or, if they have heard of them,
 have either never espous'd any Sect, or all
 equally ; they bid fairest for a truly *natural*
 and good Disposition, because their *Tempers*
 have never been soured about vain Trifles ;
 nor have they contracted any *Sullenness* or
Rancour against any Part of their own *Kind*.
 If any *Opinions* deserve to be contended for,
 they are those which give us lovely Ideas of
 the DEITY, and of our *Fellow-Creatures* :
 If any *Opinions* deserve Opposition, they are
 such as raise Scruples in our Minds about the
Goodness of PROVIDENCE, or represent
 our *Fellow-Creatures* as *base* and *selfish*, by
 instilling into us some ill-natur'd, cunning,
 P 2 shrewd

Sect. 4. shrewd Insinuations, "That our most generous Actions proceed wholly from *selfish Views*." This wise *Philosophy* of some *Moderns*, after *EPICURUS*, must be fruitful of nothing but *Discontent*, *Suspicion*, and *Jealousy*; a State infinitely worse than any little transitory *Injurys*, to which we might be expos'd by a good-natur'd *Credulity*. But Thanks be to the kind *AUTHOR* of our Nature, that in spite of such *Opinions*, our Nature itself leads us into *Friendship*, *Trust*, and *mutual Confidence*.

WERE we freely conversant with *Robbers*, who shew a *moral Sense* in the equal or proportionable *Division* of their Prey, and in *Faith* to each other, we should find they have their own sublime *moral Ideas* of their Party, as *generous*, *courageous*, *trusty*, nay *honest* too; and that those we call *honest* and *industrious*, are imagin'd by them to be *mean-spirited*, *selfish*, *churlish*, or *luxurious*; on whom that *Wealth* is ill bestow'd, which therefore they would apply to better *Uses*, to maintain gallanter Men, who have a *Right* to a *Living* as well as their Neighbours, who are their profess'd *Enemies*. Nay, if we observe the *Discourse* of our profess'd *Debauchees*, our most dissolute *Rakes*, we shall find their *Vices* cloath'd, in their *Imaginations*, with some amiable Dress of *Liberty*, *Generosity*, just *Resentment* against the Contrivers of artful Rules to enslave Men, and rob them of their Pleasures. P E R-

PERHAPS never any Men pursu'd Vice long with Peace of Mind, without some such deluding Imagination of *moral Good* *, while they may be still inadvertent to the *barbarous* and *inhuman Consequences* of their Actions. The Idea of an *ill-natur'd Villain* is too frightful ever to become familiar to any Mortal. Hence we shall find, that the *basest* Actions are dress'd in some *tolerable Mask*. What others call *Avarice*, appears to the Agent a *prudent Care* of a *Family*, or *Friends*; *Fraud*, *artful Conduct*; *Malice* and *Revenge*, a *just Sense* of *Honour*, and a *Vindication* of our Right in Possessions, or *Fame*; *Fire* and *Sword*, and *Desolation*, among *Enemys*, a *just* *thorow Defence* of our *Country*; *Persecution*, a *Zeal* for the *Truth*, and for the *eternal Happiness* of Men, which *Hereticks* oppose. In all these Instances, Men generally act from a *Sense* of *Virtue* upon *false Opinions*, and *mistaken Benevolence*; upon *wrong* or *partial Views* of *publick Good*, and the Means to promote it; or upon very *narrow Systems* form'd by like *foolish Opinions*. It is not a *Delight* in the *Misery* of others, or *Malice*, which occasions the horrid Crimes which fill our *Historys*; but generally an *injudicious*, *unreasonable Enthusiasm* for some kind of *limited Virtue*.

* See below, Sect. vi. Art. 2. Par. 1.



*Insani sapiens nomen ferat, æquus iniqui,
Ultra, quam satis est, VIRTUTEM si petat
ipsam †.*

*False Opinions of
the divine
Laws.*

V. THE last Ground of *Diversity* which occurs, are the *false Opinions* of the *Will* or *Laws* of the DEITY. To obey these we are determin'd from *Gratitude*, and a *Sense* of *Right* imagin'd in the DEITY, to dispose at Pleasure the Fortunes of his Creatures. This is so abundantly known to have produc'd *Follies*, *Superstitions*, *Murders*, *Devastations* of Kingdoms, from a *Sense* of *Virtue* and *Duty*, that it is needless to mention particular Instances. Only we may observe,
“ That all those *Follies*, or *Barbaritys*, rather
“ confirm than destroy the Opinion of a *moral*
“ *Sense* ;” since the DEITY is believ'd to have a *Right* to dispose of his Creatures; and *Gratitude* to him, if he be conceiv'd *good*, must move us to Obedience to his Will: if he be not conceiv'd *good*, *Self-Love* may overcome our *moral Sense* of the Action which we undertake to avoid his Fury.

As for the Vices which commonly proceed from *Love* of *Pleasure*, or any violent *Passion*, since generally the *Agent* is soon sensible of their *Evil*, and that sometimes amidst the Heat of the Action, they only prove,

"That this *moral Sense* and *Benevolence* Sect. 4.
 "may be overcome by the more importunate
 "Solicitations of *other Desires*."

VI. BEFORE we leave this Subject, it is ^{Objection} necessary to remove one of the strongest Ob- ^{from In-} ^{cest.} ^{jections} against what has been said so often, viz. "That this *Sense* is *natural*, and independent on *Custom* and *Education*." The Objection is this, "That we shall find *some Actions* always attended with the strongest Abhorrence, even at first View, in some whole Nations, in which there appears nothing contrary to *Benevolence*; and that the *same Actions* shall in another Nation be counted *innocent*, or *honourable*. Thus Incest, among *Christians*, is abhorred at first Appearance as much as *Murder*; even by those who do not know or reflect upon any necessary Tendency of it to the Detriment of Mankind. Now we generally allow, that what is from *Nature* in one Nation, would be so in all. This Abhorrence therefore cannot be from *Nature*, since in GREECE, the marrying Half-sisters was counted *honourable*; and among the *Persian* MAGI, the marrying of Mothers. Say they then, may not all our *Approbation* or *Dislike* of Actions arise the same way from *Custom* and *Education*?"

THE Answer to this may be easily found from what is already said. Had we no mo-

Sect. 4. *ral Sense natural* to us, we should only look
 upon *Incest* as hurtful to ourselves, and shun
 it, and never disapprove other *incestuous Per-*
sons, more than we do a *broken Merchant*;
 so that still this Abhorrence supposes a *Sense*
of moral Good. And farther, it is true, that
 many who abhor *Incest* do not know, or re-
 flect upon the natural Tendency of some sorts
 of *Incest* to the *publick Detriment*: but
 where-ever it is hated, it is apprehended as
 offensive to the DEITY, and that it exposes
 the Person concern'd to his just Vengeance.
 Now it is universally acknowledg'd to be the
 grossest Ingratitude and Baseness, in any
 Creature, to counteract the Will of the
 DEITY, to whom it is under such Obliga-
 tions. This then is plainly a *moral evil*
Quality apprehended in *Incest*, and reducible
 to the general Foundation of *Malice*, or
 rather Want of *Benevolence*. Nay farther,
 where this Opinion, " That *Incest* is offen-
 " sive to the DEITY," prevails, *Incest* must
 have another direct Contrariety to *Benevo-*
lence; since we must apprehend the *Incestuous*,
 as exposing an Associate, who should be dear
 to him by the Ties of *Nature*, to the lowest
 State of *Misery* and *Baseness*, *Infamy* and
Punishment. But in those Countrys where
 no such Opinion prevails of the DEITY's
 abhorring or prohibiting *Incest*; if no ob-
 vious *natural Evils* attend it, it may be look'd
 upon as *innocent*. And farther, as Men who
 have the *Sense of Tasting*, may, by *Company*
 and

and Education, have Prejudices against Meats Sect. 4.
 they never tasted, as *unfavoury*; so may Men
 who have a *moral Sense*, acquire an Opinion
 by implicit Faith, of the *moral Evil* of Actions,
 altho' they do not themselves discern in them
 any Tendency to *natural Evil*; imagining
 that others do: or, by Education, they may
 have some Ideas associated, which raise an
 Abhorrence without Reason. But without a
moral Sense we could receive no Prejudice
 against Actions, under any other View than
 as *naturally disadvantageous* to ourselves.

VII. THE *Universality* of this *moral Sense*, *Moral*
Sense not
from Edu-
cation
 and that it is antecedent to *Instruction*, may
 appear from observing the Sentiments of *Chil-*
dren, upon hearing the Storys with which
 they are commonly entertain'd as soon as they
 understand Language. They always pas-
 sionately interest themselves on that side where
Kindness and *Humanity* are found; and detest
 the *Cruel*, the *Covetous*, the *Selfish*, or the
Treacherous. How strongly do we see their
 Passions of *Joy*, *Sorrow*, *Love*, and *Indigna-*
tion, mov'd by these *moral Representations*,
 even tho' there have been no Pains taken to
 give them Ideas of a DEITY, of *Laws*, of
 a *future State*, or of the more intricate Ten-
 dency of the *universal Good* to that of each
Individual!

S E C T. V.

A farther Confirmation, that we have practical Dispositions to Virtue implanted in our Nature ; with a farther Explication of our Benevolent Instincts of various Kinds, with the additional Motives of Interest, viz. Honour, Shame and Pity.


Degrees of
Benevo-
lence.

I. **W**E have already endeavoured to prove, “ That there is a *universal Determination to Benevolence in Mankind*, “ even toward the most distant Parts of the “ Species :” But we are not to imagine, that all benevolent Affections are of one Kind, or alike strong. There are nearer and stronger Kinds of *Benevolence*, when the Objects stand in some nearer Relations to ourselves, which have obtain’d distinct Names ; such as *natural Affection, Gratitude, Esteem.*

Natural
Affection.

ONE Species of *natural Affection*, viz. that in *Parents* towards their *Children*, has been consider’d already * ; we shall only

* See above, Sect. ii. Art. 9. Par. 2, 3.

observe farther, That there is the same kind Sect. 5.
 of *Affection* among *collateral Relations*, tho' 
 in a weaker Degree; which is universally ob-
 servable, where no Opposition of *Interest* pro-
 duces contrary Actions, or counterbalances
 the Power of this *natural Affection*.

WE may also observe, that as to the ^{Not found-}
Affection of *Parents*, it cannot be entirely ^{ed on Me-}
 founded on *Merit* and *Acquaintance*; not ^{rit, or Ac-}
 only because it is antecedent to all Acquain- ^{quaint-}
 tance, which might occasion *Esteem*; but be-
 cause it operates where *Acquaintance* would
 produce *Hatred*, even toward *Children* appre-
 hended to be *vitious*. And this *Affection* is
 farther confirm'd to be from NATURE,
 because it is always observ'd to *descend*, and
 not *ascend* from *Children* to *Parents* mutu-
 ally. NATURE, who seems sometimes fru-
 gal in her Operations, has strongly deter-
 min'd *Parents* to the Care of their *Children*,
 because they universally stand in absolute
 need of Support from them; but has left it
 to *Reflection*, and a *Sense* of *Gratitude*, to
 produce Returns of *Love* in *Children*, toward
 such *tender kind Benefactors*, who very sel-
 dom stand in such absolute Need of Support
 from their Posterity, as their *Children* did
 from them. Now, did *Acquaintance* or
Merit produce *natural Affection*, we surely
 should find it strongest in *Children*, on whom
 all the Obligations are laid by a thousand
 good

Sect. 5. good Offices; which yet is quite contrary to Observation. Nay, this Principle seems not confin'd to *Mankind*, but extends to other *Animals*; where yet we scarcely ever suppose any Ideas of Merit; and is observ'd to continue in them no longer than the Necessitys of their Young require. Nor could it be of any Service to the Young that it should, since when they are grown up, they can receive little Benefit from the Love of their *Dams*. But as it is otherwise with *rational Agents*, so their *Affections* are of longer Continuance, even during their whole Lives.

Gratitude. II. BUT nothing will give us a juster Idea of the *wise Order* in which *human Nature* is form'd for *universal Love*, and *mutual good Offices*, than considering that *strong Attraction* of *Benevolence*, which we call *Gratitude*. Every one knows that *Benevolence* toward ourselves makes a much deeper Impression upon us, and raises *Gratitude*, or a *stronger Love* toward the *Benefactor*, than *equal Benevolence* toward a *third Person* *. Now because of the great Numbers of *Mankind*, their distant Habitations, and the Incapacity of any one to be remarkably useful to great Multitudes; that our *Benevolence* might not be quite distracted with a Multiplicity of Objects, whose equal Virtues would equally recommend

* See above, Sect. ii. Art. 6. Par. 3.

them to our Regard; or become useless, by Sect. 5. being equally extended to Multitudes, whose Interests we could not understand, nor be capable of promoting; having no Intercourse of Offices with them; NATURE has so well ordered it, that as our Attention is more raised by those good Offices which are done to ourselves or our Friends, so they cause a stronger Sense of Approbation in us, and produce a stronger Benevolence toward the Authors of them. This we call *Gratitude*. And thus a Foundation is laid for joyful *Associations* in all kinds of *Business*, and *virtuous Friendships*.

By *this Constitution* also the *Benefactor* is more encourag'd in his *Beneficence*, and better secur'd of an *Increase* of Happiness by *grateful Returns* *, than if his *Virtue* were only to be honour'd by the colder general Sentiments of Persons unconcern'd, who could not know his Necessitys, nor how to be profitable to him; especially, when they would all be equally determin'd to love innumerable Multitudes, whose equal Virtues would have the same Pretensions to their Love.

THE *universal Benevolence* toward all Men, we may compare to that Principle of *Gravitation*, which perhaps extends to all

* See above, Sect. iii. Art. 2. Par. 2.

Sect. 5. Bodys in the *Universe*; but *increases* as the Distance is diminish'd, and is *strongest* when Bodys come to touch each other. Now this *Increase*, upon nearer Approach, is as necessary as that there should be any *Attraction* at all. For a *general Attraction*, equal in all Distances, would by the Contrariety of such Multitudes of equal Forces, put an End to all Regularity of Motion, and perhaps stop it altogether. Beside this general Attraction, the Learned in these Subjects shew us a great many other Attractions among several Sorts of Bodys, answering to some particular Sorts of Passions, from some special Causes. And that Attraction or Force by which the Parts of each Body cohere, may represent the Self-Love of each Individual.

THESE different Sorts of Love to Persons according to their *nearer Approaches* to ourselves by their *Benefits*, is observable in the high Degree of *Love*, which *Heroes* and *Largivers* universally obtain in their own Countrys, above what they find abroad, even among those who are not insensible of their Virtues; and in all the strong Ties of *Friendship*, *Acquaintance*, *Neighbourhood*, *Partnership*; which are exceedingly necessary to the Order and Happiness of Human Society.

Love of
Himself.

III. FROM considering that *natural Gratitude*, and *Love* toward our *Benefactors*, which was already

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already shewn to be *disinterested**; we are Sect. 5:
 easily led to consider *another Determination*
 of our *Minds*, equally *natural* with the *former*, which is to desire and delight in the
good Opinion and *Love of others*, even when
 we expect no other *Advantage* from them,
 except what flows from *this Constitution*,
 whereby HONOUR is made an *immediate*
Good. This Desire of *Honour* I would call
 AMBITION, had not *Custom* join'd some
 evil Ideas to that Word, making it denote
 such a *violent Desire of Honour*, and of *Power*
 also, as will make us stop at no base Means
 to obtain them. On the other hand, we are
 by NATURE subjected to a *grievous Sensa-*
tion of Misery, from the unfavourable Opini-
 ons of others concerning us, even when we
 dread no other *Evil* from them. This we
 call SHAME; which in the same manner
 is constituted an *immediate Evil*, as we said
Honour was an *immediate Good*.

Now, were there no *moral Sense*, or had
 we no other Idea of Actions but as *advan-*
tageous or *hurtful*, I see no Reason why we
 should be *delighted* with *Honour*, or subject-
 ed to the *Uneasiness* of *Shame*; or how it
 could ever happen, that a Man, who is se-
 cure from Punishment for any Action, should
 ever be *uneasy* at its being known to *all the*
World. The *World* may have an Opinion

* See above, Sect. ii. Art. 6.

Sect. 5. of him as pernicious to his Neighbours; but what subjects his Ease to this Opinion of the *World*? Why, perhaps, he shall not be so much trusted henceforward in Business, and so suffer Loss. If this be the only Reason of *Shame*, and it has no *immediate Evil* or *Pain* in it, distinct from Fear of Loss, then, where-ever we expose ourselves to Loss, we should be *asham'd*, and endeavour to conceal the Action: and yet it is quite otherwise.

A MERCHANT, for Instance, lest it should impair his Credit, conceals a *Shipwreck*, or a very bad *Market*, which he has sent his Goods to. But is this the same with the Passion of SHAME? Has he that *Anguish*, that *Dejection of Mind*, and *Self-condemnation*, which one shall have whose *Treachery* is detected? Nay, how will Men sometimes glory in their Losses, when in a Cause imagin'd *morally good*, tho' they really weaken their Credit in the Merchant's Sense: that is, the Opinion of their *Wealth*, or *Fitness* for Business? Was any Man ever *asham'd* of impoverishing himself to serve his Country, or his Friend?

The Foundation of
Morals not
the Opinions of our
Country.

IV. THE *Opinions* of our Country are by some made the first Standard of *Virtue*. They alledge, "That by comparing Actions to them, we first distinguish between *moral Good* and *Evil*: And then, say they

"AMBITION

AMBITION, or the *Love* of HONOUR, is Sect. 5.
our *chief Motive*." But what is *Honour*?

It is not the being universally known, no matter how. A *covetous Man* is not *honour'd* by being universally known as *covetous*; nor a *weak, selfish, or luxurious Man*, when he is known to be so: Much less can a *treacherous, cruel or ungrateful Man*, be said to be *honour'd* for his being known as such. A *Posture-master, a Fire-eater, or Practiser of Leger-de-main*, is not *honour'd* for these publick Shews, unless we consider him as a Person capable of giving the Pleasures of *Admiration and Surprise* to Multitudes. *Honour* then is the *Opinion of others concerning* our *morally good Actions, or Abilitys* pretend'd to be apply'd that way; for *Abilitys* constantly apply'd to other Purposes, procure the greatest Infamy. Now it is certain, that *Ambition, or Love of Honour*, is really *selfish*; but then this Determination to love *Honour*, presupposes a *Sense of moral Virtue*, both in the Persons who confer the Honour, and in the Person who pursues it.

AND let it be observ'd, that if we knew an *Agent* had no other Motive of Action than *Ambition*, we should apprehend no *Virtue* even in his most useful Actions, since they flow'd not from any *Love* to others, or desire to their Happiness. When *Honour* thus constituted by NATURE pleasant to us, it may be an *additional Motive to Virtue*,

Q

as,

Sect. 5. as, we said above *, the Pleasure arising from *Reflection on our Benevolence* was: but the Person whom we imagine *perfectly virtuous*, acts immediately from the *Love* of others; however these refin'd Interests may be *joint Motives* to him to set about such a Course of Actions, or to cultivate every *kind Inclination*, and to despise every *contrary Interest*, as giving a smaller Happiness than *Reflection* on his own Virtue, and *Consciousness* of the Esteem of others.

SHAME is in the same manner constituted an *immediate Evil*, and influences us the same way to abstain from *moral Evil*: not that any Action or Omission would appear *virtuous*, where the *sole Motive* was Fear of *Shame*.

Opinions
flow from
the Moral
Sense.

V. BUT to inquire farther, how far the Opinions of our Company can raise a Sense of *moral Good or Evil*: If any Opinion be universal in any Country, Men of little Reflection will probably embrace it. If an Action be believ'd to be *advantageous* to the *Agent*, we may be led to believe so too, and then *Self-Love* may make us undertake it; or may, the same way, make us shun an Action reputed *pernicious* to the *Agent*. If an Action pass for *advantageous* to the *Publick*, we may believe so too; and what next?

* See Sect. iii. Art. 15. Par. 2.

* THIS
wife, high
such desired;

Moral Good and Evil.

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Sect 5.

If we have no *disinterested Benevolence*, what shall move us to undertake it? "Why, we love *Honour*; and to obtain this Pleasure, we will undertake the Action from *Self-Interest*." Now, is *Honour* only the Opinion of our Country, that an Action is *advantageous* to the *Publick*? No: we see no *Honour* paid to the *useful Treachery* of an Enemy, whom we have brib'd to our Side, to *casual undesign'd Services*, or to the most useful Effects of *Compulsion* on Cowards; and yet we see *Honour* paid to *unsuccessful Attempts* to serve the *Publick* from sincere Love to it. *Honour* then presupposes a *Sense* of something *amiable* besides *Advantage*, viz. a *Sense* of *Excellence* in a *publick Spirit*; and therefore the *first Sense* of *moral Good* must be antecedent to *Honour*; for *Honour* is founded upon it *. The Company we keep may lead us, without examining, to believe that certain Actions tend to the *publick Good*; but that our Company *honours* such Actions, and loves the *Agent*, must flow from a *Sense* of *some Excellence* in this Love of the *Publick*, and serving its Interests.

"WE therefore, say they again, pretend to love the *Publick*, altho' we only desire the Pleasure of *Honour*; and we will ap-

* THIS should be considered by those who talk much of *Prize*, high Opinion, or Value, Esteem, Glory, as Things much desired; while yet they allow no moral Sense.

Q 2

"plaud

Sect. 5. "plaud all who seem to act in that manner,
 "either that we may reap *Advantage* from
 "their Actions, or that others may believe
 "we *really love* the *Publick*." But shall any
 Man ever be heartily *approved* and *admired*,
 when we know that *Self-Love* is the only
 Spring of his Actions? No: that is impossi-
 ble. Or, shall we ever really admire Men
 who appear to *love* the *Publick*, without a
moral Sense? No: we could form no Idea
 of such a Temper; and as for these Preten-
 ders to *publick Love*, we should hate them as
 Hypocrites, and our Rivals in Fame. Now
 this is all which could be effected by the
 Opinions of our Country, even supposing
 they had a *moral Sense*, provided we had
 none ourselves: They never could make us
 admire *Virtue*, or *virtuous Characters* in
 others; but could only give us Opinions of
Advantage or *Disadvantage* in Actions, ac-
 cording as they tended to procure to us the
 Pleasures of *Honour*, or the Pain of Shame.

BUT if we suppose that Men have, by
 NATURE, a *moral Sense* of *Goodness* in Ac-
 tions; and that they are capable of *disinterest-*
ed Love; all is easy. The Opinions of our
 Company may make us rashly conclude, that
 certain Actions tend to the universal Detri-
 ment, and are *morally evil*, when perhaps
 they are not so; and then *our Sense* may de-
 termine us to have an Aversion to them, and
 their Authors; or we may, the same way,
 be

be led into implicit Prejudices in favour of Sect. 5. Actions as *good*; and then our Desire of Honour may co-operate with *Benevolence*, to move us to such Actions. But, had we no *Sense* of *moral Qualities* in Actions, nor any Conceptions of them, except as *advantageous* or *hurtful*, we never could have *honour'd* or *lov'd Agents* for *publick Love*, or had any Regard to their Actions, farther than they affected ourselves in particular. We might have form'd the metaphysical Idea of *publick Good*, but we had never desir'd it, farther than it tended to our own *private Interest*, without a Principle of *Benevolence*; nor admir'd and lov'd those who are studious of it, without a *moral Sense*. So far is *Virtue* from being (in the Language of a late * Author) *the Offspring of Flattery, begot upon Pride*; that *Pride*, in the bad Meaning of that Word, is *the spurious Brood of Ignorance by our moral Sense, and Flattery only an Engine, which the Cunning may use to turn this moral Sense in others, to the Purposes of Self-Love in the Flatterer.*

VI. To explain what has been said of the *Moral Power of Honour*: Suppose a STATE or PRINCE, observing the Money which is *Sense, not from Love of Honour.* drawn out of *England* by *Italian Musicians*, should decree *Honours, Statues, Titles*, for *great Musicians*: This would certainly ex-

* Author of the Fable of the Bees, Pag. 37. 3^d Ed.

Sect. 5. cite all who had Hopes of Success, to the Study of *Musick*; and all Men would look upon the good Performers as useful Subjects, as well as very entertaining. But would this give all Men a good *Ear*, or make them delight in *Harmony*? Or could it ever make us really love a *Musician*, who study'd nothing but his own Gain, in the same manner we do a *Patriot*, or a generous *Friend*? I doubt, not. And yet *Friendship*, without the Assistance of Statues, or Honours, can make Persons appear exceedingly amiable.

LET us take another Instance: Suppose Statues and triumphal Arches were decreed, as well as a large Sum of Money, to the Discoverer of the *Longitude*, or any other useful Invention in Mathematicks: This would raise an universal Desire of such Knowledge from *Self-Love*; but would Men therefore love a *Mathematician*, as they do a virtuous Man? Would a *Mathematician* love every Person who had attain'd Perfection in that Knowledge, where-ever he observ'd it, altho' he knew that it was not accompany'd with any Love to Mankind, or Study of their Good, but with *Ill-nature*, *Pride*, *Covetousness*? In short, let us honour other Qualities by external Shew as much as we please; if we do not discern a *benvolent Intention* in the Application, or presume upon it, we may look upon these Qualities as useful, enriching, or otherwise advantageous to any one who

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who is possess'd of them; but they shall ne-Sect. 5.
 ver meet with those endearing Sentiments
 of *Esteem* and *Love*, which our *Nature* de-
 termines us to appropriate to *Benevolence* or
Virtue.

LOVE of *Honour*, and Aversion to *Shame*,
 may often move us to do Actions, for which
 others profess to honour us, even tho' we
 see no *Good* in them ourselves: And *Com-*
pliance with the Inclinations of others, as it
 evidences Humanity, may procure some
 Love to the *Agent*, from Spectators who see
 no *moral Good* in the Action itself. But
 without some *Sense* of *Good* in the Actions,
 Men shall never be fond of such Actions in
 Solitude, nor ever love any one for Perfec-
 tion in them, or for practising them in Soli-
 tude; and much less shall they be dissatis-
 fy'd with themselves, when they act other-
 wise in Solitude. Now this is the Case with
 us, as to *Virtue*; and therefore we must
 have, by NATURE, a *moral Sense* of it
 antecedent to *Honour*.

THIS will shew us with what Judgment
 a late * Author compares the Original of
 our Ideas of *Virtue*, and Approbation of it,
 to the manner of regulating the Behaviour
 of awkward Children by Commendation. It

* See the Fable of the Bees, Page 38. 3d Ed.

Seet. 5. shall appear hereafter*, that our Approbation of some *Gestures*, and what we call *Decency* in Motion, depends upon some *moral Ideas* in People of advanc'd Years. But before Children come to observe this Relation, it is only *good Nature*, an *Inclination* to please, and *Love of Praise*, which makes them endeavour to behave as they are desir'd; and not any Perception of *Excellence* in this Behaviour. Hence they are not solicitous about *Gestures* when alone, unless with a View to please when they return to Company; nor do they ever love or approve others for any Perfection of this kind, but rather envy or hate them; till they either discern the Connexion between *Gestures* and *moral Qualities*; or reflect on the *good Nature*, which is evidenc'd by such a Compliance with the Desire of the Company.

*False
Honour.*

VII. T H E considering *Honour* in the manner above explain'd may shew us the Reason, why Men are often *asham'd* for things which are not *vitious*, and *honour'd* for what is not *virtuous*. For, if any Action only appears *vitious* to any Persons or Company, altho' it be not so, they will have a bad Idea of the *Agent*; and then he may be *asham'd*, or suffer Uneasiness, in being thought *morally evil*. The same way, those who look upon

* See Seet. vi. Art. 4.

an Action as *morally good*, will honour the Sect. 5.
Agent; and he may be pleas'd with the *Honour*, altho' he does not himself perceive any
moral Good in what has procur'd it.

AGAIN, we shall be *asham'd* of every *Moral In-*
 Evidence of *moral Incapacity*, or Want of *capacity,*
Ability; and with good Ground, when this *matter of*
 Want is occasion'd by our own Negligence. *Shame.*
 Nay farther, if any Circumstance be look'd
 upon as *indecent* in any Country, *offensive* to
 others, or *deform'd*; we shall, out of our
 Desire of the good Opinions of others, be
asham'd to be found in such Circumstances,
 even when we are sensible that this Inde-
 cency or Offence is not founded on *Nature*,
 but is merely the Effect of *Custom*. Thus
 being observ'd in those Functions of Nature
 which are counted *indecent* and *offensive*, will
 make us *uneasy*, altho' we are sensible that
 they really do not argue any *Vice* or *Weakness*.
 But on the contrary, since *moral Ability*s of
 any kind, upon the general Presumption of
 a good Application, and of having been
 acquired by Virtue, procure the Esteem of
 others, we shall value ourselves upon them,
 or grow proud of them, and be *asham'd* of
 any Discovery of our Want of such *Ability*s.
 This is the Reason that *Wealth* and *Power*,
 the great *Engines* of *Virtue*, when presum'd
 to be intended for *benevolent* Purposes, either
 toward our Friends or our Country, procure
Honour from others, and are apt to beget
Pride

~ Sect. 5. *Pride* in the *Possessor*; which, as it is a general Passion, which may be either *good* or *evil*, according as it is grounded, we may describe to be *the Joy which arises from the real or imagin'd Possession of Honour, or Claim to it*. The same are the Effects of *Knowledge, Sagacity, Strength*; and hence it is that Men are apt to boast of them.

BUT, whenever it appears that Men have only their *private Advantage* in View, in the Application of these *Abilities*, or *natural Advantages*, the *Honour* ceases, and we study to conceal them, or at least are not fond of displaying them; and much more, when there is any Suspicion of an *ill-natur'd* Application. Thus some *Misers* are ashamed of their *Wealth*, and study to conceal it; as the *Malicious* or *Selfish* do their *Power*: Nay, this is very often done, where there is no positive evil Intention; because the diminishing their *Abilities*, increases the *moral Good* of any little kind Action, which they can find in their Hearts to perform.

*Selfishness
shameful.*

IN short, we always see Actions which flow from *publick Love*, accompany'd with generous Boldness and Openness; and not only *malicious*, but even *selfish ones*, the matter of Shame and Confusion; and that Men study to conceal them. The Love of *private Pleasure* is the ordinary Occasion of *Vice*; and when Men have got any lively Notions of
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Virtue, they generally begin to be ashamed of Sect. 5.
 every thing which betrays *Selfishness*, even in
 Instances where it is innocent. We are apt
 to imagine, that others observing us in such
 Pursuits, form mean Opinions of us, as too
 much set on private Pleasure; and hence we
 shall find such Enjoyments, in most polite
 Nations, conceal'd from those who do not
 partake with us. Such are *venereal Pleasures*
 between *Persons marry'd*, and even *eating*
 and *drinking* alone, any nicer sorts of Meats
 or Drinks: whereas a *hospitable Table* is rather
 matter of boasting; and so are all other kind
 generous Offices between *marry'd Persons*,
 where there is no Suspicion of *Self-Love* in
 the *Agent*; but he is imagin'd as acting from
 Love to his *Associate*. This, I fancy, first
 introduc'd Ideas of *Modesty* in polite Nations,
 and *Custom* has strengthen'd them wonder-
 fully; so that we are now ashamed of many
 things, upon some confus'd implicit Opini-
 ons of *moral Evil*, tho' we know not upon
 what account.

HERE too we may see the Reason, why
 we are not ashamed of any of the Methods
 of *Grandeur*, or *High-Living*. There is such
 a Mixture of *moral Ideas*, of *Benevolence*, of
Abilitys kindly employ'd; so many Depen-
 dants supported, so many Friends entertain'd,
 assisted, protected; such a *Capacity* imagin'd
 for great and amiable Actions, that we are
 never ashamed, but rather boast of such
 things.

Sect. 5. things. We never affect Obscurity or Concealment, but rather desire that our *State* and *Magnificence* should be known. Were it not for this Conjunction of *moral Ideas*, no Mortal could bear the Drudgery of *State*, or abstain from laughing at those who did. Could any Man be pleas'd with a Company of *Statues* surrounding his Table, so artfully contriv'd as to consume his various Courses, and inspir'd by some Servant, like so many Puppets, to give the usual trifling Returns in Praise of their Fare? Or with so many *Machines* to perform the Cringes and Whispers of a Levee?

THE *Shame* we suffer from the Meanness of *Dress*, *Table*, *Equipage*, is intirely owing to the same Reason. This Meanness is often imagin'd to argue *Avarice*, *Meanness* of *Spirit*, Want of *Capacity*, or *Conduct* in Life, of *Industry*, or *moral Abilities* of one kind or other. To confirm this, let us observe that Men will glory in the Meanness of their Fare, when it was occasion'd by a good Action. How many would be asham'd to be surpriz'd at a Dinner of *cold Meat*, who will boast of their having fed upon *Dogs* and *Horses* at the Siege of *Derry*? And they will all tell you, that they were not, nor are asham'd of it.

THIS ordinary Connexion in our Imagination, between *external Grandeur*, *Regularity*

rity in *Dress, Equipage, Retinue, Badges* of Sect. 5.
Honour, and some *moral Ability*s greater than
 ordinary, is perhaps of more Consequence in
 the World than some *recluse Philosophers* ap-
 prehend, who pique themselves upon despi-
 sing these external Shews. This may pos-
 sibly be a great, if not the only Cause of
 what some count *miraculous*, viz. That
civil Governors of no greater Capacity than
 their Neighbours, by some inexpressible *Awe*
 and *Authority*, quell the Spirits of the *Vulgar*,
 and keep them in Subjection by such small
 Guards, as might easily be conquer'd by those
 Associations which might be rais'd among
 the *Disaffected*, or *Factionous* of any *State*;
 who are daring enough among their *Equals*,
 and shew a sufficient Contempt of Death
 for undertaking such an Enterprize.

HENCE also we may discover the Reason,
 why the gratifying our *superior Senses* of
Beauty and *Harmony*, or the Enjoyment of
 the Pleasure of *Knowledge*, never occasions
 any Shame or Confusion, tho' our Enjoyment
 were known to all the *World*. The Objects
 which furnish this Pleasure, are of such a
 Nature, as to afford the same Delights to
 Multitudes; nor is there any thing in the
 Enjoyment of them by one, which excludes
 any Mortal from a like Enjoyment. So that,
 altho' we pursue these Enjoyments from *Self-*
Love, yet, since our Enjoyment cannot be
 prejudicial to others, no Man is imagin'd
 any

Sect. 5. any way *inhumanly selfish*, from the fullest Enjoyment of them which is possible. The same *Regularity* or *Harmony* which delights me, may at the same time delight Multitudes; the same *Theorem* shall be equally fruitful of Pleasure, when it has entertain'd Thousands. Men therefore are not ashamed of such Pursuits, since they never, of themselves, seduce us into any thing *malicious, envious, or ill-natur'd*; nor does any one apprehend another *too selfish*, from his pursuing Objects of unexhausted universal Pleasure*.

THIS View of *Honour* and *Shame* may also let us see the Reason, why most Men are uneasy at being prais'd, when they themselves are present. Every one is delighted with the Esteem of others, and must enjoy great Pleasure when he hears himself commended; but we are unwilling others should observe our Enjoyment of this Pleasure, which is really *selfish*; or that they should imagine us fond of it, or influenc'd by Hopes of it in our good Actions: and therefore we choose Secrecy for the Enjoyment of it, as we do with respect to other Pleasures, in which others do not share with us.

* See another Reason of this, perhaps more probably true, in the *Essay on the Passions*, p. 6.

VIII. LET us next consider another Determination of our *Mind*, which strongly improves *Benevolence* to be *natural* to us, and that is *COMPASSION*; by which we are dispos'd to study the *Interest* of others, without any Views of *private Advantage*. This needs little Illustration. Every Mortal is made uneasy by any grievous Misery he sees another involv'd in, unless the Person be imagin'd *evil* in a *moral Sense*: Nay, it is almost impossible for us to be unmov'd, even in that Case. *Advantage* may make us do a cruel Action, or may overcome *Pity*; but it scarce ever extinguishes it. A sudden Passion of *Hatred* or *Anger* may represent a Person as *absolutely evil*, and so extinguish *Pity*; but when the Passion is over, it often returns. Another *disinterested* View may even in cold Blood overcome *Pity*; such as *Love* to our Country, or *Zeal* for Religion. *Persecution* is generally occasion'd by *Love* of *Virtue*, and a *Desire* of the *eternal Happiness* of Mankind, altho' our *Folly* makes us choose absurd Means to promote it; and is often accompany'd with *Pity* enough to make the *Persecutor* uneasy, in what, for prepollent Reasons, he chooses; unless his Opinion leads him to look upon the *Heretick* as *absolutely and intirely evil*.

WE may here observe, how wonderfully the Constitution of *human Nature* is adapted to

Sect. 5. to move *Compassion*. Our *Misery* or *Distress* immediately appears in our *Countenance*, if we do not study to prevent it, and propagates some Pain to all Spectators; who, from Observation, universally understand the Meaning of those *dismal Airs*. We *mechanically* send forth *Shrieks* and *Groans* upon any surprizing Apprehension of *Evil*; so that no Regard to Decency can sometimes restrain them. This is the Voice of *NATURE*, understood by all Nations, by which all who are present are rous'd to our Assistance, and sometimes our *injurious* Enemy is made to relent.

WE observ'd above*, that we are not immediately excited by *Compassion* to desire the *Removal* of our own Pain: we think it just to be so affected upon the Occasion, and dislike those who are not so. But we are excited directly to desire the *Relief* of the Miserable; without any Imagination, that this Relief is a *private Good* to ourselves: And if we see this impossible, we may by *Reflection* discern it to be vain for us to indulge our *Compassion* any farther; and then *Self-Love* prompts us to retire from the Object which occasions our Pain, and to endeavour to divert our Thoughts. But where there is no such *Reflection*, People are hurry'd by a natu-

* See Sect. ii. Art. 8. Par. 2.

ral kind *Instinct*, to see Objects of *Compassion*, Sect. 5.
and expose themselves to this Pain, when they
can give no Reason for it; as in the Instance
of publick Executions.

THIS same Principle leads Men to *Tragedies*; only we are to observe, that another strong Reason of this is the *moral Beauty* of the *Characters* and *Actions*, which we love to behold. For I doubt, whether any Audience would be pleas'd to see fictitious Scenes of Misery, if they were kept Strangers to the *moral Quality*s of the Sufferers, or their *Characters* and *Actions*. As in such a Case, there would be no *Beauty* to raise Desire of seeing such Representations, I fancy we would not expose ourselves to Pain alone, from Misery which we knew to be fictitious.

IT was the same Cause which croud'd the *Roman Theatres* to see *Gladiators*. There the People had frequent Instances of great *Courage*, and *Contempt* of Death, two great *moral Ability*s, if not *Virtues*. Hence CICE-RO looks upon them as great Instructions in *Fortitude*. The *Antagonist Gladiator* bore all the Blame of the Cruelty committed, among People of little Reflection; and the *courageous* and artful one, really obtain'd a Reputation of *Virtue*, and Favour among the Spectators, and was vindicated by the Necessity of *Self-defence*. In the mean time they were inadvertent to this, that their crouding

Sect. 5. to such Sights, and favouring the Persons who presented them with such Spectacles of Courage, and with Opportunitys of following their *natural Instinct* to *Compassion*, was the true Occasion of all the real Distress, or Assaults which they were sorry for.

WHAT Sentiments can we imagine a *Candidate* would have rais'd of himself, had he presented his Countrymen only with Scenes of *Misery*; had he drain'd *Hospitals* and *Infirmaries* of all their pityable Inhabitants, or had he bound so many *Slaves*, and without any Resistance, butcher'd them with his own Hands? I should very much question the Success of his Election, (however *Compassion* might cause his Shews still to be frequented) if his *Antagonist* chose a *Diversion* apparently more *virtuous*, or with a *Mixture* of Scenes of *Virtue*.

Compassion
natural.


How independent this Disposition to *Compassion* is on *Custom*, *Education*, or *Instruction*, will appear from the Prevalence of it in *Women* and *Children*, who are less influenc'd by these. That *Children* delight in some Actions which are *cruel* and *tormenting* to Animals which they have in their Power, flows not from *Malice*, or want of *Compassion*, but from their *Ignorance* of those Signs of Pain which many Creatures make; together with a *Curiosity* to see the various Contortions of their Bodys. For when they are more acquainted

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Moral Good *and* Evil.

243

acquainted with these Creatures, or come by Sect. 5.
any means to know their Sufferings, their
Compassion often becomes too strong for their
Reason; as it generally does in beholding *Ex-*
ecutions, where as soon as they observe the
Evidences of Distress, or Pain in the *Male-*
factor, they are apt to condemn this necessa-
ry Method of Self-defence in the *State*.



S E C T. VI.

Concerning the Importance of this moral Sense to the present Happiness of Mankind, and its Influence on human Affairs.

*Importance
of the Mo-
ral Sense.*

IT may now probably appear, that notwithstanding the Corruption of Manners so justly complain'd of every-where, this *moral Sense* has a greater Influence on *Mankind* than is generally imagin'd, altho' it is often directed by very partial imperfect Views of *publick Good*, and often overcome by *Self-Love*. But we shall offer some farther Considerations to prove, "That it gives us
" more *Pleasure* and *Pain*, than all our other
" *Facultys*." And to prevent Repetitions, let us observe, "That where-ever any *morally*
" *good Quality* gives *Pleasure* from *Reflection*,
" or from *Honour*, the contrary *evil one* will
" give proportionable *Pain*, from *Remorse*
" and *Shame*." Now we shall consider the *moral Pleasures*, not only *separately*, but as they are the *most delightful Ingredient* in the ordinary *Pleasures of Life*.

ALL MEN seem persuaded of some *Excellency* in the Possession of *good moral Qualities*, which is superior to all other Enjoy-
men;

ments; and on the contrary, look upon a Sect. 6.
 State of *moral Evil*, as worse and more
 wretched than any other whatsoever. We
 must not form our Judgment in this matter
 from the Actions of Men; for, however they
 may be influenc'd by *moral Sentiments*, yet it
 is certain, that *self-interested Passions* fre-
 quently overcome them, and *partial Views*
 of the Tendency of Actions, make us do
 what is really *morally evil*, apprehending it
 to be *good*. But let us examine the Senti-
 ments which Men universally form of the
 State of others, when they are no way im-
 mediately concern'd; for in these Sentiments
human Nature is calm and *undisturb'd*, and
 shews its *true Face*.

Now should we imagine a *rational Crea-
 ture* in a sufficiently happy State, whose
 Mind was, without *Interruption*, wholly oc-
 cupy'd with pleasant Sensations of *Smell*,
Taste, *Touch*, &c. if at the same time all
 other Ideas were excluded? Should we not
 think the State *low*, *mean*, and *sordid*, if there
 were no *Society*, no *Love* or *Friendship*, no
good Offices? What then must that State be,
 wherein there are no Pleasures but those of
 the *external Senses*, with such long Intervals
 as *human Nature* at present must have? Do
 these short Fits of Pleasure make the *Luxu-
 rious* happy? How *insipid* and *joyless* are the
 Reflections on past Pleasure! And how poor
 a Recompence is the Return of the transient

Sect. 6. Sensation, for the *nauseous Satiety*, and *Langours* in the Intervals! This *Frame* of our *Nature*, so incapable of long Enjoyments of the *external Senses*, points out to us, "That
 " there must be some other more *durable*
 " *Pleasure*, without such *tedious Interrup-*
 " *tions*, and *nauseous Reflections*."

LET us even join with the Pleasures of the *external Senses*, the Perceptions of *Beauty*, *Order*, *Harmony*. These are, no doubt, more *noble Pleasures*, and seem to enlarge the *Mind*; and yet how *cold* and *joyless* are they, if there be no *moral Pleasures* of *Friendship*, *Love* and *Beneficence*! Now, if the bare Absence of *moral Good* makes, in our Judgment, the State of a rational Agent contemptible; the Presence of *contrary Dispositions* is always imagin'd by us to sink him into a degree of *Misery*, from which no other Pleasures can relieve him. Would we ever wish to be in the same Condition with a *wrathful*, *malicious*, *vengeful*, or *envious Being*, tho' we were at the same time to enjoy all the Pleasures of the *external* and *internal Senses*? The internal Pleasures of *Beauty* and *Harmony* contribute greatly indeed toward soothing the Mind into a Forgetfulness of *Wrath*, *Malice* or *Revenge*; and they must do so, before we can have any tolerable Delight or Enjoyment: for while *these Affections* possess the Mind, there is nothing but *Torment* and *Misery*.

WHAT

WHAT *Castle-builder*, who forms to himself imaginary Scenes of Life, in which he thinks he should be happy, ever made *Castle-builders* *ac-* *prove it.* *knowledg'd Treachery, Cruelty, or Ingratitude,* the Steps by which he mounted to his wish'd-for Elevation, or Parts of his Character, when he had attain'd it? We always conduct ourselves in such Resveries, according to the Dictates of *Honour, Faith, Generosity, Courage*; and the lowest we can sink, is hoping we may be enrich'd by some innocent Accident.

*O si urnam Argenti Fors qua mihi
monstret * ! —*

But *Labour, Hunger, Thirst, Poverty, Pain, Danger*, have nothing so detestable in them, that our *Self-Love* cannot allow us to be often expos'd to them. On the contrary, the Virtues which these give us Occasions of displaying, are so amiable and excellent, that scarce ever is any imaginary Hero, in *Romance* or *Epic*, brought to his highest Pitch of Happiness, without going thro' them *all*. Where there is no *Virtue*, there is nothing worth Desire or Contemplation; the *Romance* or *Epos* must end. Nay, the *Difficulty* †, or *natural Evil*, does so much increase the *Vir-*

* Hor. Lib. 2. Sat. 6. ver. 10.

† Sect. iii. Art. 11. Axiom 6.

SECT. 6. *tue* of the good Action which it accompanys, that we cannot easily sustain these Works after the Distress is over; and if we continue the Work, it must be by presenting a new Scene of *Benevolence*, in a prosperous Fortune. A Scene of *external Prosperity* or *natural Good*, without any thing *moral* or *virtuous*, cannot entertain a Person of the dullest Imagination, had he ever so much interested himself in the Fortunes of his Hero; for where *Virtue* ceases, there remains nothing worth wishing to our Favourite, or which we can be delighted to view his Possession of, when we are most studious of his Happiness.

*Virtue
own'd su-
perior to
all Plea-
sure.*

LET us take a particular Instance, to try how much we prefer the Possession of *Virtue* to all other Enjoyments, and how we look upon *Vice* as worse than any other Misery. Who could ever read the History of REGULUS, as related by CICERO, and some others, without concerning himself in the Fortunes of that gallant Man, sorrowing at his Sufferings, and wishing him a better Fate? But how better a Fate? Should he have comply'd with the Terms of the CARTHAGINIANS, and preserv'd himself from the intended Tortures, tho' to the Detriment of his Country? Or should he have violated his plighted Faith, and Promise of returning? Will any Man say, that either of these is the better Fate he wishes his Favourite? Had he acted thus, *that* *Virtue* would

would have been gone, which interests every Sect. 6.
 one in his Fortunes. — “ Let him take his
 “ Fate like other common Mortals.” —

What else do we wish then, but that the
 CARTHAGINIANS had relented of their
 Cruelty, or that PROVIDENCE, by some
 unexpected Event, had rescued him out of
 their Hands?

N o w may not this teach us, that we are
 indeed determin'd to judge *Virtue* with Peace
 and Safety, preferable to *Virtue* with Distress;
 but that at the same time we look upon the
 State of the *Virtuous*, the *Publick-spirited*,
 even in the utmost natural Distress, as pre-
 ferable to all Affluence of other Enjoyments?
 For this is what we choose to have our Fa-
 vourite Hero in, notwithstanding all its Pains,
 and natural Evils. We should never have
 imagin'd him happier, had he acted other-
 wise; or thought him in a more eligible
 State, with Liberty and Safety, at the Ex-
 pence of his *Virtue*. We secretly judge the
 Purchase too dear; and therefore we never
 imagine he acted foolishly in securing his
Virtue, his *Honour*, at the Expence of his
Ease, his *Pleasure*, his *Life*. Nor can we
 think these *latter* Enjoyments worth the
 keeping, when the former are intirely lost.

II. L E T us in the same manner examine ^{Necessary}
 our Sentiments of the Happiness of others ^{in other}
 in common Life. W E A L T H and E X T E R -
 N A L ^{Pleasures.}

Sect. 6. **NATURAL PLEASURES** bear no small bulk in our Imaginations; but does there not always accompany this Opinion of Happiness in *Wealth*, some suppos'd *beneficent Intention* of doing good Offices to Persons dear to us, at least to our *Familys* or *Kinsmen*? And in our imagin'd Happiness from *external Pleasure*, are not some Ideas always included of some *moral Enjoyments* of *Society*, some *Communication* of Pleasure, something of *Love*, of *Friendship*, of *Esteem*, of *Gratitude*? Who ever pretended to a *Taste* of these Pleasures without *Society*? Or if any seem violent in Pursuit of them, how *base* and *contemptible* do they appear to all Persons, even to those who could have no Expectation of Advantage from their having a more generous Notion of Pleasure?

NOW, were there no *moral Sense*, no Happiness in *Benevolence*, and did we act from no other Principle than *Self-Love*; sure there is no Pleasure of the external Senses, which we could not enjoy alone, with less Trouble and Expence than in *Society*. But a *Mixture* of the *moral Pleasures* is what gives the *alluring Relish*; 'tis some Appearance of *Friendship*, of *Love*, of *communicating Pleasure* to others, which preserves the Pleasures of the *Luxurious* from being *nauseous* and *insipid*. And this partial Imagination of some good *moral Qualitys*, some *Benevolence*, in Actions which have many *cruel, inhuman*,
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* See ab

and *destructive* Consequences toward others, Sect. 6.
is what has kept *Vice* more in Countenance
than any other Consideration *.

BUT to convince us farther wherein the
Happiness of *Wealth*, and *external Pleasure*
lies; let us but suppose *Malice*, *Wrath*, *Re-*
venge; or only *Solitude*, Absence of *Friend-*
ship, of *Love*, of *Society*, of *Esteem*, join'd
with the Possession of them; and all the
Happiness vanishes like a Dream. And yet
Love, *Friendship*, *Society*, *Humanity*, tho'
accompany'd with *Poverty* and *Toil*, nay
even with smaller degrees of *Pain*, such as
do not wholly occupy the Mind, are not on-
ly the Object of Love from others, but even
of a sort of Emulation: which plainly shews,
"That *Virtue* is the chief *Happiness* in the
"Judgment of all Mankind."

III. THERE is a farther Consideration ^{The Charm in Beauty.}
which must not be pass'd over, concerning
the EXTERNAL BEAUTY of Persons,
which all allow to have a great Power over
human Minds. Now it is some apprehended
Morality, some natural or imagin'd Indica-
tion of *concomitant Virtue*, which gives it this
powerful Charm above all other kinds of
Beauty. Let us consider the Characters of
Beauty, which are commonly admir'd in
Countenances, and we shall find them to be

* See above, Sect. iv. Art. 4 Par. 4, 5.


Señ. 6. *Sweetness, Mildness, Majesty, Dignity, Vivacity, Humility, Tenderneſs, Good-nature*; that is, that certain *Airs, Proportions, je ne ſçay quoy's*, are natural Indications of ſuch Virtues, or of Abilitys or Diſpoſitions toward them. As we obſerv'd above * of *Miſery* or *Diſtreſs* appearing in Countenances; ſo it is certain, almoſt all *habitual Diſpoſitions* of *Mind* form the Countenance in ſuch a manner, as to give ſome Indications of them to the Spectator. Our *violent Paſſions* are obvious at firſt View in the Countenance; ſo that ſometimes no Art can conceal them, and ſmaller Degrees of them give ſome leſs obvious Turns to the Face, which an accurate Eye will obſerve. Now, when the *natural Air* of a Face approaches to that which any Paſſion would form it unto, we make a Conjecture from this concerning the *leading Diſpoſition* of the Perſon's *Mind*.

As to thoſe Fancys which prevail in certain Countrys toward *large Lips, little Noſes, narrow Eyes*; unleſs we knew from themſelves under what Idea ſuch Features are admir'd, whether as *naturally beautiful* in Form, or Proportion to the reſt of the Face, or as preſum'd Indications of ſome *moral Quality*s; we may more probably conclude that it is the *latter*; ſince this is ſo much the Ground of Approbation or Averſion towards

* See Señ. v. Art. 8. Par. 2.

Faces among ourselves. And as to those Sect. 62
 Features which we count *naturally disagree-*
 able as to Form, we know the Aversion on
 this Account is so weak, that *moral Qualities*
 shall procure a Liking even to the Face,
 in Persons who are sensible of the *Irregula-*
rity, or Want of that *Regularity* which is
 common in others. With us, certain Fea-
 tures are imagin'd to denote *Dullness*; as
hollow Eyes, large Lips; a *Colour* of Hair,
Wantonness; and may we not conclude the
 like *Association of Ideas*, upon some pro-
 bable Foundation in Nature, and sometimes
 without any, to be the Ground of those
 Approbations which appear unaccountable
 to us?

IN the same manner, when there is no-
 thing grossly disproportion'd in any Face, what
 is it we dispraise? Is it *Pride, Haughtiness,*
Sourness, Ill-nature, Discontent, Folly, Levity,
Wantonness; which some Countenances dis-
 cover in the Manner above hinted at? And
 these *Airs*, when brought by Custom upon
 the most *regular Set* of Features, have often
 made them very disagreeable; as the *con-*
trary Airs have given the strongest Charms
 to Countenances, which were far from Per-
 fection in *external Beauty*. Had HOMER,
 in his Character of HELEN, rais'd our Idea
 of her *external Beauty* to the greatest Height,
 yet it would have been ridiculous to have
 engag'd his Countrymen in a War for such a
 HELEN

Sect. 6. HELEN as VIRGIL has drawn her.  therefore still retains something morally amiable amidst all her Weakness, and often suggests to his Reader,


—Ἑλένης ὀρμήματα τε ζοναχάς τε *,

as the Spring of his Countrymens Indignation and Revenge.

*The Cause
of different
Fancys of
Beauty.*

THIS Consideration may shew us one Reason, among many others, for Mens *different Fancys*, or *Relishes of Beauty*. The Mind of Man, however generally dispos'd to esteem *Benevolence* and *Virtue*, yet by more particular Attention to some Kinds of it than others, may gain a stronger Admiration of some *moral Dispositions* than others. *Military Men* may admire *Courage* more than other Virtues; Persons of *smaller Courage*, may admire *Sweetness of Temper*; Men of *Thought and Reflection*, who have more extensive Views, will admire the *like Quality* in others; Men of *keen Passions* expect equal Returns of all the kind Affections, and are wonderfully charm'd by *Compliance*: The *Proud* may like those of *higher Spirit*, as more suitable to their Dignity; tho' *Pride*, join'd with *Reflection* and *good Sense*, will recommend to them *Humility* in the Person belov'd. Now as the *various Tempers* of Men

* See Homer, Iliad 1. ver. 356, 390.

make various Tempers of others agreeable to Sect. 6.
 tem, so they must differ in their *Relishes* of 
 beauty, according as it denotes the several
 qualitys most agreeable to themselves.

THIS may also shew us, how, in *virtuous*
 we, there may be the greatest Beauty, with-
 out the least Charm to engage a Rival.
 Love itself gives a Beauty to the *Lover*, in
 the Eyes of the Person *below'd*, which no other
 mortal is much affected with. And this per-
 haps is the *strongest Charm* possible, and that
 which will have the greatest Power, where
 there is not some very great Counterbalance
 from *worldly Interest, Vice, or gross Deform-*
ity.

IV. THIS same Consideration may be ex- *Air, Mo-*
 tended to the whole AIR and MOTION of *tion, Gef-*
 any Person. Every thing we count agreeable, *tures.*
 in the same way denotes *Chearfulness, Ease, a Con-*
descension, and Readiness to oblige, a *Love of*
company, with a Freedom and Boldness which
 always accompanys an *honest, undesigning*
Heart. On the contrary, what is shocking
 in *Air or Motion*, is *Roughness, Ill-nature,*
Disregard to others, or a *foolish Shame-fa-*
rdness, which evidences a Person to be un-
 experienc'd in Society, or Offices of Huma-
ny.

WITH relation to these *Airs, Motions,*
Gestures, we may observe, that considering
 the

Sect. 6. the different *Ceremonys* and *Modes* of shewing Respect, which are practis'd in different Nations, we may indeed probably conclude, that there is no *natural* Connection between any of these *Gestures* or *Motions*, and the *Affections* of *Mind* which they are by *Custom* made to express. But when *Custom* has made any of them pass for Expressions of *such Affections*, by a constant *Association* of Ideas, some shall become *agreeable* and *lovely*, and others *extremely offensive*, altho' they were both, in their own Nature, *perfectly indifferent*.

The Spring
of Love
between the
Sexes.

V. HERE we may remark the Manner in which NATURE leads *Mankind* to the Continuance of their Race, and by its strongest Power engages them to what occasions the greatest Toil and Anxiety of Life; and yet supports them under it with an inexpressible Delight. We might have been excited to the Propagation of our Species, by such an uneasy Sensation as would have effectually determin'd us to it, without any great Prospect of Happiness; as we see *Hunger* and *Thirst* determine us to preserve our Bodys, tho' few look upon eating and drinking as any considerable Happiness. The *Sexes* might have been engag'd to Concurrence, as we imagine the *Brutes* are, by *Desire* only, or by a *Love* of *sensual Pleasure*. But how dull and insipid had Life been, were there no more in MARRIAGE! Who would have had Resolution enough to bear

bear all the Cares of a *Family*, and Educa- Sect. 6.
tion of *Children*? Or who, from the general 
Motive of *Benevolence* alone, would have
chosen to subject himself to *natural Affection*
toward an *Offspring*, when he could so easily
foresee what Troubles it might occasion?

THIS Inclination therefore of the *Sexes*,
is founded on something stronger, and more
efficacious and joyful, than the Solicitations
of *Uneasiness*, or the bare *Desire* of *sensible*
Pleasure. BEAUTY gives a favourable Pre-
sumption of good *Moral Dispositions*, and *Ac-*
quaintance confirms this into a real *Love* of
Esteem, or begets it, where there is little
Beauty. This raises an Expectation of the
greatest *moral Pleasures* along with the *sensi-*
ble, and a thousand tender Sentiments of *Hu-*
manity and *Generosity*; and makes us impa-
tient for a *Society* which we imagine big with
unspeakable *moral Pleasures*: where nothing
is indifferent, and every trifling Service, be-
ing an Evidence of *this strong Love* and *Es-*
teem, is mutually receiv'd with the Rapture
and Gratitude of the greatest Benefit, and of
the most substantial Obligation; and where
Prudence and *Good-nature* influence both
Sides, this *Society* may answer all their Ex-
pectations.

NAY, let us examine those of looser Con-
duct with relation to the *fair Sex*, and we
shall find, that *Love* of *sensible Pleasure* is not
S the

Sect. 6. the chief Motive of *Debauchery*, or *false Gallantry*. Were it so, the *meanest Prostitutes* would please as much as any. But we know sufficiently, that Men are fond of *Good-nature*, *Faith*, *Pleasantry* of *Temper*, *Wit*, and many other *moral Qualitys*, even in a *Mistress*. And this may furnish us with a Reason for what appears pretty unaccountable, viz. "That *Chastity* itself has a powerful Charm in the Eyes of the *Dissolute*, even when they are attempting to destroy it."

THIS powerful Determination even to a *limited Benevolence*, and other *moral Sentiments*, is observ'd to give a strong Bias to our Minds towards a *universal Goodness*, *Tenderness*, *Humanity*, *Generosity*, and *Contempt of private Good* in our whole Conduct; besides the obvious Improvement it occasions in our *external Deportment*, and in our Relish of *Beauty*, *Order*, and *Harmony*. As soon as a Heart, before *hard* and *obdurate*, is soften'd in this Flame, we shall observe, arising along with it, a Love of *Poetry*, *Music*, the *Beauty of Nature* in rural Scenes, a *Contempt* of other selfish Pleasures of the *external Senses*, a *neat Dress*, a *humane Deportment*, a *Delight* in, and *Emulation* of, every thing which is *gallant*, *generous*, and *friendly*.

Society,
Friend-
ships, from
our Moral
Sense.

IN the same manner we are determin'd to common Friendships and Acquaintances, not by the fullen Apprehensions of our *Necessitys*,
or

* See

or Prospects of *Interest*; but by an incredible Sect. 6. Variety of little, agreeable, engaging Evidences of *Love, Good-nature*, and other *morally, amiable Qualitys* in those we converse with. Among the rest, none of the least considerable is an Inclination to *Cheerfulness*, a *Delight* to raise *Mirth* in others, which procures a secret Approbation and Gratitude toward the Person who puts us in such an agreeable, innocent, good-natur'd, and easy State of Mind, as we are conscious of, while we enjoy pleasant Conversation, enliven'd by moderate *Laughter*.

VI. UPON this *moral* Sense is founded all the Power of the ORATOR. The various Figures of Speech are the several Manners, which a lively Genius, warm'd with Passions suitable to the Occasion, naturally runs into, only a little diversify'd by *Custom*: and they only move the *Hearers*, by giving a lively Representation of the Passions of the *Speaker*; which are communicated to the *Hearers*, as we * observ'd above of one Passion, viz. *Pity*.

NOW the Passions which the *Orator* attempts to raise, are all founded on *moral Qualitys*. All the bold *Metaphors*, or *Descriptions*, all the artificial Manners of *Expostulation*, *Arguing*, and *Addressing* the *Audience*, all the

* See Sect. v. Art. 8. Par. 2.

Sect. 6. *Appeals to Mankind*, are but more lively Methods of giving the *Audience* a stronger Impression of the *moral Qualities* of the Person *accus'd* or *defended*; of the *Action advis'd*, or *dissuaded*: And all the *Antitheses*, or *Witticisms*; all the *Cadences* of sonorous Periods, whatever inferior kind of Beauty they may have separately, are of no Consequence to persuade, if we neglect moving the Passions by some Species of *Morality*. They may perhaps raise a little Admiration of the *Speaker*, among those who already favour his Party, but they oftener raise Contempt in his *Adversarys*. But when you display the *Beneficence* of any Action, the good *Effect* it shall have on the *Public* in promoting the Welfare of the *Innocent*, and relieving the *unjustly Distressed*; if you prove your Allegations, you make every Mortal approve the undertaking it. When any Person is to be recommended, display his *Humanity*, *Generosity*, *Study* of the *publick Good*, and *Capacity* to promote it, his *Contempt* of Dangers, and private Pleasures; and you are sure to procure him *Love* and *Esteem*. If at the same time you shew his *Distress*, or the *Injurys* he has suffer'd, you raise *Pity*, and every tender Affection.

ON the contrary, represent the *Barbarity*, or *Cruelty* of any Action, the *Misery* it shall procure to the *Kind*, the *Faithful*, the *Generous*, or only to the *Innocent*; and you raise an Abhorrence of it in the Breasts of the *Audience*,

dience, tho' they were not the Persons who Sect. 6.
 would have suffer'd by it. The same way, ~~~~~
 would you make a Person *infamous*, and *despis'd* and *bated*, represent him as *cruel*, *inhuman*, or *treacherous* toward the most distant rational Agents; or shew him only to be *selfish*, and given to *solitary Luxury*, without regard to any *Friend*, or the *Interest* of others; and you have gain'd your Point, as soon as you prove what you alledge. Nay, how does it stop our Admiration of any *celebrated* Action, to suggest, "That the *Author* of it was no Fool; he knew it would turn to his own *Advantage*!"

N o w, are the *Learned* and *Polite* the only Persons who are mov'd by such Speeches? Must Men know the Schemes of the *Moralists* and *Politicians*, or the *Art* of *Rhetoric*, to be capable of being persuaded? Must they be nicely conversant in all the Methods of promoting *Self-Interest*? Nay, do we not see on the contrary, the *rude undisciplin'd Multitude* most affected? Where had *Oratory* so much Power as in *popular States*, and that too before the Perfection of the Sciences? *Reflection* and *Study* may raise in Men a Suspicion of Design, and Caution of Assent, when they have some Knowledge of the various Topicks of Argument, and find them employ'd upon themselves: but *rude Nature* is still open to every *moral* Impression, and carry'd furiously along without Caution, or

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
Suspense.

Sect. 6. Suspense. It was not the *Groves* of the *Academy*, or the *polish'd Stones* of the *Portico*, or the *manag'd Horses* of *GREECE*, which listen'd to the Harp of an *AMPHION*, or an *ORPHEUS*; but the *Trees*, and *Rocks*, and *Tygers* of the *Forest*: which may shew us,
 " That there is some *Sense* of *Morality* antecedent to Instruction, or metaphysical Arguments proving the *private Interest* of the
 " Person who is persuaded, to be connected
 " with the *publick Good*."

Poetry
 pleases
 from this
 Moral
 Sense.

VII. WE shall find this *Sense* to be the Foundation also of the chief Pleasures of *POETRY*. We hinted, in the former Treatise, at the Foundation of Delight in the *Numbers, Measures, Metaphors, Similitudes* *. But as the Contemplation of *moral Objects*, either of *Vice* or *Virtue*, affects us more strongly, and moves our Passions in a quite different and a more powerful manner, than *natural Beauty*, or (what we commonly call) *Deformity*; so the most moving Beautys bear a Relation to our *moral Sense*, and affect us more vehemently, than the Representations of *natural Objects* in the liveliest Descriptions. *Dramatic* and *Epic Poetry* are intirely address'd to this *Sense*, and raise our Passions by the Fortunes of *Characters*, distinctly represented as *morally good* or *evil*; as might be

* See Treatise I. Sect. ii. Art. 13. Sect. iv. Art. 3.

seen more fully, were we to consider the Sect. 6.
 Passions separately. 

WHERE we are studying to raise any *Desire*, or *Admiration* of an Object really beautiful, we are not content with a bare *Narration*, but endeavour, if we can, to present the Object itself, or the most lively *Image* of it. And hence the *Epic Poem*, or *Tragedy*, gives a far greater Pleasure than the Writings of *Philosophers*, tho' both aim at recommending *Virtue*. The representing the Actions themselves, if the Representation be *judicious*, *natural*, and *lively*, will make us admire the *Good*, and detest the *Vicious*, the *Inhuman*, the *Treacherous* and *Cruel*, by means of our *moral Sense*, without any Reflections of the Poet to guide our Sentiments. It is for this Reason that HORACE has justly made Knowledge in *Morals* so necessary to a good Poet :


*Scribendi recte SAPERE est & principium
 & fons **.

And again :

*Qui didicit Patriæ quid debeat, & quid
 Amicis,
 Quo sit amore Parens, quo Frater amandus,
 & Hospes,*

* Hor. de Arte Poet. ver. 369.

Sect. 6.



Quod sit Conscripti, quod Judicis officium, quæ

Partes in bellum missi Ducis; ille profecto Reddere Personæ scit convenientia cuique.*

*Imagery
in Poetry
founded on
the Moral
Sense.*

UPON this same Sense is founded the Power of that great Beauty in Poetry, the PROSOPOPOEIA, by which every Affection is made a Person; every natural Event, Cause, Object, is animated by moral Epithets. For we join the Contemplation of moral Circumstances and Qualitys, along with natural Objects, to increase their Beauty or Deformity; and we affect the Hearer in a more lively manner with the Affections describ'd, by representing them as Persons. Thus a shady Wood must have its solemn venerable Genius, and proper rural Gods; every clear Fountain, its sacred chaste Nymph; and River, its bountiful God, with his Urn, and perhaps a Cornucopiæ diffusing Plenty and Fruitfulness along its Banks. The Day-light is holy, beneign, and powerful to banish the pernicious Spirits of the Night. The Morning is a kind officious Goddess, tripping over the dewy Mountains, and ushering in Light to Gods and Men. War is an impetuous, cruel, undistinguishing Monster, whom no Virtue, no Circumstance of Compassion, can move from his bloody Purposes. The Steel is unrelenting; the Arrow and Spear are impatient to

* Hor. de Arte Poet. ver. 312, &c.

destroy,

destroy, and carry *Death* on their Points. Sect. 6. Our modern Engines of War are also *frightful Personages*, counterfeiting with their rude Throats the Thunder of J O V E. The *moral Imagery* of *Death* is every-where known, viz. his *Insensibility* to *Pity*, his *Inflexibility*, and *universal impartial Empire*. FORTUNE is inimitably drawn by HORACE *, with all her *Retinue* and *Votarys*, and with her *rigid severe Minister*, *Necessity*. The Qualitys of *Mind* too become *Persons*. *Love* becomes a VENUS, or a CUPID; *Courage*, or *Conduct*, a MARS, or a PALLAS, *protecting* and *assisting* the Hero; before them march *Terror* and *Dread*, *Flight* and *Pursuit*, *Shouts* and *Amazement*. Nay, the *most sacred Poets* are often led into this *Imagery*, and represent *Justice* and *Judgment*, as *supporting* the ALMIGHTY's Throne, and *Mercy* and *Truth* going before his Face: They shew us *Peace* as *springing up* from the Earth, and *Mercy* looking down from Heaven.

EVERY one perceives a greater Beauty in this manner of Representation, this Imagery, this Conjunction of *moral Ideas*, than in the fullest Narration, or the most lively natural Description. When one reads the fourth Book of HOMER, and is prepar'd, from the Council of the *Gods*, to imagine the bloody Sequel, and amidst the most beau-

* See *Lib. i. Od. 35.*

Sect. 6. tiful Description which ever was imagin'd of
 shooting an Arrow, meets with its *moral* Epi-
 thet,

— μελαινάων ἔρμ' ὀδυνάων *,
 — The Source of blackest Woes;

he will find himself more mov'd by this Cir-
 cumstance, than by all the Profusion of na-
 tural Description which Man could imagine.


History.

VIII. HISTORY derives its chief Excel-
 lence from the representing the *Manners* and
Characters; the Contemplation of which in
Nature being very affecting, they must ne-
 cessarily give Pleasure, when well related.

Painting.

IX. IT is well known too, that a Colle-
 ction of the best Pieces of *Face-painting* is
 but a poor Entertainment, when compar'd
 with those Pieces which represent *moral*
Actions, *Passions*, and *Characters*.

* See Homer, *Iliad* iv. ver. 117.



S E C T. VII.

A Deduction of some Complex moral Ideas ; viz. of Obligation, and Right, Perfect, Imperfect, and External, Alienable, and Unalienable, from this moral Sense.

I. **T**O conclude this Subject, we may, from what has been said, see the *true Original of moral Ideas, viz. This moral Sense of Excellence in every Appearance, or Evidence of Benevolence.* It remains to be explain'd, how we acquire more particular Ideas of *Virtue* and *Vice*, abstracting from any *Law, Human, or Divine.*

IF any one ask, Can we have any Sense of *Obligation*: *OBLIGATION*, abstracting from the *Laws* of a *Superior*? We must answer according to the various Senses of the Word *Obligation*. If by *Obligation* we understand a *Determination, without regard to our own Interest, to approve Actions, and to perform them; which Determination shall also make us displeas'd with ourselves, and uneasy upon having acted contrary to it:* in this Meaning of the word *Obligation*, there is *naturally* an *Obligation* upon all Men to *Benevolence*; and they are still under

Sect. 7. under its Influence, even when by false, or partial Opinions of the natural Tendency of their Actions, this *moral Sense* leads them to *Evil*; unless by long inveterate Habits it be exceedingly weaken'd; for it scarce seems possible wholly to extinguish it. Or, which is to the same Purpose, this *internal Sense*, and *Instinct* of *Benevolence*, will either influence our Actions, or make us very uneasy and dissatisfy'd; and we shall be conscious, that we are in a base unhappy State, even without considering any *Law* whatsoever, or any external Advantages lost, or Disadvantages impending from its Sanctions. And farther, there are still such Indications given us of what is in the whole *beneficent*, and what not, as may probably discover to us the true Tendency of every Action; and let us see, some time or other, the evil Tendency of what upon a partial View appear'd good: or if we have no Friends so faithful as to admonish us, the Persons injur'd will not fail to upbraid us. So that no Mortal can secure to himself a perpetual Serenity, Satisfaction, and Self-approbation, but by a *serious Inquiry* into the Tendency of his Actions, and a *perpetual Study* of *universal Good*, according to the justest Notions of it.

BUT if, by *Obligation*, we understand a *Motive from Self-Interest*, sufficient to determine all those who duly consider it, and pursue their own Advantage wisely, to a certain Course

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* See

Course of Actions; we may have a Sense of Sect. 7. such an *Obligation*, by reflecting on this *Determination* of our *Nature* to approve *Virtue*, to be pleas'd and happy when we reflect upon our having done *virtuous Actions*, and to be uneasy when we are conscious of having acted otherwise; and also by considering how much superior we esteem the Happiness of *Virtue* to any other Enjoyment*. We may likewise have a Sense of this sort of *Obligation*, by considering those Reasons which prove a constant Course of *benevolent* and *social Actions*, to be the most probable Means of promoting the *natural Good* of every *Individual*; as CUMBERLAND and PUFENDORF have prov'd: And all this without Relation to a *Law*.

BUT farther, if our *moral Sense* be suppos'd exceedingly weakened, and the *selfish Passions* grown strong, either thro' some general Corruption of Nature, or inveterate Habits; if our *Understanding* be weak, and we be often in danger of being hurry'd by our *Passions* into precipitate and rash Judgments, that *malicious Actions* shall promote our Advantage more than *Beneficence*; in such a Case, if it be inquir'd what is necessary to engage Men to *beneficent Actions*, or induce a steady Sense of an *Obligation* to act for the *public Good*; then, no doubt, "A *Law* with Sanctions,

* See above, Sect. vi. Art. 1, 2.

" given

Sect. 7. " given by a *superior Being*, of sufficient
 " Power to make us happy or miserable,
 " must be necessary to counterbalance those
 " apparent Motives of *Interest*, to calm our
 " *Passions*, and give room for the Recovery
 " of our *moral Sense*, or at least for a just
 " View of our *Interest*."

How far
 Virtue can
 be taught.

II. Now the principal Business of the *moral Philosopher* is to shew, from solid Reasons,
 " That *universal Benevolence* tends to the
 " Happiness of the *Benevolent*, either from
 " the Pleasures of *Reflection*, *Honour*, *natural*
 " *Tendency* to engage the good Offices of
 " Men, upon whose Aid we must depend for
 " our Happiness in this World; or from the
 " Sanctions of *divine Laws* discover'd to us
 " by the Constitution of the *Universe*;" that
 so no apparent Views of *Interest* may counter-
 act this *natural Inclination*: but not to at-
 tempt proving, " That Prospects of our own
 " *Advantage* of any kind can raise in us the
 " *virtuous Benevolence* toward others." Let
 the Obstacles from *Self-Love* be only remov'd,
 and NATURE itself will incline us to *Bene-*
volence. Let the Misery of *excessive Self-*
ishness, and all its *Passions*, be but once
 explain'd, that so *Self-Love* may cease to
 counteract our *natural Propensity* to *Bene-*
volence; and when this *noble Disposition* gets
 loose from these Bonds of *Ignorance*, and false
 Views of *Interest*, it shall be assisted even by
Self-Love, and grow strong enough to make

a noble virtuous Character. Then he is to Sect. 7. inquire, by *Reflection* upon human Affairs, what Course of Action does most effectually promote the *universal Good*, what universal Rules or Maxims are to be observ'd, and in what Circumstances the Reason of them alters, so as to admit Exceptions; that so our good *Inclinations* may be directed by *Reason*, and a just Knowledge of the *Interests* of Mankind. But *Virtue* itself, or good *Dispositions* of *Mind*, are not directly taught, or produc'd by *Instruction*; they must be originally implanted in our Nature by its great AUTHOR, and afterwards strengthen'd and confirm'd by our own Cultivation.

III. WE are often told, "That there is *Objection*.
 "no Need of supposing such a *Sense* of *Morality* given to Men, since *Reflection* and
 "Instruction would recommend the same
 "Actions from Arguments of *Self-Interest*,
 "and engage us, from the acknowledg'd
 "Principle of *Self-Love*, to the Practice of
 "them, without this *unintelligible Determination* to *Benevolence*, or the *occult Quality* of a *moral Sense*."

IT is perhaps true, that *Reflection*, and *Moral Reason* might lead us to approve the same *Sense, not from Reflection*. Actions as *advantageous*. But would not the same *Reflection* and *Reason* likewise generally recommend the same *Meats* to us, which
 our

Sect. 7. our *Taste* represents as pleasant? And shall we thence conclude, that we have no *Sense* of *Tasting*, or that such a *Sense* is *useless*? No: The *Use* is plain in both Cases. Notwithstanding the mighty *Reason* we boast of above other Animals, its Processes are too slow, too full of Doubt and Hesitation, to serve us in every Exigency, either for our own Preservation, without the *external Senses*, or to influence our Actions for the *Good* of the *Whole*, without this *moral Sense*. Nor could we be so strongly determin'd at all times to what is most conducive to either of these Ends, without these *expeditious Monitors*, and *importunate Solicitors*; nor so nobly rewarded, when we act vigorously in Pursuit of these Ends, by the calm dull Reflections of *Self-Interest*, as by those delightful Sensations.

THIS *natural Determination* to approve and admire, or hate and dislike Actions, is, no doubt, an *occult Quality*. But is it any way more mysterious, that the Idea of an Action should raise *Esteem* or *Contempt*, than that the Motion or tearing of Flesh should give *Pleasure* or *Pain*; or the Act of Volition should move *Flesh* and *Bones*? In the latter Case, we have got the Brain, and elastic Fibres, and animal Spirits, and elastic Fluids, like the *Indian's Elephant*,

Elephant, and Tortoise, to bear the Burden Sect. 7. of the Difficulty: but go one Step farther, and you find the whole as difficult as at first, and equally a Mystery with *this Determination* to love and approve, or condemn and despise *Actions* and *Agents*, without any Views of *Interest*, as they appear *benevolent*, or the contrary.

WHEN they offer it as a Presumption that there can be no such *Sense*, antecedent to all Prospect of *Interest*, "That these Actions for the most part are really *advantageous*, one way or other, to the *Actor*, the *Approver*, or *Mankind* in general, by whose Happiness our own State may be some way made better;" may we not ask, supposing the DEITY intended to impress such a *Sense* of something *amiable* in Actions, (which is no impossible Supposition) What sort of Actions would a good GOD determine to *approve*? Must we deny the Possibility of such a Determination, if it did not lead us to admire Actions of no *Advantage* to *Mankind*, or to love *Agents* for their being *eminent Triflers*? If then the Actions which a wise and good GOD must determine us to approve, if he give us any such *Sense* at all, must be Actions *useful* to the *Publick*, this *Advantage* can never be a Reason against the *Sense* itself. After the same manner, we should deny all *Revelation*, which taught us good *Sense*, *Humanity*, *Justice*, and a rational

Se^ct. 7. *tional Worship*, because *Reason* and *Interest* confirm and recommend such *Principles* and *Services*; and should greedily embrace every *Contradiction*, *Foppery*, and *Pageantry*, as a *truly divine Institution*, without any thing *humane*, or *useful* to *Mankind*.

Moral
Sense
judges of
Laws.

IV. THE Writers upon opposite Schemes, who deduce all Ideas of *Good* and *Evil* from the *private Advantage* of the *Actor*, or from Relation to a *Law*, and its *Sanctions*, either known from *Reason* or *Revelation*, are perpetually recurring to this *moral Sense* which they deny; not only in calling the *Laws* of the DEITY *just* and *good*, and alledging *Justice* and *Right* in the DEITY to govern us; but by using a Set of Words which import something different from what they will allow to be their only Meaning. *Obligation*, with them, is only such a *Constitution*, either of *Nature*, or some governing *Power*, as makes it advantageous for the *Agent* to act in a certain manner. Let this Definition be substituted, where-ever we meet with the Words, *ought*, *should*, *must*, in a moral Sense, and many of their Sentences would seem very strange; as that the DEITY *must* act rationally, *must* not, or *ought* not to punish the Innocent, *must* make the State of the *Virtuous* better than that of the *Wicked*, *must* observe Promises; substituting the Definition of the Words, *must*, *ought*, *should*, would make these

Sen-

Sentences either ridiculous, or very disputable. Sect. 7.

V. B U T that our first Ideas of *moral Good* depend not on *Laws*, may plainly appear from our constant Inquiries into the *Justice* of *Laws themselves*; and that not only of *human Laws*, but of the *divine*. What else can be the Meaning of that universal Opinion, "That the *Laws* of *GOD* are *just*, "and *holy*, and *good*?" *Human Laws* may be call'd *good*, because of their Conformity to the *Divine*. But to call the *Laws* of the *supreme DEITY* *good*, or *holy*, or *just*, if all *Goodness*, *Holiness*, and *Justice* be constituted by *Laws*, or the *Will* of a *Superior* any way reveal'd, must be an insignificant Tautology, amounting to no more than this, "That *GOD* wills what he wills."

I T must then first be suppos'd, that there is something in Actions which is apprehended *absolutely good*; and this is *Benevolence*, or Desire of the *publick natural Happiness* of *rational Agents*; and that our *moral Sense* perceives this *Excellence*: and then we call the *Laws* of the *DEITY* *good*, when we imagine that they are contriv'd to promote the *publick Good* in the most effectual and impartial manner. And the *DEITY* is call'd *good*, in a *moral Sense*, when we apprehend that his *whole Providence* tends to the universal Happiness of his *Creatures*; whence we con-

Sect. 7. clude his *Benevolence*, and *Desire* in their
 ~~~~~ Happiness.

SOME tell us, "That the *Goodness* of  
 " the *divine Laws* consists in their Confor-  
 " mity to some *essential Rectitude* of his  
 " *Nature*." But they must excuse us from  
 assenting to this, till they make us under-  
 stand the Meaning of this Metaphor, *essen-*  
*tial Rectitude*; and till we discern whether  
 any thing more is meant by it than a *per-*  
*fectly wise, uniform, impartial Benevolence*.

Difference  
 between  
 Constraint  
 and Obli-  
 gation.

HENCE we may see the Difference be-  
 tween *Constraint* and *Obligation*. There is  
 indeed no Difference between *Constraint*, and  
 the second Sense of the Word *Obligation*, viz.  
 a *Constitution* which makes an *Action* eligible  
 from *Self-Interest*, if we only mean *exter-*  
*nal Interest*, distinct from the delightful Con-  
 sciousness which arises from the *moral Sense*.  
 The Reader need scarcely be told, that by  
*Constraint*, we do not understand an *external*  
*Force* moving our Limbs without our Con-  
 sent; for in that Case we are not *Agents* at  
 all; but that *Constraint* which arises from  
 the threatening and presenting some *Evil*, in  
 order to make us act in a certain manner.  
 And yet there seems an universally acknow-  
 ledg'd Difference between even this sort of  
*Constraint* and *Obligation*. We never say,  
 we are *oblig'd* to do an *Action* which we  
 count base, but we may be *constrain'd* to it:

we

we never say, that the *divine Laws*, by their Sect. 7. Sanctions, *constrain* us, but *oblige* us; nor do we call Obedience to the DEITY *Constraint*, unless by a Metaphor, tho' many own they are influenc'd by Fear of Punishments. And yet supposing an *almighty evil Being* should require, under grievous Penalties, *Treachery*, *Cruelty*, *Ingratitude*, we would call this *Constraint*. The Difference is plainly this: When any Sanctions co-operate with our *moral Sense*, in exciting us to Actions which we count *morally good*, we say we are *oblig'd*; but when Sanctions of Rewards or Punishments oppose our *moral Sense*, then we say we are *brib'd* or *constrain'd*. In the former Case we call the *Lawgiver good*, as designing the *publick Happiness*; in the latter we call him *evil*, or *unjust*, for the suppos'd *contrary* Intention. But were all our Ideas of *moral Good* or *Evil* deriv'd solely from Opinions of *private Advantage* or *Loss* in Actions, I see no possible Difference which could be made in the Meaning of these Words.

VI. FROM this Sense too we derive our *Rights* Ideas of RIGHTS. Whenever it appears to us, that a *Faculty of doing, demanding, or possessing any thing, universally allow'd in certain Circumstances, would in the Whole tend to the general Good*, we say, that one in such Circumstances has a *Right to do, possess, or demand that Thing*. And according as

Sect. 7. this Tendency to the *publick Good* is greater  
 or less, the *Right* is greater or less.

*Perfect  
Rights.*

THE *Rights* call'd *perfect*, are of such  
*Necessity to the publick Good, that the universal  
 Violation of them would make human Life  
 intolerable; and it actually makes those mise-  
 rable, whose Rights are thus violated. On  
 the contrary, to fulfil these Rights in every  
 Instance, tends to the publick Good, either  
 directly, or by promoting the innocent Ad-  
 vantage of a Part. Hence it plainly follows,  
 " That to allow a violent Defence, or Pro-  
 " secution of such Rights, before Civil Go-  
 " vernment be constituted, cannot in any  
 " particular Case be more detrimental to the  
 " Publick, than the Violation of them with  
 " Impunity." And as to the general Conse-  
 quences, the universal Use of Force in a  
 State of Nature, in pursuance of *perfect  
 Rights*, seems exceedingly *advantageous* to the  
 Whole, by making every one dread any At-  
 tempts against the *perfect Rights* of others.*

*Right of  
War, and  
Punish-  
ment.*

THIS is the *moral Effect* which attends  
*proper Injury, or a Violation of the perfect  
 Rights of others, viz. A Right to War, and  
 all Violence which is necessary to oblige the  
 Injurious to repair the Damage, and give  
 Security against such Offences for the future.  
 This is the sole Foundation of the Rights  
 of punishing Criminals, and of violent Prose-  
 cutions of our Rights, in a State of Nature.*  
 And



And these Rights, naturally residing in the Sect. 7.  
Persons injur'd, or their *voluntary*, or *invited* ~~~~~  
Assistants, to use Force according to the Judgment of indifferent Arbitrators, being by the Consent of the *Persons injur'd*, transferr'd to the *Magistrate* in a *Civil State*, are the true Foundation of his Right of Punishment. Instances of *perfect Rights* are those to our *Lives*; to the *Fruits* of our Labours; to demand Performance of *Contracts* upon valuable Considerations, from Men capable of performing them; to *direct* our own Actions either for *publick*, or *innocent private Good*, before we have submitted them to the Direction of others in any measure: and many others of like Nature.

IMPERFECT Rights are such as, when *Imperfect*  
*universally violated, would not necessarily make* <sup>Rights.</sup>  
*Men miserable.* These Rights tend to the Improvement and Increase of *positive Good* in any Society, but are not *absolutely* necessary to prevent universal Misery. The Violation of them only disappoints Men of the Happiness expected from the Humanity or Gratitude of others; but does not deprive Men of any *Good* which they had before. From this Description it appears, "That a violent Prosecution of such Rights would generally occasion greater *Evil* than the Violation of them." Besides, the allowing of Force in such Cases would deprive Men of the greatest Pleasure in Actions of *Kindness*,  
T 4                      *Humanity,*

Sect. 7. *Humanity, Gratitude*; which would cease to appear amiable, when Men could be constrain'd to perform them. Instances of *imperfect Rights* are those which the *Poor* have to the Charity of the *Wealthy*; which *all Men* have to Offices of no Trouble or Expence to the Performer; which *Benefactors* have to Returns of Gratitude, and such-like.

THE Violation of *imperfect Rights* only argues a Man to have such weak *Benevolence*, as not to study advancing the *positive Good* of others, when in the least opposite to his own: but the Violation of *perfect Rights* argues the *injurious Person* to be *positively evil* or *cruel*; or at least so *immoderately selfish*, as to be indifferent about the *positive Misery* and *Ruin* of others, when he imagines he can find his *Interest* in it. In violating the *former*, we shew a weak Desire of *publick Happiness*, which every small View of *private Interest* overbalances; but in violating the *latter*, we shew ourselves so entirely negligent of the *Misery* of others, that Views of increasing our own *Good* overcome all our Compassion toward their Sufferings. Now as the Absence of *Good* is more easily borne than the Presence of *Misery*; so our *good Wishes* toward the *positive Good* of others, are weaker than our *Compassion* toward their *Misery*. He then who violates *imperfect Rights*, shews that his *Self-Love* overcomes only the Desire of *positive Good* to others; but

but he who violates *perfect Rights*, betrays Sect. 7.  
 such a *selfish* Desire of advancing his own  
*positive Good*, as overcomes all *Compassion* to-  
 ward the *Misery* of others.

BESIDE these two sorts of *Rights*, there <sup>External</sup>  
 is a third call'd *External*; as when *the doing, Rights.*  
*possessing, or demanding of any Thing, is really*  
*detrimental to the Publick in any particular*  
*Instance, as being contrary to the imperfect*  
*Right of another; but yet the universally deny-*  
*ing Men this Faculty of doing, possessing, or*  
*demanding that Thing, or of using Force in*  
*Pursuance of it, would do more Mischief than*  
*all the Evils to be fear'd from the Use of this*  
*Faculty.* And hence it appears, " That  
 " there can be no Right to use Force in Op-  
 " position even to *external Rights*, since it  
 " tends to the *universal Good* to allow Force  
 " in Pursuance of them."

CIVIL Societys substitute *Actions in*  
*Law*, instead of the Force allow'd in *the*  
*State of Nature.*

INSTANCES of *external Rights* are these;  
 that of a *wealthy Miser* to recal his Loan from  
 the most industrious poor Tradesman at any  
 time; that of demanding the Performance  
 of a *Covenant* too burdensome on one Side;  
 the Right of a *wealthy Heir* to refuse Pay-  
 ment of any Debts which were contracted by  
 him under Age, without Fraud in the Len-  
 der;



Sect. 7. *der*; the Right of taking Advantage of a *positive Law*, contrary to what was *Equity* antecedent to that Law; as when a *register'd Deed* takes Place of one not register'd, altho' prior to it, and known to be so before the second Contract.

What  
Rights  
can be  
opposite.

Now, whereas no *Action*, *Demand*, or *Possession*, can at once be either necessary to the *publick Good*, or conducive to it, and at the same time its *contrary* be either necessary or conducive to the same End; it follows, "That there can be no Opposition of *perfect Rights* among themselves, of *imperfect* among themselves, or between *perfect* and *imperfect Rights*." But it may often tend to the *publick Good*, to allow a *Right* of doing, possessing, or demanding, and of using *Force* in Pursuance of it, while perhaps it would have been more *humane* and *kind* in any Person to have acted otherwise, and not have claim'd his *Right*. But yet a violent Opposition to *these Rights* would have been vastly more *pernicious* than all the Inhumanity in the Use of them. And therefore, tho' *external Rights* cannot be opposite among themselves; yet they may be opposite to *imperfect Rights*; but *imperfect Rights*, tho' violated, give no *Right* to *Force*. Hence it appears, "That there can never be a *Right* to *Force* on both Sides, or a *just War* on both Sides at the same time."

VII. T H E R E is another important Difference of *Rights*, according as they are *Alienable*, or *Unalienable*. To determine what *Rights* are *alienable*, and what not, we must take these two Marks:

1<sup>st</sup>. I F the Alienation be within our natural Power, so that it be possible for us in Fact to transfer our *Right*; and if it be so, then,

2<sup>dly</sup>. I T must appear, that to transfer such *Rights* may serve some valuable Purpose.

B Y the *first* Mark it appears, " That the *Right of private Judgment*, or of our *inward Sentiments*, is *unalienable*;" since we cannot command ourselves to think what either we ourselves, or any other Person pleases. So are also our *Internal Affections*, which necessarily arise according to our Opinions of their Objects. By the *second* Mark it appears, " That our *Right of serving* G O D, in the manner which we think acceptable, is not *alienable*;" because it can never serve any valuable Purpose, to make Men worship him in a way which seems to them displeasing to him. The same way, a *direct Right* over our *Lives* or *Limbs* is not *alienable* to any Person; so that he might at Pleasure put us to Death, or maim us. We have indeed

Sect. 7. *deed a Right to hazard our Lives in any good Action which is of Importance to the Publick; and it may often serve a most valuable End, to subject the Direction of such perilous Actions to the Prudence of others in pursuing a publick Good; as Soldiers do to their General, or to a Council of War: and so far this Right is alienable. These may serve as Instances to shew the Use of the two Marks of alienable Rights, which must both concur to make them so, and will explain the manner of applying them in other Cases.*

*The Foundation of Property.*

VIII. THAT we may see the Foundation of some of the more *important Rights of Mankind*, let us observe, that probably nine Tenths, at least, of the things which are useful to Mankind, are owing to their *Labour and Industry*; and consequently, when once Men become so numerous, that the *natural Product* of the Earth is not sufficient for their Support, or Ease, or innocent Pleasure; a Necessity arises, for the Support of the increasing *System*, that such a *Tenour* of Conduct be observ'd, as shall most effectually promote *Industry*; and that Men abstain from all Actions which would have the contrary Effect. It is well known, that *general Benevolence* alone, is not a Motive strong enough to *Industry*, to bear *Labour and Toil*, and many other Difficultys which we are averse to from *Self-Love*. For the strengthening therefore our Motives to *Industry*, we have



have the strongest Attractions of *Blood*, of Sect. 6. *Friendship*, of *Gratitude*, and the additional Motives of *Honour*, and even of *external Interest*. *Self-Love* is really as necessary to the Good of the *Whole*, as *Benevolence*; as that *Attraction* which causes the Cohesion of the Parts, is as necessary to the regular State of the *Whole*, as *Gravitation*. Without these additional Motives, *Self-Love* would generally oppose the Motions of *Benevolence*, and concur with *Malice*, or influence us to the same Actions which *Malice* would. "That Tension of Action then, which would take away the stronger Ties of *Benevolence*, or the additional Motives of *Honour* and *Advantage*, from our *Minds*, and so hinder us from pursuing industriously that Course which really increases the Good of the *Whole*, is evil; and we are oblig'd to shun it."

FIRST then, the depriving any Person of the Fruits of his own innocent Labour, takes away all Motives to *Industry* from *Self-Love*, or the nearer *Ties*; and leaves us no other Motive than *general Benevolence*: nay, it exposes the *Industrious* as a constant Prey to the *Slothful*, and sets *Self-Love* against *Industry*. This is the Ground of our *Right of Dominion* and *Property* in the Fruits of our Labours; without which *Right*, we could scarce hope for any *Industry*, or any thing beyond the Product of uncultivated Nature.

*Industry*

Sect. 7. *Industry* will be confin'd to our present Necessity, and cease when they are provided for; at least it will only continue from the weak Motive of *general Benevolence*, if we are not allow'd to store up beyond present Necessity, and to dispose of what is above our Necessity, either in Barter for other kinds of Necessaries, or for the Service of our Friends or Familys. And hence appears the *Right* which Men have to lay up for the *future*, the Goods which will not bespoil'd by it; of alienating them in *Trade*; of Donation to *Friends, Children, Relations*: otherwise we deprive *Industry* of all the Motives of *Self-Love, Friendship, Gratitude*, and *natural Affection*. The same Foundation there is for the *Right* of Disposition by *Testament*. The *Presumption* of Disposition is the Ground of the *Right* of Succession to the *Intestate*.

THE *external Right* of the *Miser* to his useless Hoards is founded also on this, That allowing Persons by Violence, or without Consent of the Acquirer, to take the Use of his Acquisitions, would discourage *Industry*, and take away all the Pleasures of *Generosity, Honour, Charity*, which cease when Men can be forc'd to these Actions. Besides, there is no determining in many Cases, who is a *Miser*, and who is not.

MARRIAGE

MARRIAGE must be so constituted as to <sup>Sect. 7.</sup> ascertain the Offspring ; otherwise we take away from the *Males* one of the strongest <sup>Right of Marriage.</sup> Motives to *publick Good*, viz. *natural Affection* ; and discourage *Industry*, as has been shewn above.

THE *Labour* of each Man cannot furnish <sup>Commerce.</sup> him with all Necessaries, tho' it may furnish him with a needless Plenty of one Sort : Hence the *Right of Commerce*, and alienating our Goods ; and also the *Rights* from *Contracts* and *Promises*, either to the Goods acquir'd by others, or to their *Labours*.

THE great Advantages which accrue to <sup>Right of Civil Government.</sup> Mankind from unprejudiced *Arbitrators*, empower'd to decide the *Controversys* which ordinarily arise, thro' the Partiality of *Self-love*, among Neighbours ; as also from prudent Directors, who should not only instruct the Multitude in the best Methods of promoting the *publick Good*, and of defending themselves against mutual or foreign *Injurys* ; but also be arm'd with Force sufficient to make their Decrees or Orders effectual at home, and the Society formidable abroad : These Advantages, I say, sufficiently shew the *Right* Men have to constitute *Civil Government*, and to subject their *alienable Rights* to the Disposal of their Governors, under such *Limitations* as their Prudence suggests. And as far as the People have subjected their *Rights*, so far their Governors have an *external Right*,  
at



Sect. 7. at least, to dispose of them, as their Prudence shall direct, for attaining the Ends of their Institution; and no farther.

Corollarys  
for comparing the  
Degrees of  
Virtue and  
Vice in Ac-  
tions.

IX. THESE Instances may shew how our *moral Sense*, by a little Reflection upon the Tendencies of Actions, may adjust the *Rights* of Man *kind*. Let us now apply the general Rule laid down above\*, for comparing the Degree of *Virtue* and *Vice* in Actions, in a few Corollarys besides that one already deduc'd †.

From Ability.

1. THE Disappointment, in whole, or part, of any Attempt, *Good* or *Evil*, if it be occasion'd only by external Force, or any unforeseen Accident, does not vary the *moral Good* or *Evil*; for as in *good* Attempts, the *Moment* of *Good* is diminish'd or vanishes in such Case, so does the *Ability* likewise: The *Quantity* then may still be the same. This holds equally in *evil* Attempts. So that Actions are not to be judg'd *good* or *evil* by the Events, any farther than they might have been foreseen by the *Agent* in *evil* Attempts; were actually intended, if they were *good*, *good* Actions; for then only they argue either *Love* or *Hatred* in the *Agent*.

Interest.

2. SECULAR Rewards annex'd to *Virtue* and actually influencing the *Agent* farther than his *Benevolence* would, diminish the *moral Good* as far as they were necessary to move the *Agent* to the Action, or to maintain it.

\* See Sect. iii. Art. 11, 12.

† See Sect. iii. Art. 15. Par. 3.

him do more *Good* than otherwise he would Sect. 7.  
 have done; for by increasing the *Interest*, to  
 be subtracted, they diminish the *Benevolence*.  
 But *additional Interests*, which were not ne-  
 cessary to have mov'd the *Agent*, such as the  
*Rewards* of a good Being for Actions which he  
 would have undertaken without a Reward,  
 do not diminish the *Virtue*. In this, how-  
 ever; no Mortal is capable of judging ano-  
 ther: Nor do the Prospects of grateful Re-  
 turns for Benefits which we would have con-  
 ferr'd gratuitously, diminish the *Generosity*.  
 This Corollary may be apply'd to the *Re-*  
*wards* of a future State, if any Person con-  
 ceives them distinct from the Pleasures of  
*Virtue* itself: If they be not conceiv'd as  
 something distinct from those Pleasures, then  
 the very Desire of them is a strong Evidence  
 of a *virtuous Disposition*.

3. EXTERNAL *Advantage* exciting us to  
 Actions of *evil* Tendency to others, if with-  
 out this Prospect of *Advantage* we would not  
 have undertaken them, diminishes the *Evil*  
 of the Action; such as the Prospects of *great*  
*Rewards*, of avoiding *Tortures*, or even the  
*uneasy Solicitations* of violent *selfish Passions*.  
 This is commonly called the *Greatness of*  
*Temptation*. The Reason of this is the same  
 with that in the former Case. We may  
 here also remember again, that we are more  
 uneasy upon the Presence of *Pain*, than upon  
 the Absence of *Good*; and hence *Torture* is a  
 more extenuating Circumstance than *Bribes*,  
 U engaging

Sect. 7. engaging us to *Evil*, because the Motives of private Interest are greater.

*Detriment.* 4. THE surmounting the uneasy Solicitations of the *selfish Passions* increases the *Virtue* of a *benevolent Action*, and much more worldly Losses, Toil, &c. For now the *Interest* becomes *negative*; the Subtraction of which increases the *Quantity*.

5. A MALICIOUS Action is made the more odious by all its foreseen *Disadvantages* to the *Agent*, for the same Reason: particularly,

*Knowledge of Laws, how it affects Actions.* 6. THE Knowledge of a *Law*, prohibiting an *evil Action*, increases the *Evil* by increasing the *negative Interest* to be subtracted; for then the *ill-natur'd Inclination* must be so strong as to surmount all the selfish Motives from the Penalties, and all the Motives of *Gratitude* toward the *Law-giver*. This is commonly call'd *sinning against Conscience*.

7. OFFICES of no *Toil* or *Expence* have little *Virtue* generally, because the *Ability* is very great, and there is no *contrary Interest* surmounted.

8. BUT the refusing of them may be very *vitious*, as it argues an Absence of good *Affection*, and often produces a great enough Moment of *natural Evil*. And,

*Degree of Right.* 9. IN general, the fulfilling the *perfect Rights* of others has little *Virtue* in it: For thereby



thereby no new *Moment* of Good is produc'd; Sect. 7. and the *Interest* engaging to the Action is very great, even the avoiding all the Evils of War in a State of natural Liberty, or the Penalties of Law in Civil Society.

10. BUT the violating perfect, or even external Rights, is always exceedingly evil, either in the immediate, or more remote Consequences of the Action; and the selfish Motives, surmounted by this vitious Inclination, are the same with those in the former Case.

11. The truest Matter of Praise are those Actions or Offices, which others claim from us by an imperfect Right; and generally, the stronger their Right is, there is the less Virtue in fulfilling it, but the greater Vice in violating it.

A STRONGER and less extensive Tie of *Strength* Benevolence, in equal Abilitys, must produce of Ties. a greater Moment of Good to the Object of it, in equally good Characters, than the weaker Ties. Thus, natural Affection, Gratitude, Friendship, have greater Effects than general Benevolence: Or, we do more Good to Friends, Children, Benefactors, than to Persons under no special Relation.

12. In equal Moments of Good produc'd by two Agents, when one acts from general Benevolence

Sect. 7. *nevolence* alone, and the other from a nearer Tie; there is greater *Virtue* in the Agent, who produces *equal Good* from the more extensive, but less passionate Attachment; and less *Virtue*, where there is the more violent, or passionate Attachment, which yet produces no more. The general Benevolence appears of itself a more amiable Principle, according to the Constitution of our moral Sense \*, than any particular Passion.

13. BUT the Omission of the good Offices of the stronger Ties, or Actions contrary to them, have greater *Vice* in them, than the like Omissions, or Actions, contrary to the weaker Ties; since our *Selfishness* or *Malice* must appear the greater, by the Strength of the contrary Attachment which it surmounts. Thus, in co-operating with *Gratitude*, *natural Affection*, or *Friendship*, we evidence

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\* See Sect. 3. Art. ix. The Author all along supposes, that no Man acts without some Desire, or Instinct, or Affection, or Appetite; that of these Attachments of the Will, some are calm and unpassionate, others are passionate; some are extensive, and others confined to one, or to a few. The former Sort in each of these Divisions, manifestly appears more amiable; and consequently, ceteris paribus, the *Virtue* is less, in any given Quantity, of Good done from the violent, passionate, and narrow Attachment. A certain Remarker thence argues, "That then the *Virtue* is highest, when there is no Desire, Affection, or Attachment at all; or when we act solely from Reason, without any Affection to any Thing". One may retort this Reasoning in a like Case. In any given Momentum of Bodies, there the Velocity is greater, where there is least Matter; consequently, it is there greatest, where there is no Matter at all.

less *Virtue* in any given Moment of Good pro-Sect. 7.  
duc'd, than in equally important Actions of  
general Benevolence: But *Ingratitude* to a  
*Benefactor*, *Negligence* of the *Interests* of a  
*Friend* or *Relation*, or Returns of *evil Offices*,  
are vastly more odious, than equal *Negligence*,  
or *evil Offices* toward *Strangers*.

14. WHEN we cannot at once follow <sup>What of-</sup>  
two different Inclinations of *Benevolence*, we <sup>fices to be</sup>  
are to prefer gratifying the stronger Inclina- <sup>prefer'd,</sup>  
tion; according to the wise Order of NA- <sup>when there</sup>  
TURE, which has constituted these Attach- <sup>appears</sup>  
ments. Thus, we are rather to be *grateful* <sup>any Oppo-</sup>  
than *liberal*; rather serve a *Friend*, or *Kins-*  
*man*, than a *Stranger* of only *equal Virtue*,  
when we cannot do both.

15. OR, more generally, since there can  
be no *Right*, *Claim*, or *Obligation* to *Impossi-*  
*bilitys*; when two *Actions* to be done by any  
Agent, would both tend to the Good of Man-  
kind, but they cannot be perform'd both at  
once; that which occasions most *Good* is to  
be done, if the Omission of the other occasi-  
ons no prepollent *Evil*. If the Omission of  
either will occasion some *new natural Evil*,  
that is to be omitted, whose Omission will  
occasion the least *Evil*. Thus if two Per-  
sons of unequal Dignity be in Danger, we  
are to relieve the more *valuable*, when we  
cannot relieve both. *Ingratitude*, as it evi-  
dences a worse Temper than Neglect of Be-  
neficence;



Sect. 7. *negligence*; so it raises worse Sentiments in the Benefactor, and greater Diffidence, and Suspicion of his Fellow-Creatures, than an Omission of an Act of Beneficence: we ought therefore to be *grateful*, rather than *beneficent*, when we cannot (in any particular Case) evidence both Dispositions. If omitting of one Action will occasion *new positive Evil*, or Continuance in a State of *Pain*, whereas the Omission of another would only prevent some *new positive Good*; since a State of *Pain* is a greater Evil, than the Absence of Good, we are to follow *Compassion*, rather than *Kindness*; and relieve the *Distressed*, rather than increase the Pleasures of the *Easy*; when we cannot do both at once, and other Circumstances of the Objects are equal. In such Cases, we should not suppose *contrary Obligations*, or *Dutys*; the more important Office is our *present Duty*, and the Omission of the less important inconsistent Office at present, is no *moral Evil*.

The Original of Government.

X. FROM *Art. vii.* it follows, "That all human *Power*, or *Authority*, must consist in a *Right transferr'd to any Person or Council, to dispose of the alienable Rights of others*; and that consequently, there can be no Government so absolute, as to have even an *external Right* to do or command every thing." For where-ever any Invasion is made upon *unalienable Rights*, there must arise either a *perfect*, or *external Right* to *Resistance*.

*Resistance.* The only Restraints of a moral Sect. 7.  
 Kind upon Subjects in such Cases, are, when  
 they foresee that, thro' their want of Force,  
 they shall probably by Resistance occasion  
 greater Evils to the Publick, than those  
 they attempt to remove; or when they find  
 that *Governors*, in the main very useful to  
 the Publick, have by some unadvised Passion,  
 done an Injury too small to overbalance the  
 Advantages of their Administration, or the  
 Evils which Resistance would in all likeli-  
 hood occasion; especially when the Injury  
 is of a private Nature, and not likely to be  
 made a Precedent to the Ruin of others. *Un-  
 lienable Rights* are *essential Limitations* in  
 all Governments.

BUT by *absolute Government*, either in *Absolute*  
*Prince or Council*, or in *both jointly*, we *Govern-*  
 understand a *Right to dispose of the natural* *ment.*  
*Force, and Goods of a whole People, as far*  
*as they are naturally alienable, according to*  
*the Prudence of the Prince, Council, or of*  
*both jointly, for the publick Good of the State,*  
*or whole People; without any Reservation as*  
*to the Quantity of the Goods, Manner of Le-*  
*vying, or the Proportion of the Labours of*  
*the Subject, which they shall demand.* But  
 in all States this *tacit Trust* is presuppos'd,  
 "That the Power conferr'd shall be em-  
 "ploy'd according to the best Judgment  
 "of the Rulers for the publick Good." So  
 that, whenever the *Governors* openly profess

Secl. 7. a Design of destroying the State, or act in such a manner as will necessarily do it; the *essential Trust*, suppos'd in all Conveyance of *Civil Power*, is violated, and the *Grant* thereby made void.

Limited  
Govern-  
ment.

A PRINCE, or Council, or both jointly, may be variously limited; *either when the Consent of the one may be necessary to the Validity of the Acts of the other; or when, in the very Constitution of this supreme Power, certain Affairs are expressly exempted from the Jurisdiction of the Prince, or Council, or both jointly*: as when several independent States uniting, form a general Council, from whose Cognizance they expressly reserve certain Privileges, in the very Formation of this Council; or when, in the very Constitution of any State, a certain Method of *Election* of the Person of the Prince, or of the Members of the supreme Council, is determin'd, and the *Intention* of their Assembling declar'd. In all such Cases, it is not in the Power of such Prince, Council, or both jointly, to alter the very *Form of Government*, or to take away that Right which the People have to be govern'd in such a manner, by a Prince or Council thus elected, without the universal Consent of the very People who have subjected themselves to this Form of Government. So that there may be a very *regular State*, where there is no universal absolute Power, lodg'd either in one Person, or Council,



cil, or in any other Assembly beside that of Sect. 7  
 the whole People associated into that State. ~~~~~  
 To say, that upon a Change attempted in  
 the very *Form of the Government*, by the  
*supreme Power*, the People have no Remedy  
 according to the Constitution itself, will not  
 prove that the *supreme Power* has such a  
*Right*; unless we confound all Ideas of *Right*  
 with those of *external Force*. The only Re-  
 medy indeed in that Case, is an universal In-  
 surrection against such *perfidious Trustees*.

DESPOTICK Power, is *that which Per-* The Na-  
 sons injur'd may acquire over those Criminals, ture of Des-  
 whose Lives, consistently with the publick Safe- spotick  
 ty, they may prolong, that by their Labours Power.  
 they may repair the Damages they have done;  
 or over those who stand oblig'd to a greater  
 Value, than all their Goods and Labours can  
 possibly amount to. This Power itself is li-  
 mited to the Goods and Labours only of the  
 Criminals or Debtors; and includes no Right  
 to *Tortures*, *Prostitution*, or any Rights of  
 the Governed which are *naturally unaliena-  
 ble*; or to any thing which is not of some  
 Moment toward *Repair of Damage*, *Pay-  
 ment of Debt*, or *Security against future Of-  
 fences*. The Characteristick of *Despotick  
 Power*, is this, " That it is solely intended  
 " for the Good of the Governors, without  
 " any *tacit Trust* of consulting the Good of  
 " the Governed." Despotick Government,  
 in

Sect. 7. in this Sense, is directly inconsistent with the  
 ~~~~~ Notion of Civil Government.

FROM the Idea of *Right*, as above explain'd, we must necessarily conclude, "That
 " there can be no *Right*, or *Limitation* of
 " *Right*, inconsistent with, or opposite to the
 " greatest publick Good." And therefore
 in Cases of *extreme Necessity*, when the State
 cannot otherwise be preserv'd from Ruin, it
 must certainly be *just* and *good* in limited
 Governors, or in any other Persons who
 can do it, to use the Force of the State for
 its own Preservation, beyond the Limits fix'd
 by the *Constitution*, in *some transitory Acts*,
 which are not to be made *Precedents*. And
 on the other hand, when an *equal Necessity*
 to avoid Ruin requires it, the Subjects may
 justly resume the Powers ordinarily lodg'd in
 their Governors, or may counteract them.
 This Privilege of *flagrant Necessity* we
 all allow in Defense of the most perfect *private Rights*: And if *publick Rights* are of
 more extensive Importance, so are also *publick Necessitys*. These *Necessitys* must be
 very grievous and flagrant, otherwise they
 can never overbalance the *Evils* of violat-
 ing a tolerable Constitution, by an *arbitrary*
Act of Power, on the one hand; or by an
 Insurrection, or Civil War, on the other.
 No Person, or State can be happy, where
 they do not think their *important Rights*
 are secure from the *Cruelty, Avarice, Am-*
bition,

bition, or Caprice of their Governors. Nor Sect. 7. can any *Magistracy* be safe, or effectual for the Ends of its Institution, where there are frequent Terrors of *Insurrections*. Whatever *temporary Acts* therefore may be allow'd in extraordinary Cases; whatever may be lawful in the *transitory Act* of a bold Legislator, who without previous Consent should rescue a slavish Nation, and place their Affairs so in the Hands of a *Person* or *Council*, *elected* or *limited* by themselves, that they should soon have Confidence in their own Safety, and in the Wisdom of the Administration; yet, as to the fixed State which should ordinarily obtain in all Communities, since no *Assumer* of Government can so demonstrate his superior Wisdom or Goodness to the Satisfaction and Security of the Governed, as is necessary to their Happiness; this must follow, "That except when Men, " for their *own Interest*, or out of *publick* " *Love*, have by *Consent* subjected their " Actions, or their Goods, within certain Limits to the Disposal of others; no Mortal can have a *Right* from his *superior Wisdom*, or *Goodness*, or any other *Quality*, to " give Laws to others without their *Consent*, " *express* or *tacit*; or to dispose of the *Fruits* " of their Labours, or of any other *Right* " whatsoever." And therefore *superior Wisdom*, or *Goodness*, gives no *Right* to Men to govern others,

BUT

Sect. 7.

*Divine Gov-
ernment
founded on
Wisdom
and Good-
ness.*

BUT then with relation to the DEITY, suppos'd *omniscient* and *benevolent*, and secure from *Indigence*, the ordinary Cause of Injuries toward others; it must be *amiable* in such a *Being*, to assume the Government of *weak, inconstant Creatures*, often misled by *Selfishness*; and to give them Laws. To these Laws every Mortal should submit from *publick Love*, as being contriv'd for the *Good of the Whole*, and for the *greatest private Good* consistent with it; and every one may be sure, that he shall be better directed how to attain these Ends by the *Divine Laws*, than by his own greatest Prudence and Circumspection. Hence we imagine, "That a
" *good and wise GOD* must have a *perfect*
" *Right* to govern the *Universe*; and that all
" Mortals are oblig'd to *universal Obedience*."

*Divine
Justice
what.*

The *Justice* of the DEITY is only a Conception of his *universal impartial Benevolence*, as it shall influence him, if he gives any Laws, to attemper them to the *universal Good*, and enforce them with the most effectual Sanctions of *Rewards* and *Punishments*.

*Creation
not the
Ground of
God's Do-
minion.*

XI. SOME imagine that the *Property* the *Creator* has in all his Works, must be the *true Foundation* of his *Right* to govern. Among Men indeed, we find it necessary for the *publick Good*, that none should arbitrarily dispose

dispose of the Goods acquir'd by the Labour Sect. 7. of another, which we call his *Property*; and hence we imagine that *Creation* is the *only* Foundation of G O D's *Dominion*. But if the Reason * of establishing the *Rights* of *Property* does not hold against a *perfectly wise* and *benevolent Being*, I see no Reason why *Property* should be necessary to his *Dominion*. Now the Reason does not hold: For an *infinitely wise* and *good Being* could never employ his assumed Authority to counteract the *universal Good*. The Tie of *Gratitude* is stronger indeed than bare *Benevolence*; and therefore supposing two *equally wise* and *good Beings*, the one our *Creator*, and the other not, we should think ourselves more oblig'd to obey our *Creator*. But supposing our *Creator* *malicious*, and a *good Being* condescending to rescue us, or govern us better, with sufficient Power to accomplish his kind Intentions; his *Right* to govern would be perfectly good. But this is rather Matter of curious Speculation than Use; since both Titles of *Benevolence* and *Property* concur in the *one only true D E I T Y*, as far as we can know, join'd with *infinite Wisdom* and *Power*.

XII. I F it be here inquir'd, " Could not ^{Our Moral Sense the Effect of the Divine Goodness.} the D E I T Y have given us a *different* or *contrary Determination* of Mind, viz. to *approve* Actions upon another Foundation

* See Art. 10. Par. 6. of this Section.

" than

Sect. 7. *“than Benevolence?”* There seems nothing in this surpassing the natural Power of the DEITY. But, as in the first Treatise *, we resolv'd the Constitution of our present *Sense* of *Beauty* into the *divine Goodness*, so with much more obvious Reason may we ascribe the present Constitution of our *moral Sense* to his *Goodness*. For if the DEITY be really *benevolent*, and desires the Happiness of others, he could not *rationaly* act otherwise, or give us a *moral Sense* upon another Foundation, without counteracting his own *benevolent Intentions*. For even upon the Supposition of a *contrary Sense*, every *rational Being* must still have been solicitous in some degree about his own external Happiness: Reflection on the Circumstances of Mankind in this World would have suggested, that *universal Benevolence*, and a *social Temper*, or a *certain Course* of external Actions, would most effectually promote the *external Good* of every one, according to the Reasonings of CUMBERLAND and PUFFENDORF; while at the same time this *perverted Sense* of *Morality* would have made us uneasy in such a Course, and inclin'd us to the quite contrary, *viz. Barbarity, Cruelty, and Fraud*; and *universal War*, according to Mr. HOBBS, would really have been our *natural State*; so that in every Action we must have been distracted by two

* Sect. viii. Art 2. Prop. 5.

contrary Principles, and perpetually miser- Sect. 7.
able, and dissatisfy'd, when we follow'd the
Directions of either.

XIII. IT has often been taken for granted ^{Whence}
in *these Papers*, "That the DEITY is *mo-* ^{this uni-}
" *rally good*;" tho' the Reasoning is not at all ^{versal Opi-}
built upon this Supposition. If we inquire ^{nion of the}
into the Reason of the great Agreement of ^{Divine}
Mankind in this Opinion, we shall perhaps ^{Goodness.}
find no demonstrative Arguments *à priori*,
from the Idea of an *Independent Being*, to
prove his *Goodness*. But there is abundant
Probability, deduc'd from the whole *Frame*
of *Nature*, which seems, as far as we know,
plainly contriv'd for the *Good* of the *Whole*;
and the casual Evils seem the necessary Con-
comitants of some Mechanism design'd for
prepollent *Good*. Nay, this very *moral Sense*,
implanted in *rational Agents*, to approve and
admire whatever Actions flow from a Study
of the *Good* of *others*, is one of the strongest
Evidences of *Goodness* in the AUTHOR of
Nature.

BUT these Reflections are not so universal
as the Opinion, nor are they often inculca-
ted. What then more probably leads *Man-*
kind into that Opinion, is this: The obvious
Frame of the *World* gives us Ideas of bound-
less *Wisdom* and *Power* in its AUTHOR.
Such a *Being* we cannot conceive *indigent*, and
must conclude *happy*, and in the *best State*
possible,

possible, since he can still gratify himself. The *best State of rational Agents*, and their *greatest* and most *worthy Happiness*, we are necessarily led to imagine must consist in *universal efficacious Benevolence*: and hence we conclude the DEITY *benevolent* in the most *universal impartial manner*. Nor can we well imagine what else deserves the Name of *Perfection* more than *Benevolence*, and those *Capacitys* or *Abilitys* which are necessary to make it *effectual*; such as *Wisdom* and *Power*: at least we can have no more lovely Conception of it.

F I N I S.



Additions and Corrections, &c.

THIS Edition having been inadvertently cast off, before the Author's Corrections were obtained, a few Sheets have been cancelled where it was necessary, and some few additional Paragraphs or Notes are here subjoined, with some few Corrections of the Expressions referred to their proper Pages and Lines, where the Reader may make a Mark.

P. 45. upon the penult. Paragraph, Note. 'Tis surprising to see the ingenious Author of *Alcibiades* alledging, that all Beauty observed is solely some Use perceived or imagined; for no other reason than this, that the Apprehension of the Use intended, occurs continually, when we are judging of the Forms of Chairs, Doors, Tables, and some other Things of obvious Use; and that we like those Forms most, which are *fittest for the Use*. Whereas we see, that in these very Things *Similitude* of Parts is regarded, where unlike Parts would be equally useful: Thus the Feet of a Chair would be of the same Use, tho' unlike, were they equally long; tho' one were straight, and the other bended; or one bending outwards, and the other inwards: A Coffin-shape for a Door would bear a more manifest Aptitude to the human Shape, than that which Architects require. And then what is the Use of these Imitations of Nature, or of its Works, in Architecture? Why should a Pillar please which has none of the Human Proportions? Is the End or Use of a Pillar the same as of a Man? Why the Imitation of other natural or well-proportioned Things in the Entablature? Is there then a *Sense of Imitation*, relishing it where there is no other Use than this, that it naturally pleases? Again; no Man pleased with the Shapes of any Animals, but those which he expects Use from? The Shapes of the Horse or the Ox may promise

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Use to the Owner ; but is he the only Person who relishes the Beauty ? And is there no Beauty discerned in Plants, in Flowers, in Animals whose Use is to us unknown ? But what is still more surprising, is his representing *Aristotle* as giving the ἐπαινετόν, for the Notion of the καλόν when he has so often told us, “ that the καλόν is “ prior to it ; that we love Praise from others, “ as it gives Testimony to, and confirms our “ Opinion of, our being possessed of Virtue, or “ the καλόν ; and that the superior Excellency of “ this, which we antecedently perceive, is the “ Reason why we love Praise.” See *Ethic. ad Nicom. Lib. i. c. 5.* and often elsewhere. ’Tis true, that the καλόν is laudable, and, as *Plato* asserts, all-wise, ἡδὺ, καὶ ὠφέλιμον, at last ; and so does every one maintain who asserts a *Moral Sense*, in that very Assertion. And yet the Doctor has found out the Art of making this an Objection to a *Moral Sense*.

P. 117. l. 3. insert *what follows.*

As Mr. *Hobbes* explains all the Sensations of Pity by our Fear of the like Evils, when by Imagination we place ourselves in the Case of the Sufferers ; so others explain all Approbation and Condemnation of Actions in distant Ages or Nations, by a like Effort of Imagination : We place ourselves in the Case of others, and then discern an *imaginary private Advantage or Disadvantage* in these Actions. But as his Account of Pity will never explain how the Sensation increases, according to the apprehended *Worth* of the Sufferer, or according to the *Affection* we formerly had to him ; since the Sufferings of any Stranger may suggest the same Possibility of our suffering the like : So this Explication will never account for our high Approbation of brave unsuccessful Attempts, which we see prove detrimental both to the Agent, and to those for whose

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those Service they were intended ; here there
no private Advantage to be imagined. Nor
will it account for our Abhorrence of such In-
juries as we are incapable of suffering. Sure,
when a Man abhors the Attempt of the young
Marquin, he does not imagine that he has chang'd
his Sex like *Cæneus*. And then, when one cor-
rects his Imagination, by remembering his own
situation, and Circumstances, we find the moral
approbation and Condemnation continues as
well as it was before, tho' the Imagination of
advantage is gone.

P. 148. l. 13. *Life*. Note. Cic. de Finib.
b. ii. c. 31. *Ista commendatio puerorum, memoria
caritas amicitiae, summorum officiorum in extremo
viritu conservatio, indicat innatam esse homini pro-
bitatem gratuitam, non invitatam voluptatibus, nec
premiarum mercedibus evocatam, &c.*

P. 161. After this Page subjoin,

ANOTHER Author thinks all this easily dedu-
cible from Self-Love. "Children are not only
made of our Bodies, but resemble us in Body
and Mind ; they are rational Agents as we
are, and we only love our own Likeness in
them." Very good all this. What is *Like-
ness* ? 'Tis not *individual Sameness* ; 'tis only be-
ing included under one general or specifical
idea. Thus there is Likeness between us and
other Mens Children, thus any Man is like any
other, in some Respects ; a Man is also like an
Angel, and in some Respects like a Brute. Is
there then a natural Disposition in every Man to
love his Like, to wish well not only to his indi-
vidual Self, but to any other like rational or
sensitive Being ? and this Disposition strongest,
where there is the greatest Likeness in the more
noble Qualities ? If all this is called by the Name
Self-Love ; be it so : The highest Mystick needs
no more-disinterested Principle ; 'tis not confined

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to the Individual, but terminates ultimately on the Good of others, and may extend to all; since each one some way resembles each other. Nothing can be better than this Self-Love, nothing more generous.

If any allege, That "Parents always derive
"Pleasure, often Honour, and sometimes Wealth,
"from the Wisdom and Prosperity of their
"Children, and hence all Parental Solitude
"arises;" let us recollect what was said above,
all these Motives cease upon Approach of Death,
and yet the Affection is as strong then as ever.
Let Parents examine their own Hearts, and see if
these Views are the only Springs of their Affection,
and that toward the most infirm, from whom
there is least Hope.

P. 243. l. 19. *subjoin*, Some have alleged,
That "however the Sight of another's Misery
"some way or other gives us Pain, yet the very
"feeling of Compassion is also attended with
"Pleasure: This Pleasure is superior to the
"Pain of Sympathy, and hence we desire to
"raise Compassion in ourselves, and incline to
"indulge it." Were this truly the Case, the
Continuation of the Suffering would be the natural
Desire of the Compassionate, in order to continue
this State, not of pure Pleasure indeed, but of
Pleasure superior to all Pains.

P. 273. *subjoin at the End of the first Paragraph*,
SOME also object, That according to this Ac-
count, Brutes may be capable of Virtue; and
this is thought a great Absurdity. But 'tis ma-
nifest, that, 1. Brutes are not capable of that,
in which this Scheme places the highest Virtue,
to wit, the *calm Motions of the Will* toward the
Good of others; if our common Accounts of
Brutes are true, that they are merely led by
particular Passions toward present Objects of
Sense. Again, 'tis plain there is something in
certain

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certain Tempers of Brutes*, which engages our
liking, and some lower Good-will and Esteem,
ho' we do not usually call it Virtue, nor do we
all the sweeter Dispositions of Children Virtue;
and yet they are so very like the lower Kinds
of Virtue, that I see no harm in calling them
Virtues. What if there are low Virtues in
Creatures void of Reflection, incapable of know-
ing Laws, or of being moved by their Sanctions,
or by Example of Rewards or Punishments?
Such Creatures cannot be brought to a proper
Trial or Judgment: Laws, Rewards, or Punish-
ments won't have these Effects upon them, which
they may have upon rational Agents. Perhaps
they are no farther rewarded or punished than
by the immediate Pleasure or Pain of their
Actions, or what Men immediately inflict upon
them. Where is the Harm of all this, That
there are lower Virtues, and lower Vices, the
Rewarding or Punishing of which, in Creatures
void of Reason and Reflection, can answer no
wise End of Government?

* Cicero is not ashamed to say of some Brutes, *Videmus in-
icia pietatis, cognitionem, memoriam, desideria, — secreta à
luxu humanarum simulacra virtutum.* De Finib. lib. ii.
33.

Small Alterations designed for this Edition.

PREFACE, p. 12. l. 15. Sense. *There are
few Objects which are not thus*
p. 13. l. 11. *pleased with certain complex Forms,*
the Author
p. 14. l. 14. *our r. some*
Treatise I. p. 3. l. 4. *Corporeal Substances.*
9. *raise a clear enough Idea*
p. 5. l. 5. *from bottom of the Page. Objects*
including many
p. 6.

Additions and Corrections

- p. 6. l. 21. *there appears no Ground*
- p. 17. l. 19. *This may seem probable, and be pretty generally.*
- p. 22. l. 15. *minuter Parts, even of those which*
- p. 26. l. 19. *frequently a perfect*
- p. 40. l. 19. *dele in a moral Sense.*
- p. 47. l. 6, 7, of the Note, it is *below our Notice.* But
- p. 100. Note upon l. 16. See *Cicero de Naturae Deorum*. lib. i. c. 27.
- p. 109. l. 15. *this pleasant Self-Approbation much*
- p. 122. l. 5. from bott. who have scarce any *Dispositions of Piety, or Thoughts of future Rewards*, and abhor
- p. 130. l. 5. *Conduct, that Virtue never fails to give Pleasure.* When
- p. 136. l. 8. from bott. be any real Good-will or Kindness at all, &c.
- p. 150. l. 10, from bott. r. *Virtuous*
- p. 152. l. 4. *dele only.* Read, approve on *such Actions*
- p. 157. l. 10, from bott. no ultimate Good-will
- p. 161. l. 11. No; say others, Children, &c.
- p. 166. l. 12. they generally appear
- p. 169. l. 10, 11. *dele speculative*
- p. 172. l. 15. the *manifest* publick Evil
- p. 179. l. 26. for VII. r. VIII.
- p. 180. l. 23. *dele VIII.*
- p. 183. l. 8. *dele IX.*
- p. 184. l. 5. for X. read IX.
- p. 219. l. 16. *descend more strongly and constantly than it ascends*
- p. 22. left it more to Reflection
- p. 220. l. penult. read a *Multiplicity*
- p. 228. l. 10. No; we should distrust all Pretenders to such a Temper, and hate

